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ABSTRACT
DISENGAGING FROM TERRITORY: IDENTITY. THE POLITICS OF
CONTESTATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL STRUCTURES
BRITAIN & INDIA (1929-1935). AND INDONESIA & EAST TIMOR (1975-1999)
SEPTEMBER 2007
LENA TAN. B.A.. SMITH COLLEGE
MSc.. LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter M. Haas
This dissertation project examines the role of identity, the politics of identity
contestation and domestic political structures as part of the mechanisms and processes
that may be involved in the decisions that states make regarding disengagement from
their colonial and territorial possessions. Specifically, it focuses on the following
questions: Why do intransigent states back down on previously entrenched territorial
policies? And why. even when states decide to disengage from their territories, are
some of these processes peaceful while others are scenes of prolonged, bloody and
violent struggles? Focusing on Britain and its reaction to Indian calls for independence
from 1929-1935, and Indonesia’s withdrawal from East Timor in 1999. this project
argues that the processes and mechanisms involved in identity construction,
maintenance and change can play an important role in how states approach the issue of
territorial disengagement. At the same time, it also argues that the structure of a state’s
domestic political system may also affect the way in which disengagement takes places.
viii
Based on its empirical findings, this dissertation also argues that identities are
constructed at both the domestic as well as the international levels, and against an
Other, and through narratives. Further, identities do not acquire ‘substance’ once they
have been constructed. Rather they are continually constituted by processes, relations
and practices as identities are defined, recognized and validated in an actor’s interaction
with and in relationship to others. Finally, identity does not only influence human
actions through enabling or constraining actions but also through the need to perform
who we are or who we say we want to be.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Disputed lands, whether in the form of colonies or territories where self-
determination and sovereignty are at stake, have been the source of much inter- and
intra-state conflict. France and Holland resisted strong independence movements in
Algeria and Indonesia respectively by deploying troops in efforts to retain them after
the end of the World War II. The Israelis and the Palestinians have waged a bloody
battle over land for more than half a century. China's refusal to countenance any
attempts by Taiwan to assert its independence and sovereignty has created tremendous
tension and the potential for conflict in East Asia. While peaceful solutions for such
conflicts may appear near impossible at times, there have been intractable states that
have abandoned previously entrenched positions on colonies and disputed territories.
Why do states abandon previously unshakeable positions on colonies and
disputed territories? And why does the process of disengagement itself engender
conflict in some cases and not in others? This broad empirical puzzle is important as
territorial disengagement continues to be relevant and critical in various parts of the
world. Restless provinces remain a challenge for the central Indonesian government
which is struggling to keep the archipelago together. Tibet, in addition to Taiwan, is
another potential arena for conflict for a China that insists on the rightness of its rule
over the country. The question of Quebec persists to this day for Canada. Sudan.
Somalia. Zaire and Liberia are also states whose territorial shapes are under pressure for
various reasons. Examining the factors involved in territorial disengagement may thus
provide some insight into the processes and mechanisms that influence the way in
which some of these cases may unfold.
This dissertation concentrates on these issues but is more narrowly focused on
the following questions: Why do intransigent states back down on previously
entrenched territorial policies? And why, even when states decide to disengage from
their territories, are some of these processes peaceful while others are scenes of
prolonged, bloody and violent struggles? The rest of this chapter proceeds in five main
parts. Section 1 .2 is a short and necessary detour to address this dissertation's focus on
processes and decisions made by the colonial or more generally, the disengaging power
rather than the equally significant political developments and decisions in the colony or
territorial possession. Section 1
.3 provides a critical overview and discussion of the
literature on decolonization and territorial disengagement. This is followed in sections
1 .4 and 1 .5 by an analysis of the literature on identity in International Relations and a
discussion of the theoretical framework on identity to be used in the rest of this
dissertation. Section 1.6 focuses on the role of domestic political structures while the
last two sections discuss methodology and chapter outlines.
1.2 Focusing on the Territorial Power
There have been two main and often sharply bifurcated avenues that
characterize past studies of territorial disengagement and decolonization. The first
focuses on decisions made in the disengaging power while the second concentrates on
developments in the territory seeking independence or secession. Explanations of the
former variety often study the pivotal impact of changes in international politics and
domestic reconsiderations in the disengaging power. Explanations in the latter category
9
on the other hand, restore agency to these territories and colonies by foregrounding the
rise of resistance and nationalism in the elite, the subsequent mobilization of the
masses, or the collapse in the social structure of collaboration that had propped up many
empires of the past.
1
Core-centered perspectives often give the problematic impression that the
decision-makers there were in complete control of the situation and dictated the fate of
2
their colonies or territories. The problems associated with this perspective in which the
decisions are assumed to have developed in an isolated and sealed environment,
divorced from external pressures, are also repeated in periphery-centered analyses. In
these, it is the agency of an important group of actors but this time, in the colonial or
territorial power, that has been excluded. The inadequacies of such explanations solely
focused on the periphery can be seen in the fact that developments in the colonies, most
notably in the form of independence and nationalist movements, have always evoked
extremely uneven reactions from various disengaging powers. Thus, it is quite obvious
that neither of these sharply divided approaches can provide a full picture or
explanation of the complex processes that affect and influence decolonization and
territorial disengagement. Discerning and attributing relative causal significance of one
over the other and making generalizable statements across all cases is an impossible
task and one which I do not attempt to undertake. Perhaps what is most important to
remember is that the disengaging power and the colony or territory interact and do not
act in isolation from each other.
1
See Grimal 1978; Low 1982; Hodgkin 1956; Wallenstein 1961; Gallagher and
Robinson 1953; Louis 1976; and Robinson 1972.
2 Low 1982, 6.
3
This dissertation takes this point seriously and will concentrate much of its
attention on the disengaging power and the decisions it makes in reaction to internal and
external developments including those in the colony or territorial possessions. Thus, the
focus here will be on decision-makers in the metropole who are not acting in isolation
but are rather, engaged with, and responding to the demands made by independence and
anti-colonial movements in the colonies.
1.3 Theoretical Approaches to Territorial Disengagement and Decolonization
Realist and neo-Realist approaches, reflecting their assumptions that states are
rational, unitary actors with fixed and given interests rooted in power and security in an
anarchical world, argue that states divest themselves of their colonies and other
3
territorial possessions when they no longer have the will or the ability to retain them.
This may be the result of either domestic or international changes or perhaps both.
Changes in military technology like the invention of nuclear weapons and qualitative
shifts in the sources and engines of economic growth and wealth for example, may lead
to the increasing irrelevance of territorial possessions which, due to their geographic-
locations, markets, raw materials and populations, may have been security and
4 . .
economic assets in the past. Thus, original economic and strategic reasons like gaining
and guaranteeing access to scarce resources and markets as well as protecting land and
sea routes that were responsible for the scramble for territory and colonies may no
longer hold sway.
Kennedy 1989.
4
Spruvt 2005, 4.
4
At the same time, states facing vastly different domestic circumstances from the
period in which colonies were first acquired may also find that holding on to their
colonies or territorial possessions is no longer politically or economically beneficial for
the national interest. For example, European colonial powers had to cope with
militaries and economies that had been devastated by the long and protracted fighting of
World War II. In addition, they were faced with the declining value of their colonial
possessions and the rising costs of maintaining their positions in the face of increasingly
vocal and persistent independence movements. With decimated treasuries, it was both
prudent and rational for these states to make new political calculations and scale back
their ambitions. As such, twentieth century decolonization was just part of an almost
timeless narrative regarding the competition between great powers, their rise, expansion
and later declined
Systemic and material factors, however, do not necessarily make their impact
when expected nor do they affect all countries to the same degree or at the same time.
The immediate years following World War II are an important example of this.
Colonial powers then were uniformly faced with adverse domestic conditions and a
reshuffled international power structure anchored by the United States and the Soviet
Union. However, there were very few indicators that decolonization would sweep
across the world within twenty years. In fact, the prospects for Asian and African
independence were dim as discussions in postwar planning conferences were still
paternalistically centered on eventual “self-government” through guidance and tutelage
from the colonial powers rather than the granting of independence and statehood. The
?
For example, see Kennedy 1989.
5
United Nations Charter of 1945. while reaffirming the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, also declared in Article 73 that UN members with foreign
territories had to accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote the well-being of the
people in these territories who were not yet capable of self-government. Thus, even in
the UN Charter which held so much hope for the rights of people, “self-determination
was a right that could be claimed only by peoples who were demonstrably capable of
, c ,,6
self-government.
In addition, there were colonial powers like Portugal who clung to their colonies
despite diminished political and economic power and the growing human and financial
costs of maintaining control. France and the Netherlands fought tenacious but
ultimately losing battles for their colonies. Clearly, states do not uniformly disengage
from their colonial or territorial possessions even when international and domestic
changes may ensure that the costs of holding on to them greatly outweigh the benefits.
This seems to indicate that other factors that are not part of realist and neo-realist
frameworks underpinned by assumptions regarding a unitary state and the fixed nature
of national interests defined in terms of security and interests may also be at play.
Other approaches that do present a more complex and nuanced picture of the
state grant a larger and more important role to domestic actors in explaining how. why
and when territorial disengagement takes place. Key domestic actors with their own
narrow interests may influence their government regarding territorial disengagement.
There are historically, two groups that have a stake in their country’s territorial policy
6
R. Jackson 1998, 121.
Kahler 1986; Snyder 1991 : and Spruyt 2005.
6
and more specifically, in the territorial status quo - economic or business interests and
8
settler populations. Business or economic actors with trading and investment interests
in the colonies or territories are likely to influence or attempt to influence territorial
9
policy for tears that changes will have adverse effects on them. Settler populations
also have important stakes in the status quo due to their sunk investments in the form o
properties, plantations and factories as well as their privileged social positions in these
colonies and territories. Settler groups in the West Bank and Gaza, the Dutch settler
communities in Indonesia and Portuguese farmers in Angola, for example, fiercely
opposed disengagement and decolonization and attempted to influence and change
policies in their capitals through political and other, often violent means.
Other groups which may influence territorial disengagement are the military and
political parties. Militaries have historically played an instrumental role in acquiring,
maintaining and defending territories and colonies. As such, their recruitment patterns,
promotional incentives, budget allocation, as well as strategic doctrine may be directed
towards a “strong corporate interest in maintaining the existing territorial
configuration.”
10
However, as Hendrik Spruyt notes, the military, unlike settler
populations and business interests, is neither always nor even necessarily/or the
territorial status quo as they have interests that are more malleable. For example, their
corporate interests may and could be better served through non-imperial policies instead
s
Spruyt 2005, 8.
° Spruyt 2005, 8; and Kahler 1986. 8.
10
Spruyt 2005, 28.
7
of fighting losing and prestige-eroding colonial wars that drain or divert resources.
Alternative policies that enable the military to secure large budgets, organizational
autonomy, new career opportunities and prestige may be just or more advantageous in
the long-run.
1
1
A fourth actor that may influence territorial policy are political parties whose
ideologies or interests are linked to imperialism or the retention of colonies and annexed
lands. In general, political parties can have both direct and indirect roles. Indirectly,
they may interpret “changes in the colonial empires and simultaneously increase the
1
2
sensitivity ot metropolitan politics to these changes.” " A direct role comes from
serving as the voice for opponents of change like settlers, the military and business
interests who are attempting to influence political outcomes through them. 13
These parties may themselves have ideological, organizational and electoral
stakes that are intimately connected to territorial policy. In Miles Kahler’s analysis on
the role of political parties on French and British decolonization, the most
comprehensive treatment on this subject to date, he discusses domestic actors in a
theoretical framework that combines Albert Hirschman’s concept of exit, voice and
loyalty with an incentive-based theory of political organizations.
14
In particular, he
discusses the options that are available to political parties that are organizationally
'
' Spruyt 2005, 28.
12
Kahler 1986. 59.
13
Kahler 1986. 59.
14
These are material, purposive and identity incentives.
8
committed to the territorial status quo but faced with the reality of having to impose
greater and greater repression on increasingly rebellious territories in order to sustain
these relationships. Kahler’s analysis concentrates on the strategies that are available to
these parties and the way in which the structure of the party system is decisive in
shaping the behavior of party members, that is, by exiting the party, voicing their
opposition, or through loyalty and towing the party line.
In these accounts which desegregates the state into various domestic competing
interests, the explanation is driven by actors acting rationally to protect and defend their
narrow and typically material self-interests. While undeniably plausible, these accounts
begin with actor identities and interests that are already fixed and given. Moreover,
some of these are not able to discount ideational factors - Kahler’s discussion regarding
political parties for example, acknowledges the importance of ideology but this is put
aside to focus on processes involving institutional structures.
1 ^
Unlike the above approaches that converge around neo-utilitarian premises of
self-regarding units in the pursuit of material interests, Neta Crawford, Robert Jackson
and Daniel Phil pott place ideational factors at the centre of their accounts.
16
At the
'
^ Institutional structures are important as will be discussed later in this chapter. The
problematic issue here is that both begin with the assumption that the interests of these
actors must be based on neo-utilitarian precepts and premises.
u
’ See Spruyt 2000 for a study on the importance of utilitarian norms in the calculation
of peripheral elites. However, Spruyt excludes and dismisses too quickly the impact of
these norms on colonial powers who were ultimately the ones who made the final
decisions to withdraw from their colonies, and grant them independence and statehood.
Was there a transmission in these utilitarian norms from strategic and calculating
nationalist elites to the colonial powers? How does Spruyt explain the influence of
individuals like Frantz Fanon, CLR James, George Padmore, and Nkrumah? What was
the relationship between the colonies and the colonial powers?
9
broadest level. Crawford, Jackson and Phi 1 pott share the following - all three argue that
norms and ideas like equality, self-determination, nationalism, democracy, human
rights, non-intervention and anti-racism were critical for paving the road to
1
7
disengagement and decolonization.
The cluster of ideas and norms pivotal to Crawford’s account - equality, self-
determination, human rights, democracy, non-intervention and anti-racism - is traced
by her to the sixteenth century when some of the colonial practices of the Spanish in the
New World were being debated and questioned by Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolome
de las Casas. Crucially, these ideas and norms, she explains, were also present in
debates and arguments regarding the international slave trade and the abolition of
1
8
slavery during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the twentieth century, they
were also part of the arguments used by opponents of colonialism in the colonies and
the metropole to successfully challenge beliefs about colonial rule, the legitimacy of
colonialism and at a more fundamental level, what it means to be human.
The ideas that are at the heart of Robert Jackson’s and Daniel Philpott’s
arguments, on the other hand, converge on what it means to be a sovereign state. For
Jackson, the ideas that dismantled colonialism were equality and self-determination -
ideas which were already part of the Western political tradition, which "extols
,19
democracy, equality and condemns unrepresentative or discriminatory governance.”
17
Crawford 2002; R. Jackson 1998; and Philpott 2001
.
18
Crawford 2002, 49-50.
19
R. Jackson 1998, 134.
10
Instead of Western-style ‘civilization’ and other requirements like political
capability, national unity, military power, national wealth, and an educated population.
statehood, self-determination and independence turned on the belief or idea that "all
?o
people have the right to self-determination.” Thus, decolonization in the twentieth
century was. according to Jackson, tied to principles ofjuridical statehood based on a
rights-based model of international relations and law.
For Philpott. anti-colonial nationalism and racial equality were the ideas that
made a difference in challenging colonialism. Decolonization of the twentieth century
was in fact a revolution in sovereignty marked by a fundamental shift in the
intersubjective understanding, meaning and significance of sovereignty from one that
was based on the ability and capability to govern to one based on self-determination and
independence.
Besides their shared perspective on the importance of this particular group of
ideas, these accounts also highlight a similar group of actors which carried and
transmitted them into the heart of these colonial empires where they eventually
influenced and changed policies. In the colonies, these actors were intellectuals,
radicals, non-governmental organizations, and anti-colonial nationalists. In the heart of
empire, the carriers and transmitters were political parties, and non-governmental
organizations and movements like the late eighteenth century anti-slavery trade
movement as well as anti-colonial organizations and lobbies." In twentieth century
20
R. Jackson 1998, 124.
Crawford (2002) has placed particular emphasis on the importance ol the arguments
made by the anti-slavery trade movement for decolonization. She argues that the
Britain, for example, organizations like the League Against Imperialism and later, the
22
very influential Movement for Colonial Freedom, were formed to tight colonialism.""
In France, the Socialist and Communist parties were both anti-colonial. Besides the
adoption of these ideas and beliefs by these groups, there were changes that were also
taking place at the international level. The US and the Soviet Union adopted anti-
colonial positions publicly and placed pressure on colonial powers on the issue of self-
determination through private diplomatic channels and in the very public forum of the
United Nations."
Despite these similarities, there are also subtle differences among the three
approaches on how and why these ideas were able to have the impact that they did on
the political level. Since ideas and norms are neither singular, scarce nor uncontested
ideational commodities, addressing this issue is a critical part of their explanations and
more generally, for how we understand decolonization and constructivist International
Relations theory.
For Robert Jackson, the power and influence of these ideas lie in his
characterization of them as principled beliefs which is defined as those that “specify
movement and the eventual ending of the slave trade and slavery challenged core
beliefs and de-legitimized core practices of colonialism. See especially. Chapter 4.
??
See Owen ( 1998). As Owen points out. they were of varying forms and had different
degrees of commitment. In the twentieth century, they ranged from the more moderate
Fabian Colonial Bureau to the radical Movement for Colonial Freedom.
The label of "non-colonial' and its relevance for the Soviet Union and the U.S. are ol
course, debatable.
24
criteria tor distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust.” In other words,
these ideas worked because it provided policymakers with the standards to distinguish
practices that were right and just. However, this begs the question of how these
standards were derived. The answer is to be found in Jackson’s connection of the
political and moral basis of these ideas to those by which the western powers, France.
Britain and the U.S., had defined themselves very publicly, whether through the liberie,
egalite, andfraternite of the French Revolution, the rights of man in the U.S.
Declaration of Independence or the ideals laid out in the Atlantic Charter. Moreover,
these were also ideas that were increasingly practiced and institutionalized domestically
in these countries as past barriers to democratic citizenship like class, gender and race
were gradually removed one by one to first include all men, and then women and racial
minorities. These ideas worked not because of their sheer rightness but because they
challenged the anti-democratic character of empires and colonies and more
significantly, the identitarian basis of these colonial powers as liberal democracies.
For Philpott, the power of ideas is generally to be found in their ability to effect
?5
“change or convert people to new identities and new political ends."" These ideas
must also wield social power - power that is rooted in the ability of their carriers and
transmitters to convert their commitments into real political costs and benefits in the
”4
Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 8.
Here, Jackson equates normative ideas with the “principled beliefs” of Goldstein and
Keohane’s typology of beliefs.
"5
D. Philpott 46.
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form of “money, offices, votes, the prospects for violence" for the head of the polity
?6
who may have to pursue new policies that these ideas demand to remain in power."
In order to explain the radical changes in policy between 1945 and 1960 when
empires were being dismantled, Philpott argues that it was the reputational social power
of ideas - the interaction between revolutionary ideas and established ideas - that was
the key. Couriers of new revolutionary ideas held up the old established ideas to heads
of states who were asked to account for their inability to fulfill their initial promises. In
doing so, these couriers reconfigured the incentives of these leaders, and imposed costs
and benefits by threatening to undermine the reputations of heads of state for not
27
upholding their goals through comparison with the new revolutionary ideas." Rather
than a change of identity of these heads of states to anti-colonialists, Philpott is explicit
in stating that the driving force was the change in their conviction of “the political and
economic benefits ol releasing colonies and the similar costs ot keeping them.
Therefore, Philpott’s explanation is based on two causal mechanisms - the
couriers of these ideas w ho are genuinely influenced by them and the impact of
reputational social power on the incentive structure of heads of states and leaders. It is
therefore, an explanation which depends critically on the material incentives of
decision-makers. At the same time, these are calculations driven by the exigencies of
reputational social power which can only come into effect through meanings and shared
6
D. Philpott 46-49.
27
D. Philpott 162-3.
2S
D. Philpott 161.
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understandings which provides the basis for these leaders and heads of states to first see
and understand that there is a discernible and potentially disadvantageous difference
between the new ideas and the established one and its impact on their reputational social
power.
Unlike Jackson and Philpott, Crawford’s approach concentrates on political
argument, persuasion and practical reason as fundamental processes in 20'
h
century
?9
decolonization.
-
Her process-oriented explanation has two driving factors. The first.
which she foregrounds, are ethical arguments or arguments about "what it is right to do
30
in particular contexts." These ethical arguments work bv initially denormalizing and
delegitimizing dominant beliefs and practices and their ability to offer “ the articulation
3
1
of an alternative that meets normative criteria,” and the adoption by some actors of
3 ?
alternative conceptions of possibility and interest. It these “arguments are persuasive
among individuals and groups, then the balance of capabilities between those who favor
the dominant nonnative belief and new normative belief will begin to change" and
99
She argues that several kinds of argument exist in world politics: instrumental or
practical arguments, identity arguments, scientific argument, and ethical arguments.
“Instrumental or practical arguments are about how to do things most effectively in the
social world; (b) identity arguments suggest that people of a certain kind, such ”we the
civilized.” ought to act in a particular way; (c) scientific argument use the laws of
science, technology or nature to define situations and show how they ought to be
addressed, (d) ethical arguments are about what it is to do right in particular contexts
(Crawford 5). In some cases, all 4 arguments are present.
30
Crawford 2002, 5.
1
Persuasive content also depends on the purpose and intended audience of the
argument, connection to larger issues tabled, relative power and identities of the
interlocutors; and relevant cultural contexts.
32
Crawford 2002, 7.
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“actors [will] begin to change their social world.”" ' This she argues, is what took place
vis-a-vis colonialism -colonialism was denormalized and delegitimized in the 20th
century because anti-colonial reformers made persuasive ethical arguments which
catalyzed alternative means of conceptualizing "what it means to be human and who
belongs to the community of humans with full rights." ^
The second driving factor, which is necessary for these arguments to work, lies
in their context and content which are crucially, embedded in beliefs which are in turn,
embedded in culture. Like Jackson, these ideas of equality, self-determination,
democracy, human rights, and anti-racism gained broader persuasive power when they
were first applied from sovereigns to individual humans in the colonial power and
gradually expanded to include citizenship for all white males, women and minorities.
36
More fundamentally, “early advocates of colonial reform and later proponents of
decolonization called on colonizers to act in ways that were consistent with their
(evolving) identities, including their newly discovered empathy with the other, colonial
37
subjects.”' In other words, these particular arguments worked because they called the
identity of western countries into question.
33
Crawford 2002. 7.
4
Crawford 2002. 4.
35
Crawford 2002, 54.
36
Crawford 2002. 388.
' Crawford 2002. 388. Emphasis mine.
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I do not dispute that ideas and norms, as discussed by Crawford. Jackson and
Philpott were important in the large wave of decolonization that took place in the
middle of the twentieth century. As Crawford argues, decolonization:
“was in part a consequence of normative changes - if only because the other
explanations for the end of colonialism could have and probably did. apply in
other epochs, but colonialism was not outlawed in those areas. In other words,
the material conditions for the end of empire were present and did not operate in
the past. A major new element in the twentieth century was changed normative
beliefs.”
38
However, these approaches, like others based on norms, ideas and principles,
point to a “logic of appropriateness” as the guide for human action and behavior. This
“logic of appropriateness is not equipped to provide a non-tautological account of norm
selection.” This is because normative frameworks do not provide standards or criteria
which can point to the norms that are most important in a social system. There is thus,
no independent theory of why a particular norm or set of norms become important or
dominant or “what constitutes appropriateness is a given social context.”
40
Moreover, my discussion of Crawford. Philpott and Jackson also show that the
logic of appropriateness which gave these ideas, norms and argument their power came
from the inconsistencies present between the principles associated with a state’s identity
and its practices via its colony or territorial possession.
41
In particular, the existence
and possession of colonies challenged the colonial power's own understanding of itself
38
Crawford 2002, 56.
39
Hopf 2002, 13.
40
Hopf 2002, 13.
41
.See in particular, Crawford 2002, and R. Jackson 1998.
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as arguments based on principles and norms of self-determination and equality pointed
to the contradictions between their stated identity and their actual practices. The ideas
and arguments that formed the crux of these approaches were effective only when they
were considered and reflected upon in the context of the state’s identity. Hence, the
efficacy of these ideas and arguments hinge ultimately on identity. In these analyses
however, identity, though necessary, is unfortunately, rather underspecified and under-
theorized.
In this dissertation. I will focus on the role of identity as a causal mechanism in
territorial disengagement and decolonization. Here, it is important to emphasize that I
do not intend to develop a theoretical framework where identity is the explanatory
factor for territorial disengagement and decolonization. More explicitly, this
dissertation is not focused on developing an invariant model for territorial
disengagement and decolonization to encompass an entire universe of cases across
space and time. Such a task is likely to be less than productive since it assumes that our
social and political world is one where large-scale structures, processes and sequences
are replicated again and again in different locations and times to produce the same
42 • 43
outcome. Such a world, as Charles Tilly argues, does not exist.
Rather, the regularities that are present in political life consist instead of
recurrent causes that "concatenate into substantially different outcomes depending on
initial conditions, subsequent sequences, and adjacent processes.”
44
Thus, a far better
42
Tilly 1995, 1596.
43
Tilly 1995. 1601.
44
Tilly 1997,48.
18
model for explaining large-scale processes would concentrate on these causes and
reconstruct the way in which they may be linked and connected together to produce the
outcome in question. In other words, a more fruitful way of understanding territorial
disengagement and decolonization would therefore, involve the search for:
“deep causes operating in variable combinations, circumstances; and sequences
with consequently variable outcomes. Most of the work therefore concerns not
the identification of similarities over whole structures and processes but the
_JS
explanation of variability among related structures and processes.”
A significant part of this larger research effort would also involve focusing our attention
on understanding specific causal mechanisms which may be at work in these overall
processes. In this dissertation, I will concentrate on the task of examining and
discussing a mechanism that is involved in territorial disengagement and decolonization
- the role of identity.
In the next two sections of this chapter. I will focus on outlining and discussing
theoretical conceptualizations of identity in International Relations. I begin first with a
brief discussion of the fundamental difference between rationalist and constructivist
approaches to identity in International Relations. This will then be followed by a
discussion and presentation of how identity construction has been understood and
discussed in various social constructivist theories in International Relations. Following
this will be a discussion of the processes and politics associated with the contestation
and emergence of a dominant identity in a social context where multiple identities and
an embarrassment of norms, both positive and negative, co-exist
46
The final step
4
" Tilly 1995. 1602.
4
Jeffrey Checkel points out that there is an embarrassment of norms, a condition with
consequences for our understanding of a socially constructed world that has been left
19
involves a discussion of how identity affects human action and more specifically here,
47
the decisions that states make regarding territorial disengagement.
1.4 Identity and International Relations
There is now considerable agreement among scholars who work under the rubric
of constructivism that identity, understood as the product of social construction, matters
in world politics.
4S
For James Fearon and Dav id Laitin, the instrumental constructions
of identity by self-interested elites is the cause of ethnic violence and the intra- and
inter-state conflict.
4
' The nature of the postwar international order, according to John
Ruggie, was not only due to the presence of a hegemon but to the fact that it was an
American hegemony .
11
Mlada Bukovansky has highlighted the importance of a
principled conception of American identity in explaining why a w'eak and divided
eighteenth century American state clung to a neutral rights policy stubbornly and
consistently despite inadequate national resources and constant challenges from far
woefully under-theorized by scholars working under the constructivist IR rubric. For
more, see Checkel 1998.
47
Checkel 1998.
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While 1 begin from the perspective that identity is a social construction, there are
arguments based on essentialist conceptualizations of identity. Essentialist perspectives
view identity as a natural and objective part of social and political life, rooted in ancient
cultural, ethnic, linguistic and civilizational ties. This argument that identities have a
primordial and unchanging core has been overtaken and rendered obsolete by a
burgeoning and cross-disciplinary literature that demonstrate that identities are invented
and manufactured, arising out of social, economic and political forces.
4
}
Fearon and Laitin 2000.
° Ruggie 1996.
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stronger powers. ' Ted Hopf s inductive study of Soviet identity in 1955 and Russian
identity in 1999 show how they were the lenses through which its decision-makers
5?
understood other states in world aftairs.' “ Peter Katzenstein has argued that Japan's
definition of itself largely in economic terms shaped a security policy that went far
beyond traditional military notions to include political and economic dimensions.'
"
Katzenstein, along with other scholars like Robert Herman have also argued that state
identity can change and its interests, along with it.' More recently, Janice Bially
Mattern has boldly and brilliantly argued, contra neo-Realism and other rationalist
perspectives, that identity is a fundamental source in shaping and securing international
order.
55
While united by the position that identity is important in giving us a more
complete understanding of international relations, these studies, representing varying
epistemological and ontological standpoints, are divided by how it actually matters.
One of the primary divides lie between approaches like Fearon and Laitin’s and those of
Ruggie, Katzenstein, Bukovansky, Hopf and Mattern. The former is anchored by
neo-utilitarianism where identity is exterior to interests. In fact, identity, in rationalistic
1
Bukovansky 1997.
52
Hopf 2002, xiv.
Katzenstein and Okawara 1993, and Katzenstein 1996.
4
Katzenstein 1996; and Herman (1996).
"" Mattern 2005.
v
There are differences even within this second group of scholars.
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and neo-utilitarian accounts of world politics, becomes a function of what are pre-given
and exogenous interests assumed to be the acquisition of power which can guarantee
security and survival. John Mearsheimer for example, discussed the rise of nationalism
and national identities in the post-Cold War period purely as a function of the structural
conditions of the international system.'"'
7
The logic of such explanations is built on the
characterization of world politics as anarchical and therefore, a ‘self-help system' where
the threat of war are constant features of world politics. In these structural conditions.
the national interest should be to ensure "that their countries possess as much power as
58
possible, or at least enough power to guarantee their own security and survival.”
There are several problematic issues associated with this understanding of the
national interests. First is the problematic claim of some neorealists that state interests
is derived from the conditions of anarchy. As argued persuasively by Helen Milner,
anarchy is an exceedingly slippery concept which makes the propositions that one can
derive from it almost entirely indeterminate. Therefore, interests that have been derived
59
from this understanding of anarchy can only be assumed.'
In addition, the phrase "the national interest' may suggest policies “to promote
demands that are ascribed to the nation rather than to individuals, sub-national groups,
or mankind as a whole,” but it may mean different things to different people.
60
During
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Mearsheimer 1990.
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Ringmar 1996, 50.
' Ruggie 1998, 862.
60
Wolfers 1962,47.
the late 1920s and early 1930s in Britain for example, the ‘national interest’ vis-a-vis
policy toward India was conceived very differently by Winston Churchill and the group
he led when compared to the group led by Stanley Baldwin. The concept is extremely
ambiguous and as Wolfers states, has “very little meaning.”
61
In a fundamental insight, constructivists argue that interests are not pre-formed
or exogenous but rather, inextricably linked with identity. Beneath this consensus
regarding the importance of identity to interests and by logical extension, the overall
importance of identity, is a variety of theoretical approaches for understanding the
various processes involved in identity construction, maintenance and change as well as
the relationship between identity and human action. Subsequently, understanding its
impact on politics and political behavior also vary according to how the nature of
identity and the processes involved in its construction are conceptualized and theorized.
Theoretically, this dissertation is broadly interested in these processes and
begins from the standpoint that there may be dominant state and national identities but
b~>
they do not exist singly or alone, as many studies have demonstrated. Moreover,
collective ideas about the state or nation may be ‘dominant’ at a particular time but they
are almost never uniformly and universally accepted by all. Instead, they are typically
questioned, challenged and politically contested by individuals or groups offering
different ideas about the state’s collective distinctiveness and purpose.
6
The dominant
Indonesian identity throughout most of the Suharto period for example, was rooted in a
61
Wolfers, 1962, 147.
Katzenstein 1996; Hopf 2002; Smith 2003; and Goff and Dunn eds. 2004.
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Katzenstein 1996a, 6.
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narrative where Indonesia’s passage into nationhood and statehood was one of constant
threat and danger to the collectivity. This identity however, was challenged and
contested by another construction of Indonesian identity, one that promoted more
democratic conceptions of itself.
More specifically, this dissertation will focus not only on the construction of
identities, but their contestation, the emergence of the identity that mattered, and the
interaction of these processes with the domestic political structure of the state in
shaping and influencing foreign policy. It asks the following questions: What are the
practices, processes, mechanisms, actors and politics involved in the construction and
contestation of identities? Why does a particular identity matter at a specific period and
not others? And how does one identity emerge as dominant ? How do the emergent
dominant identity and domestic political structures affect the decisions that states make
regarding disengagement as well as the way in which disengagement takes place?
The next section of this chapter proceeds in two parts. The first begins by
defining identity and presenting a critical discussion of one of the key aspects of
Alexander Wendt’s systemic constructivism, the most developed theoretical exposition
on identity in International Relations. In the second half, I present and discuss various
processes and mechanisms that are involved in the construction and contestation of
identity, as well as the way in which identity shapes and influences the decisions that
states make regarding territorial disengagement.
1.5 Social Constructivist Theories of Identity in International Relations
Definitions of identity, perhaps reflecting a concept that is notoriously difficult
to pin down as well as the fact that constructivism is still relatively new in International
24
Relations, abound. Janice Bially Mattern defines it very generally as “the mutual.
64
cognitive, sociological or emotional ties through which states understand themselves.”
Jeffrey Legro together with Paul Kowert define it as "prescriptive representations of
political actors themselves” as well as “their relationships to each other.”
6
^ Peter
Katzenstein gives the preceding definition greater specificity by defining these
prescriptive representations as the “shorthand label for varying constructions of nation
and statehood”
66
where nationhood refers to “the nationally varying ideologies of
collective distinctiveness and purpose” while statehood refers to “state sovereignty, as it
is enacted domestically and projected internationally.”
67
For Mlada Bukovansky,
identity is “not fully determined by geostrategic position, territory or population” but
rather, it is "the interplay of material interests and political discourse [which] generates
collective identity, articulated in terms of constitutive principles and role conceptions”
68
These principles are in turn, “the evocation of a vision of a set of expectations about
how this role was to be enacted.”69
64
Mattern 2005, 43. Her full definition of international identity is: “the mutual,
cognitive, sociological or emotional ties through which states understand themselves,
especially in relation to others, identity is an embodiment of shared categories of Self-
other understanding” (43).
° Kowert and Legro 1996, 453.
66
Katzenstein 1996a, 6.
67
Katzenstein 1996a, 59.
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Bukovansky 1997, 210.
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Bukovansky 1997, 218.
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In these definitions, there is one important commonality demonstrated in phrases
like 'states understanding themselves' and 'prescriptive representations of political
actors’. When American political actors, for example, refer to the United States as a
democratic country founded on and constituted by freedom and liberty, they are
presenting a specific definition and understanding of the nation. Amalgamating these
definitions, this dissertation defines identity as a collective idea of how states
understand themselves, usually in the form of prescriptive representations of collective
distinctiveness and purpose.
How then is identity constructed and maintained? What are the processes
involved in contestation and change? How does identity affect or influence politics and
human behavior? There are no simple answers to these questions in International
Relations and venturing into a theoretical discussion of these issues is to risk stepping
into a quagmire of differences. These range from debates over whether analytic
attention should be focused on the international level or at the domestic level to those
on the processes and mechanisms that are involved in identity formation, maintenance
and change.
1.5.1 Wendt’s Systemic Constructivism
I begin my overview of how identity has been conceptualized and theorized with
Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory ofInternational Politics, still the most discussed
theoretical interjection on identity in International Relations. " According to Wendt,
70
While there are other notable contributions on identity like Campbell 1992. Doty
1996. Neumann 1999. Mattern 2005 and P.T. Jackson 2006, 1 focus and begin with
Wendt because he has had the most influence on the field, spawning critiques and other
scholarly work which draw on his insights.
26
there are four different kinds of identities: ( 1 ) personal or corporate. (2) type, (3) role,
and (4) collective.
71
Personal or corporate identities are “constituted by the self-
.72
organizing, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities." “ These structures
refer to the essential properties and material base of actors - for a person it is the
physical body while in the case of states, it is many bodies and territories. Most
important in the personal or corporate identity of intentional actors “is a consciousness
73
and memory of Self as a separate locus of thought and activity." For states, their
members require “joint narrative[s] of themselves as a corporate actor, and to that extent
corporate identity presupposes individuals with a collective identity. The state is a
‘group Self capable of group-level cognition. These ideas of Self have an ‘auto-
genetic’ quality, and as such personal and corporate identities are constitutionally
exogenous to Otherness."
4
Type identity on the other hand, refers to a social category or “label applied to
persons who share (or are thought to share) some characteristic or characteristics, in
appearance, behavioral traits, attitudes, values, skills (e.g. language), knowledge,
opinions, experience, historical commonalities (like region or place of birth) and so
on."
7>
The characteristics that “underlie type identities are at base intrinsic to actors"
71
Wendt 1999, 224.
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Wendt 1999, 224.
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Wendt 1999: 225.
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" Wendt 1999, 225.
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and are qualities that make the actor exist “whether or not Others are present to
recognize them as meaningful.”
76
In the states system, "type identities correspond to
'regime types’ or 'forms of state,’ like capitalist states, fascist states, monarchical states,
and so on.”
7
The third category, 'role identity' are those identities that one can have through
the occupation of a position in a social structure and adopting behavioral norms towards
Others that possess relevant counter-identities. In other words, it is not based on
intrinsic properties but "exist only in relation to Others.” ‘ The fourth and final
category in Wendt’s framework, collective identity, “is a distinct combination of role
and type identities” which has "the causal power to induce actors to define the welfare
79
of the Others as part ot that ol the Self, to be alternative.” Thus, it is a category of
identity where the “Self-Other distinction becomes blurred” and "Self is 'categorized'
~ i „80
as Other.
Despite outlining these four types of identity, Wendt has chosen to focus
primarily on a state’s role identity which he argues is a cognitive schema of shared
meanings, determined by a process of interactions with other states. Critically, this is a
framework that focuses on the construction of identity at the systemic level. This is in
76
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turn, built on the ontological assumption that all state identities are fundamentally
corporal with certain essential properties, and can therefore, be bracketed and put aside.
In doing so, Wendt is in effect excluding domestic processes and politics which he
acknowledges to be important in the construction of state identity from his framework.
This part of state identity therefore becomes ontologically prior to the states’ system.
,
,
„8I
exogenously given .
With this conceptualization of identity, Wendt therefore, “presents us with
82
materially constituted, uncomplicated, preformed state actors ...” They are states who
interact with each other at the international level with “some pre-existing idea about
who they are even beyond their awareness of their individuality and their ability to
act." This conceptualization and theorization of identity, as several critics have
already noted, excludes historical, social, cultural, political and economic forces and
institutions that have been influential in constituting the identities of states which are, as
Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic points out, fundamentally and “in their entirety, social
84
arrangements." States, beyond their corporate and intrinsic properties like the claim to
a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, sovereignty, physical resources
85
and territory, are “deeply social and socially contingent." Hence, focusing on identity
Sl
Zeh fuss 2001. 321.
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construction solely at the systemic level is problematic as it lacks “concrete
conceptualization of identity formation that engages all the social levels of states'
• y. „86
sociality.
It is therefore, critical to unpack the blackbox of identity below the systemic
level in order to provide a more complete understanding not only of the processes and
mechanisms that are involved in identity construction but also, how identity shapes and
influences foreign policy and more specifically in this dissertation, the decision to
disengage from territorial or colonial possessions. While this is indeed a call to include
the domestic level in our understanding of how identities are constructed. 1 am not
eschewing the systemic level for a reductionist argument that a state's identity is only
constructed at home. Instead of assuming the importance of either the systemic or the
domestic level and therefore, prioritizing one over the other. I begin from the standpoint
that this is an empirical question that can and should be examined.
Even as we leave this levels-of-analysis issue in identity construction as an
open-ended question to be examined, the matter of how identities are constructed still
remains. What are the practices, processes and mechanisms, actors and politics that are
involved in the social construction of identity? I will turn to this question next by first
outlining three mechanisms and processes that have been prominent in many studies of
identity and identity construction. Although these three - the construction of identities
against an Other, the construction of identities from social relationships with others, and
the construction of identities through narratives - do not necessarily function
independently of one another. I will discuss them separately here for heuristic purposes.
Pasic 1996. 89; and Zehfuss 2001, 335.
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1.5.2 Constructing Identities: Processes and Mechanisms
1.5.2. 1 Self/Other
Across disciplines like social anthropology, psychology, sociology, political
science and critical social theory, there is a general consensus that the “lineation of an
“in-group” usually entails its demarcation from a number of “out-groups,” and that the
87
demarcation is an active and ongoing part of identity formation.” Identity is not only
relational but also inextricably linked to the notion of difference “since knowing who
one is requires recognition of who one is not.’” For example, a whole body of
scholarly work from history, anthropology, English and Comparative literature on
European colonialism of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, have
documented that the European Self was usually constructed against a colonial ‘Other.*
“usually through the employment of binary oppositions and the demarcating and
89
policing ot boundaries ot difference.” The colonizer was otten portrayed as the
epitome of civilization and progress while the colonized were constructed as barbaric
and backwards, its binary opposite.
>0
07
For example, see Barth 1969; Hogg and Abrams 1988: Tajfel and Turner 1985:
Jenkins 1996; Connolly 1985; and Said 1978.
For a review of some of the developments regarding the construction of identity, and
the production of boundaries in the literature in sociology, see Cerulo 1997 and Lamont
and Volnar 2002 respectively.
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In International Relations, many scholars of identity have also drawn on these
insights and argued that identity is defined and constructed against an Other .
>]
For
example, David Campbell, in his important monograph. Writing Security ( 1992), argued
that American identity was defined and constructed against an "‘Other" either from
groups within the nation like women, the working class. East Europeans, Jews. African-
92
Americans, and communists, or other states in the international system. Iver
93
Neumann argued that Russian identity was constructed against a European "Other'.
Critically, the first wave of literature on the construction of identity in International
Relations was based on an implicit and a priori assumption that “identity requires
difference to be" but more importantly, "converts difference into otherness in order to
94
secure its own self-certainty.” While this insight that identity is constructed against an
Other is an extremely important component for understanding the overall puzzle of how
identities are constructed and maintained, it is important to recognize that identities are
95
sometimes but not always oppositional. ' Ted Hopt s careful and detailed study of
M
See Neumann 1999; Todorov 1 984; Campbell 1992; Doty 1996, and Goff and Dunn
237.
Some argue that an "Other' is a necessary part of identity formation. For example, see
Rumelili 2004. While this is outside the scope of this dissertation, it needs further
study.
99
“ See Campbell 1992 and Smith 1993. Among many others who have noted and
documented this, see the work of Anders Stephanson and Emily Rosenberg on
American foreign policy.
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Connolly 1991. 64. Connolly has been influential on the first group of International
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work in the 1980s and 1990s.
Hopf 2002, 7.
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Soviet identities in 1955 and Russian identities in 1999 has shown that binary
oppositions and the resulting conflict and violence that seem to characterize such
%
identity relations do not form the sum of all Sell-Other relations.
Following Hopf, I do not begin with the assumption that that identity is always
97
constructed against a binary or oppositional Other. Instead, the Sell's treatment of
98
difference with the Other is to be regarded as a critical empirical question. Also to be
treated as an empirical question is the issue of what constitutes an Other for any given
99
Sell. Generally, the 'Other' is assumed and treated as synonymous with another state
in International Relations. Again, this is an assumption that requires further
examination.
100
Instead of another state, the Other could be in the form of "real others
with whom we are currently involved; imagined others, including characters from our
own past as from cultural narratives; historical others; and the generalized other."
101
1.5.2.2 Symbolic Interactionism
The concepts developed in symbolic interactionism have also been utilized to
develop a framework where state identities are constructed through social interactions
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102
with other states in the international systems. " Wendt for example, argues that
identities “are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by
,,103
significant Others.
7
' Here, “actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how they
think Others see or “appraise" them, in the “mirror" of Others’ representations of the
104
Self." More specifically, a state’s identity is constituted when it is named,
recognized and validated through a process of interactions and social relationships with
other states. Thus, identities are a product of social interactions - an individual’s
capacities, attitudes, ways of behaving, as well as her conception of herself may change
based on how others may see or act towards him or her. Identities are also sustained by
such interactions.
105
In Wendt's framework, social interactions are an important part of a process that
constructs state identities at the systemic level. These identities however, range
narrowly from negative identification to positive identification with co-variation
between relations of identity and difference, and co-operation and conflict. For
example, when the other is seen as different, inferior and a threat, there is negative
identification and relations are conflictual. In contrast, there is co-operation when the
Self sees the Other as similar and non-threatening.
106
While Wendt’s critics have
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rightly pointed to the problems assoeiated with this narrowly conceptualized range of
identity relations, they should not detract from some of the broader insights present in
his framework regarding identity construction. Particularly significant is the
incorporation of social interaction and practices in the construction of identities, a
process which other scholars have also noted in their work on identity.
10
As Goff and
Dunn note, “not only does identity dictate practice; practice determines whether identity
shall congeal around certain ideas or evolve.”
108
1.5.2.3 Narratives
Narratives based on certain historical events have also been important in the
109
constitution ot the identities ot many states. American identity has been constantly
constructed and indelibly marked by dominant stories regarding the principles and
ideals of its founding through history textbooks, the national monuments that dot
Washington, D.C., movies as well as other cultural sites.
1 10
In the postwar period,
Germany’s role in World War II and the extermination of six million Jews did not just
lead to serious ‘soul-searching’ but was particularly important in how Germans
understood their past and envisioned their future as a political community and as a
107
See some of the contributions in the edited volume by Goff and Dunn 2004.
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In International Relations, see the work of Barnett 1999 and Dunn 2004 who both
draw on the work of sociologist Margaret Somers. See also Ringmar 1996, Mattern
2005, and Smith 2003 for his discussion of ‘stories’ of ‘peoplehood’.
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people.
1 1
1
Recently, observers have noted that stories stressing the humiliation that
China experienced in its encounters with the West and Japan during the nineteenth and
early part of the twentieth centuries have accompanied the emergence of a more
1 P
belligerent form of Chinese nationalism. " In Israel, the Holocaust has been a central
part of how Israel understood itself not only as a victim but as a redeemer of this
victimhood.
1
1
In all these states, certain events have played an important role in these
narratives regarding how these states and their people came into being. It is critical to
understand that “events do not have an objective meaning” but rather, have been “made
meaningful and intelligible by actors who locate them within an overarching narrative
1 14
that provide a link between an interpretation ot the past and image of the future.” In
these narratives, a series of events are interpreted and cognitively connected together in
causal and associational ways in an overall plot that provide communities with larger
significance and meaning through “some understanding of its origins and its life
See Zehfuss 2002 for the impact of this identity on German foreign policy in the
1990s.
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Gries 2004.
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' For a recent and fascinating application of narratives of the Holocaust in the
constitution of Israeli identity, see Zertal 2006. Zertal also argues that this construction
did not become part of the everyday until the Eichmann trial in the 1960s when Ben-
Gurion’s actions harvested these memories into a collective consciousness.
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history.”
1 1:>
The establishment of such a narrative “constitutes one of the most
important mechanism by which a nation constructs a collective identity.” 1 16
What however, are the engines driving these mechanisms and processes in the
construction of identities? Identities are not constructed against an Other based on
some externally determined truth. Neither are they the passive product of repeated
social interactions, or free-floating and already formed narratives.
1
1
In other words,
identities do not simply emerge out of a social and political vacuum. They are
articulated, constructed, circulated and contested by actors. Therefore, it is essential to
examine and not to assume away the role of human agency and the politics that are
involved in identity construction, contestation and change.
1 1S
1.5.3 Agency and Structure in Identity Construction
One approach that does focus on the role of agency and politics in identity
1 19
construction is that of elite manipulation or strategic choice theories. In these
theories where constructivist explanations have merged with rationalist, strategic
analyses, identities are constructed either strategically or as a by-product of the efforts
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1 20
of cynical, self-interested political elites to acquire or strengthen their hold on power.
Identities are thus really epiphenomenal, used to stir up the masses and justify a
particular policy. These theories are however, problematic as they cannot account for
why the masses would find these messages based on identity particularly compelling
especially when it could lead to civil war and high overall costs. These strategies are
PI
therefore not always subjectively rational nor politically successful.
Moreover, political disputes and conflict over identity may very well emerge
from political actors who see the construction of a certain sort of life and collective
ideas of identity in the form of ideas regarding political ideals of citizenship and states,
notions of governance and proposals for specific institutions, such as political
12 ^
constitutions, legal systems, rules of property ~ which “successful political actors
incorporate into their political programs, politics, and personal identities and
123 P4
ambitions” " as their highest ideal. Thus, these disputes could very well be over
identities and competing political perspectives on the nation’s true mission as well as
the means of achieving them.
1- ^
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Perhaps more importantly, instrumentalist approaches as well as those that
emphasize the importance of language, discourses and culture in the construction of
identities tend to create a false dichotomy between structure and agency. On one level,
actors do have agency, can be strategic, and may indeed, deliberately construct
identities to “convince each other as well as the general public that certain policy
proposals constitute plausible and acceptable solutions to pressing problems.” ~ They
are therefore, not only "bearers of structures” but can "engage in practices that attempt
127
to rewrite the cultural landscape...” ' However, the locus on strategic calculations
made by self-possessed actors advances too radical a "separation of the material and the
128
ideational.” “ Actors may construct identities for strategic reasons but their strategies
as well as their interests do not materialize from thin air in a pre-given and already
constituted form, as implicitly assumed by instrumentalist and elite manipulation
129
approaches. “ Actors can and do act but they may also do so from their knowledge and
awareness of the normative and social structures which constrain and determine what
are considered to be legitimate strategies.
1 30
In short, any account of the construction of identities that takes agency into
account must recognize that actors can and do act strategically and are “capable of
126
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1 1 1
appropriating ... cultural taproots for various ends.” At the same time, such an
account should not neglect the underlying structure of cultural and social rules that may
constitute and constrain their practices. Thus "the attempt to reduce action to either
rule-governed action or strategic behavior might be analytically seductive but it forces
false choices and fails to recognize what makes social action what it is.”
133
The next section delves further and deeper into the issue of identity contestation
by building a framework that examines the question of when and why it take place.
1.5.3. 1 Stages of Identity Contestation
This dissertation adopts Peter Haas’, Ian Lustick's and J. Legro's theoretical
frameworks of contestation of ideas to examine, outline and explain the political
134
processes and mechanisms involved in the contestation of identity. While identity
contestation is by no means neatly demarcated, it is conceived here in three stages to aid
conception and analysis of the processes. The three stages are as follows:
1. Changing internal or external political, social and economic conditions arise to
challenge dominant conceptions of state or national identity.
2. The presence of an appropriate alternative to the dominant state or national
identity which provides a different conception of state- or nationhood.
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3. The presence of dedicated political-ideological entrepreneurs who are able to
push the alternative onto the political stage and to persuade others to accept it as
the right way to conceive state- or nationhood.
In stage 1, changing internal or external political, social and economic
conditions may challenge collective ideas about the state and nation especially when
they lead to growing discrepancies between the dominant identity's stated mission and
political objectives and its ability to translate them into success. In particular, social
expectations that have been derived from collective ideas or principles that guide state
behavior may interact with the experienced consequences of the changing conditions or
critical events to create a ripe situation where the dominant identity and its attendant
ideas and principles of state- and nationhood can be contested.
1 ° Thus, these collective
ideas do not only contain "a notion of appropriate action but also a portrayal of what
consequences constitute a success (or are socially desired) and what ones are a failure
(as opposed to success).”
136
Contestation however, will also require the presence of alternative conceptions
of state- or nationhood (or stage 2). As Lustick points out, “no politician, confronted
with beliefs honored or advanced as hegemonic, is likely to treat them as problematic
unless another available schema can articulate those beliefs as an interpretation of
reality and the imperatives of national life, rather than as the direct and unavoidable
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# J37
expression ot immutable facts and ultimate values.” Following Rogers Smith. I
argue that alternatives are generally not simply created or invented from scratch.
Instead, they are usually "largely generated by. motivated by, and also meaningfully
limited by the particular range of stories of possible political identity that they have
1 ^8
inherited and long valued.” These may be narratives and stories that arise from
myths, legends and a country’s founding. It must however, be noted that these
narratives or stories are complex which provides some degree of malleability.
139
flexibility, and reinterpretation.
Critically, the political impact of these alternatives are dependent on political
and ideological entrepreneurs, e.g. leaders, intellectuals as well as their organizations
(stage 3). These entrepreneurs are necessary to push the alternatives onto the political
stage and to persuade other political actors of the rightness of the identity and its related
ideas and principles of state- and nationhood for the country. Since several alternatives
may be present, it is also important to note that the conception that will emerge and
matter ultimately is the one wielded by entrepreneurs who are most successful in their
efforts of transmission and persuasion.
1.5.4 Identity, Interests and Action
In this section. I address the relationship between identity, interests and action.
What is the relationship between identity and interests? How does identity work itself
137
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into the realm of human action and behavior in international relations? Without
eschewing the pursuit of interests as an important reason for action, 1 argue, following
Alexander Wendt, Erik Ringmar and others that “it is only once we know who we are
140 . .
that we can know what we want." Identity, because it provides us with ideas ot who
we are, provide a basis for seeing the world. As Roger Brubaker argues:
“It furnishes a mode of vision and division of the world, to use Pierre
Bourdieu’s phrase, a mode of social counting and accounting. Thus it inherently
links identity and interest - bv identifying how we are to calculate our
,,141
interests.
It therefore precedes the definition of interests “and the formulation of particular actions
in certain situations or interest areas”
14
" as identity may “makes some action legitimate
and intelligible and others not so.”
144
Specifically, identity may frame issues in a different way and lead to a
reconstitution of the country's national interests, paving the way for a new policy to be
formulated and implemented. In the case of territorial disengagement and
decolonization, new or newly emergent and dominant identities may have altered the
way actors understand and constitute their interests. When confronted by the issue of
colonial or territorial possessions, old policies may no longer be compelling or logical
for political actors with the new conception of state- or nationhood.
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Besides shaping interests, there is another important dimension to identity which
links it to action. A wide range of scholars w ho work from varying epistemological and
ontological viewpoints have noted that while identities are indeed constructed, thinking,
imagining and inventing them is only part of the process. A second and equally critical
dimension involved in the substantiation of identities comes from acting and performing
these identities in the process of becoming.
144
States, as Legro notes, "become what
they do as much as they do what they are...”
14:1
In order to understand this, it is critical to note that identities are intersubjective.
By intersubjective, I mean that they are not only understandings of the self but rather.
shared understandings and ideas regarding the self and other that can only be produced
146
and sustained from social relationships and interactions w ith others. As Wendt puts
it, "identities and interests are not only learned in interaction .... But sustained by it.”
147
This is in contrast to primordialist accounts where identity amounts to something
substantive and which can stand on its own. It is. in other words, "an identification
process, not an identity condition.”
I4S
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For an individual or group which is trying to establish a contested and new
149
identity, the intersubjectivity and social nature of identity is particularly important.
Following Erik Ringmar, I argue that there are limits to the ability of states to construct
their identities. State X cannot construct, declare or imagine an identity into existence
all on its own. Due to their social character, identities cannot be decided by individuals
alone. Instead, this decision, as Erik Ringmar, following G.W.F. Hegel and sociologists
like George Herbert Mead and Alessandro Pizzorno, argues, “is always taken together
with others."
1 °
Part of this sociality involves the need for "recognition for the persons
we take ourselves to be, and only as recognized can we conclusively come to establish
an identity.”
15
' Thus, these constructions and declarations will depend on the reaction
and more importantly, the recognition of the audiences, both domestic and international,
to whom they are addressed. Recognition of the declared identity is rarely automatic
152
and will involve proving that our interpretations tit us. In order to do so, “we are
often forced to act - ... to convince people regarding the applicability of our self-
153
descriptions.” ' While there are many others ways to do so. e.g. through discussion or
arguments, it is
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“only through action can we provide the kind of final, decisive evidence that
proves the others wrong. The action will be there for everyone to see and as
such it will be an irrefutable manifestation of our character, our action will
encroach upon our detractors and force them to reconsider their views.”
1
'’4
Thus, identity does not only shape interests and influence action, it is also at the
heart of actions to "defend a certain conception of who they are.” 1
'"0
In other words,
“we act. that is, not only because there are things we want to have, but also because
there are persons we want to be”
]:)h
The need for recognition is especially strong
during periods when meanings and categories of self-understandings or identities are
157
contested. ' During these periods in which multiple interpretations or identities may
be available and still circulating in the social and political discourse, the identity that
may have emerged as a dominant one needs to be consolidated and it is during these
times that states are in particular need of acting or presenting displays and
manifestations of “visible signs that we indeed are persons of a particular kind; it is only
if other people see us in a certain way that they are able to draw conclusions regarding
our character. By facilitating identification, display also makes it possible to draw the
1 58
boundary between those who belong to a certain group and those who do not.”
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Ringmar calls these ‘formative moments’ in his framework. It is similar to the
framework that has been outlined in section 1.5.3 and also as presented by Haas
1992/1996, Lustick 1993 and Legro 2005.
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1.6 Domestic Political Systems and the Manner in Which State Contraction Takes
Place
While the emergence of a dominant identity is important for explaining the
changes in the way states have approached the issue of disengagement, there are
differences in the withdrawal process even after the decision to do so has been made.
Why are some of these processes peaceful while others are scenes of prolonged, bloody
and violent struggles? This section outlines and discusses the way in domestic political
structures may have an impact on way in which identity is involved in territorial
159
disengagement while section 4.2 of Chapter 4 will discuss its theoretical significance
in greater detail.
Domestic political systems can vary along two dimensions - the institutionalized
structure of the decision-making process and the degree to which the rules and norms
governing the outcome of political contestation may or may not be well
institutionalized. For the first dimension, they may range from unitary political systems
where decision-making is highly centralized to multiparty parliamentary systems or
fragmented democratic political systems like the American system where intra- and
inter-branch struggle have been built into the structures of government from the start
allowing for greater recourse to other branches of government and centers of power
should disagreement exist.
160
More specifically, the more fragmented the decision-
making process in a political system, the more veto players, defined here as an
1 5Q
This section draws on insights from Spruyt 2005; Snyder 1991 ; and Snyder 2000.
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“individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status
„161 .. ,
quo, it has.
In systems where there are multiple veto players with the means and institutional
opportunity to block or oppose the passage of a policy, it is more difficult to resolve
issues of contestation to identity or to implement changes that may have emerged from
the rise of a dominant one. On the other hand, in highly centralized political systems
with one veto player system, changes are more likely to be implemented once accepted
and adopted. Hence, “the number of veto players influences the latitude that
governments will have to change policy. If a proposed policy confronts many veto
16?
players with variant preferences, the veto of any player can forestall compromise.”
The second dimension refers to the degree to which the rules and norms
governing the outcome of political contestation may or may not be well
institutionalized. In mature democratic systems like Britain’s, decision-making is fairly
centralized and there are "free, fair and periodic elections in which a substantial
proportion of the adult population can vote: the actions of officials are constrained by
constitutional provisions and commitments to civil liberties; and government candidates
sometimes lose elections and leave office when they do.”
Ul
In such systems, rules,
norms and regulations governing the outcome of political contests have been
institutionalized. Thus, challenges to identity and the eventual reconstitution of state
interests in favor of disengagement take place in circumstances where actors w ill abide
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by the outcomes of these contests and the decisions that follow. In these circumstances,
the withdrawal process is likely to be peaceful.
Highly centralized and unitary political systems like Indonesia's are
characterized by an oligarchical distribution of power, weak administrative and
representative institutions, and few rules or norms which may constrain political actors.
In such systems, the process of identity contestation is only possible when there are
openings or ruptures in the system, e.g. when a dictator loses power. The replacement
of the main center of power by another may provide the opening for the emergence of a
new identity and the implementation of new policies. At the same time however,
contestation of identity may be extremely fraught and difficult to resolve as there may
be other actors who are still jostling for power during such transitional periods. Since
actors in such systems are also less likely to abide by institutional rules, norms and
regulations governing outcomes of these contests, disengagement may be violent as
these actors may turn to other means of over-turning the decision.
1.7 Methodology
In analyzing not only how identity matters but more specifically, how the
contestation of identity, mediated through domestic political structures, may affect the
decisions states make regarding disengagement from their colonies and other territorial
possession as well as the manner in they disengage, two cases of multinational states
which backed down from previously entrenched positions on disputed lands were
selected. The first concerns Britain and its response to Indian nationalist challenges and
demands from 1929 to 1934. This was a critical period for this relationship because the
proposed series of constitutional reforms purportedly aimed at the gradual transfer of
49
power from Britain to India was the site of the most hitter political battle ever fought
over a colony in Britain. The decisions that were made then would go on to have
significant influence on the course of events that would culminate in India’s
independence in August 1947. The second case focuses on Indonesia’s response to
growing calls for self-determination in East Timor and its withdrawal in 1999 after
steadfastly refusing to countenance any changes to its policy throughout its twenty-four
year occupation.
These cases were selected in order to ensure some degree of similarity across a
denominator that is most likely to have an effect on the processes and mechanisms
related to identity - the heterogeneity or homogeneity of its population. Requirements
in relatively homogeneous countries like Japan and Germany would probably differ
from heterogeneous countries in the building of a common identity for their citizens.
Here, two heterogeneous countries - multinational Britain which encompassed England.
Scotland. Wales and Northern Ireland, and Indonesia were selected in order to provide a
better basis for understanding how' some of the processes related to identity
construction, contestation and change may unfold under the broadest of these domestic
conditions.
At the same time, the selection of these cases which differ along other
dimensions and contexts rather than two identical or very similar cases will also provide
more confidence for understanding how identity affects territorial disengagement. In
other words, examining these cases will provide an opportunity for “showing that a
particular model or sets of concepts usefully illuminates these cases.”
164
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Since this project is also interested in the domestic processes and mechanisms
involved in identity construction, contestation and change as well as the way in which
identity shapes and influences policy in international relations, it begins with few
theoretical assumptions about identity. Instead, the focus is on extrapolating theoretical
insights about identity from the empirical evidence of the two cases which have been
gathered through adopting several of the following overlapping steps - establishing the
presence of identities in the cases for the periods examined and in the discourses of the
relevant political elites, process-tracing, and pattern-matching.
In order to study identity. I concentrated on the place where it is mainly
produced - in the arguments, narratives and discourses of political elites. Specifically, 1
examined the arguments, narratives and discourses of political elites like legitimate
decision and policymakers within a state, party elites and other influential members of
society in order to understand the chief ideas and principles characterizing a particular
vision of nationhood or statehood. This was accomplished mostly through studying
political debates, official publications, statements, memos, speeches, memoirs of
leading statesmen and newspaper articles related to the issue of the colony or territorial
possession. Secondary sources which discussed and analyzed representations of a
state’s identity at various cultural sites ranging from art and architecture, travel books,
novels, monuments, museums, history texts, and movies were also used to complement
this research.
In terms of empirical evidence, the type collected and the w;ay it was collected
differed across the two cases examined in this dissertation. For Britain and India,
archival sources examined included the discussions, debates and decisions of British
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party and policy elites surrounding constitutional reform for India between 1929 and
1934. More specifically, these included primary archival sources like Conservative
Party documents, British parliamentary debates, and official and conference reports
related to the issue of constitutional reforms for India during this period. Besides these
primary documents, the general pervasiveness of this identity was also established
through a wide and critical reading of secondary material which discussed
representations of Britishness in novels, travel books, children’s novels, and art and
architecture.
In the case of Indonesia and East Timor, I examined a variety of material. For
the Suharto period, I first examined primary Australian. American as well as British
government documents which reported on meetings between their government
representatives and those from Indonesia between 1974 and 1975. Since government
memos and other primary documents from the Indonesian government are not available,
these Australian. American and British documents were the next best option.
Moreover, examining documents from these three different governments allowed for
comparison of similarities and differences in how Indonesian officials discussed the
matter of East Timor and as a result, greater confidence in the reliability of the material
consulted. Other primary material examined for the Suharto period included newspaper
articles, official publications, statements, speeches, memoirs as well as some memos
from the Indonesian military which had emerged into the public sphere regarding East
Timor. In order to establish the general pervasiveness of the identity being discussed. I
also examined the dominant representations and narratives of Indonesian identity during
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the Suharto period through critical secondary sources which analyzed monuments,
national museums, history textbooks and movies.
For the Habibie period, interviews were conducted with proponents of change
like senior members of the Indonesian government at that time, as well as non-
governmental organizations who were in favor of disengaging from East Timor. Also
interviewed were individuals from the military who were against disengagement from
Indonesia. Information and views from newspaper articles and publications from these
organizations were examined in order to supplement the interviews.
Secondary historical studies have also been used to construct the background
narrative of the cases involved. Here. I presumed that “narratives consist of a normal
distribution of implicit theoretical commitments.”
16
''’
In order to avoid selection bias
particularly in the case of Britain, there was explicit consideration of the
historiographical terrain. More specifically, the background narrative was constructed
through quasi-triangulation using the claims of different historians based on different
archival sources and/or implicitly theoretic or political angles.
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In order to trace the relationship between identity, and a state’s decision to
disengage from its colony or territorial possession, as well as the relationship between
domestic political structures and the manner in which states disengage, this dissertation
uses the process-tracing method. In this method, the chain of events or the decision-
making process which connects initial case conditions with the outcomes are
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Process-tracing is a particularly suitable method as it allows for the
unfolding of the “cause-effect link that connects independent variable to [the] outcome”
1 6H
whereby "the investigator looks for observable evidence of each step." In other
words, process-tracing allows for the tracing of the relationship between the dominant
169
identity and the stages involved in the decision-making of the case being examined.
Finally, confidence in the dissertation's account was established using pattern-
matching where an empirically-based pattern is compared with a predicted one. More
specifically, the empirical evidence from these cases were matched against the
theoretical account proposed in this project and those of alternative theoretical
approaches. For example. Realism would predict that Britain would maintain its hold
on India; and for Indonesia not to have even annexed East Timor since it was of little
material benefit to the archipelago. A theory based on the role of positive norms on the
other hand, would have predicted the absence of any contemplation on the part of the
Indonesians to annex East Timor in 1975. If alternative theories of international
politics such as realism and a constructivist approach based on norms are unable to
provide a more complete and satisfactory explanation of the outcomes of both cases in
comparison to the framework offered here, this should provide some confidence in the
validity of my theoretical account.
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1.8 The Road Ahead: A Brief Chapter Outline
Chapters 2 of this dissertation examines the case of Britain and the reaction of
British political elites to calls for constitutional reforms in India between 1929 and
1934. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth discussion of the case of Indonesia and East
Timor during the stasis of the Suharto period and discusses the transformations that
took place between mid- 1998 through 1999 when new' Indonesian leadership initiated
the processes of disengagement. Chapter 4. the concluding chapter of the dissertation,
summarizes the specific empirical findings of both cases and their implications for
territorial disengagement. It will also summarize the processes and mechanisms
involved in identity construction, contestation, change, the impact of identity on policy
in these two cases as well as general theoretical implications on how identity can be
understood in International Relations.
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CHAPTER 2
THE QUESTION OF INDIA: THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE DIEHARDS ANI)
THE REFORMERS IN BRITAIN, 1929-1935
“Responsibility at the centre to some people appears to be one of the Ten
Commandments that you must always observe, and to others it appears the
unforgivable sin that you must never commit.”
1
2.1 Introduction
When India became an independent and sovereign nation in 1947. Britain
appeared to have given up the lynchpin of its empire and its "secret to the mastery of
2
the world” without as much as a whimper. In 1947. this may have appeared to be the
case but the profound changes leading to the end of this imperial relationship did not
only begin during the 1940s. Substantial changes also took place in 1919, and between
1929 and 1935. The latter period, culminating in the 1935 Government of India Act,
challenges most perspectives that portray Britain’s disengagement from India as one
that was uncontested. It was in fact, the period in which the fiercest and most sustained
political battle was fought in twentieth century British politics over India or more
generally, over any colony of the British empire. This six-year battle and its outcome
was a major turning point in British politics regarding the question of India and forms
the focus of this chapter.
1
Samuel Hoare, House of Commons Debates. 260. c. 12 10 (2 December 1931 ).
~ Quoted in Bridge 1986. 2.
On the critical significance of this period, see Ball 1988, 128-9; and Pugh 1992.
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2.2 Interwar Britain And The Question Of India
During World War I, the government of David Lloyd George and self-avowed
imperialists in his cabinet like Lord Birkenhead approved the 1917 Montagu
Declaration which stated that British policy was the ‘“increasing association of Indians
in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing
institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in
India as an integral part of the British Empire.”’
4
While this declaration was made in
recognition of the need to keep India ‘contented and supportive’ due to its crucial
monetary and manpower contributions to the British war effort, it was in fact followed
by changes on the ground when the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were
implemented. These reforms devolved power from the centre to the provinces through
the introduction of a new constitutional structure called dyarchy. In this structure,
government functions were divided between the provinces and the center, with Indians
controlling policy at the local and provincial level, and the British holding on to foreign
affairs, defense and the economy, matters they regarded as the central areas of policy.
At the provincial level, power over governmental functions was again divided between
the British and the Indians. 'Transferred' subjects like education, health, agriculture,
public works and local self-government were placed under the responsibility of Indian
ministers who had to answer to the legislature and through it. the electorate. ‘Reserved’
subjects like law and order, finance, irrigation, land revenue administration and control
4
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of newspapers, books and presses on the other hand, were under the control of the
British-appointed Governor and his executive council.'"'
During this period in which the 1919 reforms were being implemented,
Mahondas K. Gandhi emerged as a pivotal figure in the Indian Congress Party and
Indian politics/' His strategy of satyagraha or peaceful resistance to perceived injustice
was a potently symbolic and effective means of challenging British colonial rule.
Phases of direct, non-violent opposition to the Raj took place, for example, between
1920 and 1922, and between 1930 and 1934. This method of resisting and contesting
colonial rule also alternated with participation in constitutional work of the legislatures.
While Congress’ appeal in India spread widely during this period, the strength of its
challenge to colonial rule was diluted by the problematic issue of its legitimacy as the
national voice - “'Liberal' politicians, articulate Untouchables, many Muslims and other
religious minorities, and India's princes and many of the substantial landowners with a
stake in the established order were deeply suspicious of Congress and resentful of its
exclusivist claims to speak for India.”'
3
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Metcalf and Metcalf argue that the reforms might have been accepted had it not been
for the Rowlatt Acts which allowed the British to maintain the powers of detention and
trial without jury that had been enforced (2002: 166). These measures evoked intense
hostility from Indians who viewed them as a bitter reward for their wartime sacrifices
and provoked protest like the effective nationwide work stoppages that were linked to
marches in major cities. Second, the failure of the British to wholly repudiate the 1919
Jalllianwalla Bagh massacre of unarmed protestors at Amritsar and the responsible
British officer led to a loss of faith in Britain's good intentions. It also became an
extremely significant symbol of colonial injustice.
Brown 1998, 434.
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In Britain, the issue of constitutional reforms and the promise of self-
government for India only exploded onto the political arena in 1929 with the Irwin
Declaration despite the 1919 reforms and developments in India. Initiated by Lord
Irwin, the Viceroy of India, the declaration stated formally that in the British view “the
natural issue of India's constitutional progress ... is the attainment of Dominion
status.”
8
By 1929, a different definition of 'Dominion status’ that was more expansive
than previously understood which had implied a measure of subordination to the British
Parliament, was already in the public domain. More specifically. Dominion status in
this new definition meant "autonomous communities within the British empire, equal in
status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external
affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as
9
members ot the British Commonwealth ol Nations.”
The Irwin Declaration had two immediate consequences. First, it rendered the
ongoing work of the Simon Commission, appointed in 1927 to review the effectiveness
of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, moot.
10
Headed by Sir John Simon, the
Commission toured India for 18 months and was only able to conclude in 1930. months
after Irwin had already issued his Declaration, that major problems like communalism.
ineffective provincial councils, and the lack of a true party system still existed. Since
Irwin was a Liberal Tory and Viceroy of India from 1926-1931. He was nominated to
the position by Stanley Baldwin who was also a personal friend.
° Moore 1983.
1
°Boyce 1999, 92. It was appointed early because the Tory government wanted to
appoint the members in anticipation of a possibly Liberal government coming to power
in the next election.
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the resolution of these problems were considered essential for further progress in India’s
path to self-government, the Simon report did not endorse further reforms at that time.
Second, the Irwin Declaration quickly became the source of debate and protest
in British politics. The declaration had been possible in large part due to happenstance
- a series of misunderstandings between the Simon Commission, the then Labour Prime
Minister Ramsay MacDonald, and Stanley Baldwin, the leader of the Conservative
Party, allowed it to slip through without much notice.
1
1
By the time these
misunderstandings came to light in the week preceding the announcement, copies of the
Declaration had already been released to Indian leaders. Postponing or reversing it was
therefore impossible despite the protests of Conservative and Liberal party experts on
India and most members of the Simon Commission.
In Britain, the battle lines over the right approach to the question of India were
drawn in late November that year. MacDonald supported and upheld Irwin’s initiative
but he had to refer it to the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties as he lacked a
parliamentary majority. Moreover, the genesis of the 1919 Act in a coalition of the
political parties in Britain and the all-party make-up of the Simon Commission dictated
P
that MacDonald and Labour would not be able to make any unilateral decisions.
Important figures of both the Liberal and Conservative parties strongly contested the
1
1
MacDonald had sent notice of Irwin's initiative to Baldwin who received it when he
w as at Bourges. en route to Aix-les-Bains, France. Assuming the agreement of the
Statutory Commission and without consulting his colleagues, Baldwin approved the
plan. The Commission on the other hand, had not seen the draft statement but
MacDonald's government assumed its acquiescence as its chairman. Sir John Simon,
knew of it. Similarly, Simon assumed that the initiative had Baldwin's approval when
the Government proceeded with it.
12
Moore 1983. 11.
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Irwin Declaration and in particular, its seeming promise that Dominion status implied
greater autonomy and independence, a stage that was far in advance of responsible self-
government.
1
Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India ( 1924 - 1928) and a member of
the Tories, described the declaration as making 'an indication never made before.’
Reading of the Liberal Party, "objected to the declaration chiefly because Indians would
14
view it as an advance in policy and demand early implementation.” Stanley Baldwin
was however the pivotal exception in these ranks. He supported Irwin’s initiative
despite being charged “with jettisoning the empire”
15
and more importantly, the
challenge to his leadership mounted by a Conservative-Liberal coalition.
While the Irwin initiative was upheld in 1929. there was continued and steadily
increasing domestic opposition in Britain to any changes in the country’s India policy
over the next several years. This political battle over the question of India reached a
peak in Britain in 1 934-35.
U
' During this two-year period, the White Paper for what
eventually became the Government of India Act of 1935 was scrutinized and bitterly
contested by both its proponents and opponents.
;
The latter were all members of the
Conservative Party and led by Winston Churchill. This group of diehards w;as
uncompromising in their opposition to these reforms, arguing that they were an
13
Moore 1983, 1 1.
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Moore 1983, 12.
15
Moore 1983, 11-12.
16
Ghosh 1972, 1 17.
17
Entitled Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform (CMD 4268). the White Paper
was hammered out in twenty-one meetings over a marathon six-week period in late
1932 by the British government’s Cabinet India Committee.
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abdication of Britain’s responsibility to India. Proponents of these reforms, also from
the Conservative Party and led by Stanley Baldwin, were convinced that the
implementation of these constitutional reforms would be the best and most effective
means of addressing the grow ing demands for self-government and independence in
India. While both had the same goal of holding India to the empire, these two groups
had very different ideas of how it could be achieved.
The bitter battle underlines the extreme controversy of the 1935 Act w hich
eventually passed after being the subject of approximately 2000 parliamentary
1
8
speeches. Forced through by a coalition National government that was helmed by
former Labour leader, Ramsay MacDonald, and underpinned by a Conservative
majority in parliament, this Act created a federation encompassing all of India, and gave
Indians effective self-government at the provincial level and majority representation in
1
9
the central government. Responsibility in the areas of foreign affairs and defense was
?o
however, retained by the British." The passage ot this Act was both a major loss for
diehard imperialists and a major political shift on the issue of India in Britain as the
2
1
diehards did not and could not raise another battle like this again - not in 1947 when
iS
Rubinstein 2003, 64. and Pugh 1999, 242. It became the most voluminous bill ever
passed at that time.
19
Pugh 1999. 242.
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Boyce 1999, 93. The constitutions ol Britain's white Dominions, Australia, New
Zealand, and Canada formed the model for the Act though it differed from them in
several important w'ays.
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Clement Attlee's Labour Government set a timetable for British withdrawal from India
nor in the 1950s and 1960s when most of Britain’s colonies became independent.
The next section of this chapter first examines several important factors that may
have played a role in the passage of the 1935 Act. The final part of the section then
focuses on the battle between the diehards and the reformers during the passage of the
act and more generally, between 1929 and 1935. Did this battle merely represent
superficial differences between two groups whose ultimate aim was the retention of
British power and supremacy? Were domestic interest groups with economic stakes in
India involved in influencing the positions of the diehards and the reformers? Was the
question of India part of a cynical strategy by these two groups in their own fight over
political power and the leadership of the Conservative Party? What was the battle
about?
2.3 Alternative Explanations
There is no doubt that India was central to the power and material interests of
the British for a long period of time. India w as a key staging post in imperial
communications and the base of a low-cost imperial army. It also held a key position in
Britain’s overseas trade network and investments which generated sterling remittances.
It was also a source of export of unskilled, indentured labour within the empire and a
22
place where Britons could find employment. This importance was reflected in their
imperial and diplomatic strategies between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I and
acknowledged by men like Lord Curzon who. in a letter to Arthur Balfour in 1901. said:
22 Low 1997. 27; Friedberg 1988, 218; and Brown 1998. 426.
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“As long as we rule India we are the greatest power in the world. If we lose it, we shall
drop straight away to a third rate power.”"
'
By the early part of the twentieth century however, the relationship was
changing. The system of indentured labor had been terminated in 1917 while
opportunities for expatriate employment had decreased as an increasing number of
.... ?4
Indians joined the military, police, and civilian services. Britain's fiscal and
commercial relationship with India was also undergoing such drastic changes that the
latter became the holder of a sizeable sterling balance that was draining Britain’s scarce
resources. Instead of shoring up Britain’s material power, India was turning into a net
?5
liability. ~ Despite these changes, there were no decisions made to cut India adrift.
There is in fact little concrete evidence to suggest that material factors were primary in
British decisions regarding India's political future. Even in the critical period after
World War II when Britain was facing a financial Dunkirk, economic issues, and in
particular, the massive debt which Britain had incurred from India, were considered by
“Treasury and cabinet as a ‘technical’, short-term aberration and it did not figure in
their high political decision-making over India.”
A second argument along the realist vein points to these reforms as a means of
stemming its quickly eroding position in India and holding it to the empire in the
" Quoted in Friedberg 1988. 220.
24
Brown 1998, 439.
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Holland 1991.
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ultimate effort to maintain Britain's diminishing power around the globe. Thus, the
1935 Act was an inevitable or inescapable conclusion for British politicians and
policymakers and nothing more than a means of satisfying and co-opting the forces of
nationalism in order to prolong the British hold on India.
-
While I do not dispute that
the relevant politicians in Britain wanted India to remain part of the empire. I argue that
realist approaches that point to this are incomplete because they start from the
assumption that there was a unitary voice representing the British state and its interests.
In reality, there was no pre-formed unitary voice. Instead, there were two main groups,
as discussed later in this section, who despite having the same goal of holding India to
the empire, had competing positions regarding how these interests could be best
achieved.
Domestic-level explanations focused on groups and political parties may
provide some insight into these competing positions. In early twentieth century Britain,
the area of Lancashire had the most to lose from the implementation of the 1935
Government of India Act. Before 1914. Lancashire’s industries produced a quarter of
?9
all British exports and employed nearly a million people. India w as in turn vital to
Lancashire’s continued prosperity as it was the largest market of the latter’s cotton
30
textile industry, absorbing halt of its total exports/ During the interwar period
Brown 1994; and Bridge 1986.
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however. Lancashire suffered severe economic distress and its cotton textile industry
was hit particularly hard due to competition from India, the United States and Japan.
' 1
Bv 1931, the unemployment rate in Lancashire was over 40 percent and the region was
in a deep recession.
Many in Lancashire connected the region’s economic difficulties with the Indian
Fiscal Autonomy Convention, granted as part of the 1919 reforms which gave New'
Delhi the ability to set an independent tariff policy. By 1931, a general duty of 25
percent had been imposed on all British products and a duty of 15 per cent, on the
33
cotton industry. Therefore, proposals for greater Indian autonomy in the first half of
the 1930s were met with great apprehension and opposition for those w ho feared that
there would be further imposition of import duties “by a nationalist India for political
34
rather than economic or revenue raising purposes.” During this period. Lancashire
interests did indeed attempt to influence and shape the British government’s India
policy through business lobbies. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce (MCC) and
31
Muldoon 2003. 94.
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In practice, 'an independent tariff policy’ did not mean the same thing across all British
cabinets. It “varied from administration to administration and from Secretary of State to
Secretary of State.” Montagu, for instance, had used the convention to underline the
British Government’s powerlessness to come to the aid in Lancashire in 1921, but Peel,
in contrast, had made it clear to the government of India that he considered that the
British government had the right to make ‘representations to in relation to fiscal policy
which affected British interests” (Peele 131).
34
Peele 1975. 132: and Ghosh 1972. 1 1. British exporters also used the Indian situation
to mask the fact that they were losing their share of the market due to tough competition
from Japan and the U.S..
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the more aggressive Cotton Trade League in particular, mounted an intensive campaign
35
to eliminate or reduce the Indian tariff harrier. Were they however, successful in
influencing and shaping the interests or the strategies of the diehards or the reformers?
The reformers, and in particular, Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for India
( 1931 - 35), the India Office as well as the Cabinet did appear to take the concerns and
interests of Lancashire MPs seriously. Hoare for example, made a concession to the
lobby by including Lord Derby, advocate of Lancashire Conservatism and supporter of
the region's business interests in the Joint Select Committee examining the 1935
Government of India Act. However, this concession was mainly symbolic as Derby not
only disliked constituency politics but was also a pragmatist who avoided anything that
might split the party and drive it from power. Instead of giving in to these interests,
Hoare concentrated on waging "a determined and energetic campaign to ensure that the
region did not cause his Indian plans to lounder in the Commons." Moreover, the
Lancashire lobby was hardly a monolithic entity when it came to the Indian question.
While there was a faction that had a more narrow and embittered perspective on the
region’s economic problems and certainly wanted to derail these reforms, there was also
35 Muldoon 2003, 95-97; and Ghosh 1972, 11.
The MCC was “an umbrella group whose members came not just from the textile trade,
but from all areas of the region’s economic life” while the Cotton Trade League was
formed in early 1933 by a group that saw the MCC as too moderate and cautious in its
approach. However, those involved with the CTL did not renounce their affiliation with
the MCC but lobbied “within that body for a more direct and aggressive attack on the
government’s India policy, arguing that India had already attained too much autonomy,
fiscal and otherwise” (Muldoon 97).
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a moderate camp with powerful and influential figures of the Manchester Chamber of
Commerce like Raymond Streat and T.D. Barlow who were not only willing but co-
operated with Hoare.
The diehards could have strategically linked Lancashire’s economic issues to
their campaign against the Government of India bill. This political potential was
however, never harnessed by the diehards who focused most of their energies on the
importance of India to British prestige as well as the political, moral, and strategic
aspects of the constitutional reforms. Churchill in particular, was never able to disavow
himself of his belief in free trade and therefore, could not conceive the economic
potential that was present if the empire was redeveloped into a British-directed
40
economic zone, an idea that was being discussed by intellectual circles ol that period.
At the end of the day. the Lancashire lobby met with little success and did not in any
way dominate or influence the debates over the question of India in the 1930s.
41
If economic actors were not influential, what about the political parties whose
electoral interests and power may be directly linked to the fortunes of the empire? The
British Labour Party did not perceive their electoral interests during this period to be
served by adopting a stance of fervent anti-imperialism. Generally, the interests of the
young party laid in the validation of its claims to be a responsible party of
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government. " At that time, being responsible entailed achieving a bipartisan approach
and disproving tears that a Labour Government would lead to the end of empire.
While it is true that some segments of the Labour Party did oppose British
colonialism for moral reasons, these reforms were also not part of the party’s careful
plan with India’s self-government and independence as the final and long-standing
44
goal. In fact, the work of historians like J. Gallagher, P.G. Robb, B.R. Tomlinson and
Carl Bridge point to "little sign of selfless abdication in British constitutional reforms”
in British policy-making between 1917 and 1947.
4:>
The Labour Party of the 1920s and early 1930s was led by Ramsay MacDonald
who made his party’s India policy his own.46 MacDonald's position on India was
formed during the first decade of the twentieth century and it remained unchanged
throughout the time he had leadership of his party and country.
4
Unlike left-wing
factions within the party who had begun to identify with the Indian nationalist
movement, MacDonald and key members of his frontbench rejected and discounted the
4
“ Howe 1993, 46; and Cook 1975, 201.
43
Howe 1993,46.
44
Bridge and Blasted 1994, 94. See Howe 1993 as well.
4
Brasted and Bridge 1994, 95; Gallagher 1982; Robb 1976; and Tomlinson 1976.
4f
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his Secretaries of State for India, Lord Olivier ( 1924) and W. Wedgwood Benn (1929-
193 1 ). Lord Olivier, a colonial administrator, shared MacDonald’s diagnosis of
nationalism and would do nothing without his direction.
47
Brasted and Bridge 1989; and Bridge 1976, 397.
69
48
nationalism of the Indian Congress Party as "a dead-end in Indian development."
MacDonald believed that India was not a national entity but only a geographic
expression with acute differences and divisions of caste, race and religion.
4
* Thus, a
'unifying and controlling power’ was needed to ensure harmony. According to
MacDonald. Britain had not only played this role and ’saved" India but would have to
continue as “the guardian and the nurse of India’" until a remote day in the future when
it was ready for self-governance.
°
Labour’s policies during its two terms in office during the 1920s were consistent
with this view. In 1924 for example, overtures from India for a Dominion constitution,
calls to accelerate the appointment of what eventually became the Simon Commission,
and a unanimous call by the Party for a round table conference to prepare a scheme of
self-government were either rejected or ignored by MacDonald’s government.
1 When
Labour took office for the second time ( 1929-1931 ). their policy remained focused on
5 ?
remaining in India until it could be “launched, properly, honestly and honourably.’’
48
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The dichotomy in Labour attitudes began with the differences in the attitudes of J.K.
Hardie who headed the party in the first decade of the 20 th century and Ramsay
MacDonald.
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This is reflected in their support of the Irwin initiative and the 1935 constitutional
reforms for India.'
For the Conservative Party, the empire had long held a central place in its
ideology as well as its organizational and electoral interests. Generally. Conservative
parties had three political alternatives when faced with an unenviable minority position
due to the expansion of the electoral base with the advent of universal suffrage in the
late nineteenth century - subclass loyalties, religion or nationalism. As Kahler points
out, relying on subclass loyalties had distinct limits due to increasing urbanization.
Religion was also an ineffective rallying point due to secularization as well as its
potential to divide members of a conservative coalition.'"
14
Only nationalism “was fairly
resistant to erosion by internal social change.”^
Harnessing nationalism and cultivating its status and self-image as a national
party was indeed the path adopted by the Conservative Party in Britain. With Benjamin
Disraeli’s premiership in the late nineteenth century, imperialism was central to their
politics of nationhood.'
1
'' Retaining the empire would therefore have appeared to be the
logical and rational position for such a party.
However, the Conservatives did not have a unitary voice or position on the issue
of India when it arose - the ranks of the party were deeply divided on the matter.
' Blasted and Bridge 1988, 86.
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Proponents of these constitutional reforms like Stanley Baldwin. Lord Irwin and Sir
Samuel Hoare tied them to British and Indian interests. Their policies were little
different from those of the Labour Party’s. In fact, Baldwin’s front-bench and
Macdonald’s front bench have been described “as ditching their "dissident factions’, and
arriving at ‘a sort of interpenetration of ideas’” on the question of India/
7
The
contentious 1929 Irwin Declaration, for example, had come from Lord Irwin himself, a
Conservative who had been appointed by the Conservative Party.
Baldwin's 1924 general election manifesto spells out their attitude well:
“We favour the progressive grant of constitutional liberties in every part of the
Empire where the capacity and loyalty of the people will make such measures a
benefit to themselves and a strength to the Empire. But we are no less
determined to maintain the authority and the unity of the Empire against factions
58
and misguided agitation wherever it may assert itself.”
Reformers like Samuel Hoare, the main Conservative framer of the 1935 Act.
59
argued that constitutional reforms were the only way to "hold India to the empire.”” It
carried out well and skillfully, reforms would not be putting British dominion over India
at risk as the diehards alleged. Instead, they would strengthen British control at the
centre even as there was a devolution of power to India's provincial governments.
60
Last but not least, these reforms were also considered an important part of a process
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which would assist India in making "a smooth transition, in the fullness of times, to
dominion status.”
61
Neither the party’s interests nor Baldwin’s own political or personal interests
were actually served by this position. ~ Baldwin laced constant challenges to his
leadership and also critically, threats that might have been fatal to the Conservative
Party in the early 1930s.
63
William Gladstone's decision to contemplate Home Rule for
Ireland in the late nineteenth century and its irrevocable damage to the Liberal Party
was a parallel that was not far from his mind.
64
Over the course of several years, there
were many indicators of a possible party revolt as there were many who disagreed with
the position that he had adopted on India. In February 1931 for example, there was
growing cause for concern at the Central Conservative Office when growing hostility
towards the India proposals from among the party rank and tile became more
apparent.
66
In February 1933, this widespread unease was conveyed in a constituency
resolution received by an MP who was a close friend of Baldwin's which stated the
following:
"The demand for a central self-government comes not from the people of India
as a whole, but from a small, noisy minority of townsfolk, whereas 89 percent of
the population are not town dwellers and 66 per cent are rural cultivators. What
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the great majority of Indians desire is not self-government, but firm and stable
i ,„66
rule.
Two months later in April 1933. the Government’s White Paper policy was rejected by
161 votes to 17 at the annual meeting of the Horsham and Worthing Conservative
Association despite a defense put up by Lord Winterton, their MP for the last 29
67
years.
In June 1933. the issue was finally put to a vote on a resolution which expressed
grave anxiety over the proposed transfer of the central government, the judicial system,
and the police to the hands of Indian ministers at a meeting of the Conservative Central
Council attended by more than 1200 Conservatives. While Baldwin’s win of 838 votes
to 356 after three years of constant attack ensured that his position on the India question
could not easily be challenged within the party again, it was still the largest party vote
so far recorded against his position on the India policy.
68
Opponents of the reform like Winston Churchill and other diehards argued that
they would ultimately harm Indian as well as British interests for several reasons. One.
they argued that the Indian Congress Party, considered the primary beneficiary of these
reforms, did not represent all of India and was unfit to govern. Second, these reforms or
concessions, as they called them, was the beginning of the end of the British Empire as
66
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well Britain’s leading plaee in the world. Finally, approving and implementing these
reforms would be nothing but an act of irresponsibility and cowardice.
70
While some have argued that Churchill was using the India issue to usurp
Baldwin's position as Party leader in order to assume it himself, his long-term
commitment to his position on India did not lead to any personal political gain for he
was isolated from his former colleagues in the Cabinet and rejected by many within the
Conservative Party because of this issue.
71
He in fact, spent years in the political
wilderness because of his stance on the question of India. There was also no doubt in
Churchill’s mind, according to the author of a multi-volume biography on him "that his
chosen course could only weaken still further his political position, and possibly destroy
7?
altogether his chance ol future political oftice." ~ Thus, there was nothing rational or
self-interested in these actions which drove Churchill forward and sustained him in this
much-derided course.
While it may be tempting to write off these differences between opponents of
the reforms and its supporters within the Conservative Party as a normal part of
policymaking, there was nothing prosaic about them as the two men representing
opposing sides of the divide had everything to lose and nothing at the personal level to
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gain. In fact, the battle over India had also placed the Conservative Party in danger of
being torn apart and its future, at great risk.
I do not argue with many historians of the period who see these constitutional
reforms as the actions of a group of desperate politicians and policymakers who were
trying to patch up an empire that was in the first stages of decline. For theoretical
perspectives that stress the structural determinants of the international system or the
importance of power in understanding and explaining the behavior of states, this may
appear to be all that matters. However, such conclusions exclude the issue of how and
why Baldwin and the reformers chose to embark on this particular path. How did they
arrive at the conclusion that holding India to the empire laid with constitutional reforms
rather than in the rejection of them, the path adopted by the diehards? This difference
cannot and should not be easily dismissed for three reasons. First, it was something that
was critically important to the two groups who fought a long and bloody political battle
over this. Second, the path of India’s decolonization was irrevocably set by the events
and decisions taken between 1929 and 1935 - they ensured that Britain could not, even
as Churchill wished later in 1947, to "arrest or reverse these developments. In that
sense Churchill’s stricture that there was no logical stopping point for their policy
before full independence was true.”
4
Third, outcomes in international politics, contra
realism and neo-Realism, are not always dependent on the ultimate goal of the decision-
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makers but the strategies and the means that they choose in order to arrive at these
goals.
7 ''’
Before ending this section, a final note is necessary on the role and position of
the Conservative Party in the governing structure of Britain during the first half of the
1930s. Between 1931 and 1935, Ramsay MacDonald headed a National government
which had been initially formed as a temporary measure to cope with a very serious
national economic crisis. MacDonald and a small group of Labour supporters had
broken away from the Labour Party to form National Labour and run as a coalition with
the Conservative Party in the 1931 general election. While MacDonald held the
premiership, the Conservative Party was the dominant member of this coalition with the
means and ability to influence and shape the policy on India. In the election, the
Conservative Party won 473 seats, polled 55 per cent of the total vote and formed the
core component of the National Government of the 1930s.
7h
Thus, the success of any
Indian policy depended upon the attitudes of the Conservative Party and the extent to
which the Tory leader could contain any rebellion over the issue. Baldwin’s victory
in this battle is therefore important because it placed Britain’s road to disengagement
from India on a different route that was not only different but would allow for far more
radical changes in the future. Had Baldwin lost the leadership of the Conservative Party
° Kiel’s 1997 argument that culture and organizational norms were important factors
which resulted in the adoption of a defensive rather than an offensive position, and the
construction of the seriously flawed Maginot Line in post-World War I French military
strategy is an example of this.
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in the early 1930s, a distinct probability then, the path leading to the end of British rule
in India could have been extremely different, characterized perhaps, by much greater
resistance from London.
S
In the rest of this chapter, I examine why and how having the same goal of
holding India to the empire led to such a chasm between the diehards and the reformers.
In other words, how did the same goal of retaining India produce two policies which
were not only extremely different but irreconcilable for the two groups? Why,
critically, did these differences take the form that they did? Section 2.4 embarks on this
task by first outlining the arguments made by each of these two groups regarding India.
I focus on arguments as they are one of the main processes by which actors in world
79
politics attempt to communicate and persuade others ol their position.
2.4 Contesting Britishness and Constitutional Reforms for India
2.4.1 Churchill, the Diehards and An Unchanging India
Besides Winston Churchill, the most prominent of these diehards in government
circles included retired officials like Sir Michael O' Dwyer. Lord Syndenham, Sir Alfred
Know, Sir Reginald Craddock. Professor Charles Oman and Lord Lloyd. Members of
Parliament like Henry Page-Croft. William H. Davison. Victor Raikes, the Duchess of
Atholl. Sir Robert Horne. Patrick Donner, Alan Lennox-Boyd. H. Brendan-Bracken and
Commander P.G. Agnew and members of the House of Lords like Lord Salisbury.
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Midleton. Burnham, Edward Carson, Hartington, Sumner and FitzAlan. These
diehards also formed pressure groups like the Indian Empire Society and the India
Defence League to oppose the proposed reforms.
1
Comprised mainly of retired
officials, the former’s main activity consisted of publishing its monthly journal. The
Indian Empire Review and working with the diehards. This group worked closely with
the Indian Defence League which had been founded by some Conservative MPs to
bolster the effectiveness of their position as the Society had a public image as an
organization of administrators and officials with a rigid view on India.
In fighting Baldwin and the reformers’ proposals to grant responsibility at the
centre and the transfer of responsibility for law and order to the control of ministers in
the provinces, the diehards made several main arguments regarding India which they
would repeat throughout all of the six years that these reforms were being debated.
First, the diehards insisted that Britain was bound by duty and a historic mission “to
82
bring peace and good government to India.” " Besides being a necessary part of India's
development, the diehards also made the crucial claim that British rule had been the
most important factor in reversing the sub-continent from "ages of barbarism, tyranny,
and intestine war.”
83
The noble sacrifices and sense of duty of “four or five generations
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of the best British race" had banished war from India, defended her frontiers against
invasion from the north, controlled famine and developed a system where a district
facing crop failure would be able to draw on surpluses from another, and implemented
the rule of law where justice was served impartially regardless of race or caste.
Moreover, the British had brought the wonders of medicine and science to a 'helpless'
84
population, improving their health and mortality rates.
However, the diehards insisted that Britain’s work was far from over despite all
the ‘achievements’ they had listed in bringing ‘civilization’ to India. A second and
pivotal part of their arguments rested on their insistence that the facts in India were
85
timeless and unchanged. In a speech at the House ot Commons. Churchill insisted:
“What are the facts in India? We are told that the opinion of India has changed.
But the facts of India have not changed. They are immemorial.”
86
What then were these timeless and immemorial “facts' according to the
diehards ? The most important of these were what they considered the inherent and
irreconcilable differences in appearance, customs, habits, language and faith of
Punjabis, Gurkhas, Jats. Pathans. and others across the sub-continent. India, they
argued, was populated by "great masses of people of utterly divergent views upon
religion and with utterly different outlooks upon life and who are utterly contemptuous
84
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87
of the ways and habits of one another.’* They considered it undeniable that these
divisions in India were the cause of its “fierce racial and religious dissensions” and a
primitive hate that was 'unimaginable* to the British.
“We cannot easily conceive what these hatreds are. There are mobs of
neighbours, people who have dwelt together in the closest proquinity all their
lives, who. when held and dominated by these passions, will tear each other to
88
pieces, men, women and children with their fingers.”
'
Therefore, the diehards had a model of South Asian society where communities
dominated by systems of irreconcilable religious beliefs were constantly in conflict.
S '
Henry Page-Croft for example, pointed unceasingly to the Moplah massacres, of Hindus
by Muslims, and the Cawnpore massacre, of Muslims by Hindus, as incontrovertible
c , . 90prool this.
With these 'facts’ regarding deep and ancient divisions based on caste and
religion in India, the diehards concluded that there would be "the immediate
91
presumption of medieval wars” without the British there to maintain peace, order and
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stability. India, in other words, still needed rescuing from itself - the proposed
constitutional reforms and the subsequent withdrawal of British influence and
governance in many areas of Indian life would be the beginning of a slippery slope to
the re-emergence of these differences that would rip the country and its inhabitants
92
apart. " Based on these 'facts’, the diehards argued unwaveringly that India, with its
93
different classes, religions, languages and castes, was not and could never be a nation.
The legitimacy of Indian nationalism and their demands for independence was
94
therefore, dismissed and the end of British colonial rule considered far too premature.
A second 'fact' that emerged continually in their speeches and arguments was
that calls for British withdrawal came from an insignificant fraction of the Indian
95
population who were either “a few agitators with goat and loin cloth" ‘ or those
wielding Western ideas that had “no relation whatever to the life and thought of
96
India." Instead of representing all of India, the members of this elite, usually the
leaders of Indian Congress Party - merely represented "those Indians who have
acquired a veneer of western civilization, and have read all those books about
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democracy which Europe is now beginning to discard.” If enacted, the diehards
believed that the constitutional reforms would only usher in a "well-organized, narrowly
98
elected, political and religious Brahmin oligarchy and caucus.” Hence, what would
99
ensue would not be "‘India for the Indians" but “India for a very few Indians."
The diehards also insisted without any self-consciousness that the masses in
India needed Britain’s protection from the elite minority who were clamoring for self-
government and independence instead of from them, the colonizers. The sixty million
untouchables in the Indian caste system, for example, were invoked. Churchill
described them as:
“a multitude as big as a nation, men. women and children deprived of hope and
of the status of humanity. Their plight is worse than that of slaves because they
have been taught to consent not only to a physical but to a psychic servitude and
„ioo
prostration.
Should the 1935 Government of India Act be enacted and the impartial protection of the
British removed, the diehards argued that the untouchables would be utterly powerless
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The invocations of the plight of Afghan women during the US campaign in
Afghanistan follows similar lines. While this is not an argument that Afghan women
had been subjugated and treated like objects, it should not negate the fact that they had
been used in this instance for political purposes as well.
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“to control or to make their wishes felt by the their new rulers.’'
101
The latter’s rights
“to a bearable existence would be swept away once Indians became responsible for their
kp
own affairs ~ as the Hindus, they argued, “would tyrannize the untouchables, and
deny them all human rights.”
10
' Hence, they insisted again and again that it was
morally their duty to remain in India as it was still plagued by severe issues.
The final key component of the arguments was the connection that they made
between remaining in India and Britain’s greatness as a nation. India was central to the
“glory and strength of the British empire. The loss of India would mark and
consummate the downfall of the British empire. The great organism would pass
at a stroke out of life into history. From such a catastrophe there could be no
„ 104
recovery.
Without India, it would “cease forever to exist as a Great Power.”
10
'"'
The proposed
reforms were considered a catastrophic act from which “there could be no recovery,”
106
a 'hideous act of self-mutilation astounding to every nation in the world’
107
and a
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‘scuttle’ from Empire that was tantamount to an abdication of Britain’s leading place in
the world.
108
Leaving India would be cowardly, dishonourable and shameful, an act
that would destroy any claims to the country’s morality, courage, benevolence, and
superiority, all elements of its greatness. It would turn "the British lion, so fierce and
valiant in bygone days, so dauntless and unconquerable through all the agony of
Armageddon” into something that could now be "chased by rabbits from the fields and
forests of his former glory.”
10)
In general, the diehards argued that the masses needed the British to provide
them with the peace, order and justice that enabled them to continue “their humble and
narrowly spent livelihood^].”'
10
The elite minority in India who were demanding for
self-government would never bring this about for they were, crucially, depicted and
contrasted against the British by the diehards as being narrowly self-interested,
untrustworthy, incompetent and uncivilized. These elites were "a comparatively small
and utterly unrepresentative political faction” who would place the masses on the altar
of “misgovernment, of deterioration in every public service, of religious bigotry of a
kind not dreamed of for generations in the West, and finally of civil war.”
1 1
1
Thus, the
diehards argued that Britain had no right to deliver India into the hands of these elites.
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Instead, Britain had the duty, responsibility and obligation to create the conditions that
would bring about:
"peacelul existence and progress to about three hundred and fifty millions of
helpless primitive people who are separated by an almost measureless gulf from
the ideas and institutions of the western world.”
1 12
Abrogating this responsibility would also be the beginning of the end of the
greatness of Great Britain.
2.4.1. 1 The Indian ‘Other’ and the Construction of British Greatness
What was the basis of these facts and arguments brandished by the diehards?
These 'facts' that the diehards insisted again and again about India, the corresponding
consequences should the British withdraw and the need to rescue the sub-continent from
itself were not based on a complete or accurate understanding of Indian history, society
and politics. A key piece in the diehards’ representation of India was that it was a place
of deep divisions, unimaginable primitive hatreds and characterized by ‘barbaric
practices’.
India’s diversity was undeniable at that time. It was and is an area of great
geographic, economic and social diversity with a large population of distinctive regional
identities, languages and vernaculars spread across a territory the size of western
1 13
Europe. However, Indian society was never static, timeless and unchanging as
1
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depicted by the diehards as well as other colonial observers and scholars - “what was
seen in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as traditional was often not of many
114
generations standing. Muslims in India, often singled out by the diehards as an
example of the inevitability of communal politics, were not calling in the early 1930s
for "a nationhood defined by religion: merely distinctive status needing safeguards in a
political world where numbers become increasingly important.” 1 18 A simple linear
development of an all-Indian Muslim politics, claiming nationhood for Muslims just did
,
• ,116
not exist.
In fact, the British had played a larger role in constructing the political and
social identities of Indians through their own understanding of Indians in terms of
religious identification and its subsequent institutionalization through their
implementation of various political processes and structures which emphasized them.
1 17
One of these processes was in the decennial censuses in India where the population was
counted and categorized by religion and by caste.
1 18
Besides this problematic understanding of Indian society, the diehards were also
unable to accept or understand that changes were taking place in Indian politics in the
form of political participation and the development and evolution of the Indian National
Congress as a political party. The 1919 reforms had begun to slowly change the make-
114
Browm 1998. 427.
1 15
Brown 1998. 435.
116
Brown 1998, 434.
1 1
7
Brown 1 998, 434.
1 1
8
This practice is sharply different from censuses conducted in Britain.
87
1 1
9
up of the governing and decision-making structures of the Raj. By 1929, there were
367 Indian men in the Indian Civil Service alongside 894 Europeans. Indians also
formed a large part of the military, the police force, the courts as well as the lower
. . . 120
echelons of the civil service. Moreover, the enlargement of legislatures in Delhi and
the provincial capitals, the acquisition of a majority by elected Indians and a large
measure of influence over finance ensured that Indians had experience in government
and decision-making, as defined by the British. At the same time, a wide range of
people, e.g. educated professionals, landowners, large and petty businessmen and
substantial farmers were channeling their political interests into the new political arenas
in the provinces “because the power on offer there, though limited, was none the less
121
significant.” A more democratic, electorally-oriented culture was evolving and
1 22
would “profoundly influence styles of successful politics and political organization."
The Indian National Congress was in 1914, "a loose organization and often
divided federation of local, educated men, predominantly Hindus, who met annually to
123
make limited political demands.” ~ Its attempts in the 1920s to re-organize itself as a
political party with widespread appeal and organizational structures from the centre
down to the village level were admittedly, unsuccessful. By the late 1930s however,
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Congress had begun “to resolve these problems related to its status both as a party and
1 ^4
as a voice of national demand.” It had achieved electoral success by 1937-39,
formed the governments in seven provinces, assembled a leadership of all-India figures
and perhaps most critically, had “become the natural political environment in which
most Hindus interested in politics chose to function, rather than adopting independent or
125
more ideological labels.” " It was therefore, quite inaccurate to portray them merely as
a party of self-interested and elitist Brahmins.
When compared to such far more accurate renderings of Indian society and
politics, it is tempting to accuse the diehards of gross distortions and dishonesty in their
polemical reviews of the facts about India and "their hysterical insistence on the
1
catastrophic consequences of granting Indian control at the centre." Such a
conclusion is too premature as the diehards, their arguments and their beliefs must be
placed within a larger context. Their views of India were not unique but embedded
within a larger and almost homogeneous British view of India that existed at the start of
the twentieth century. This view underlined India’s difference from the British
“in religion, morals, society and political identity and capacity. In India,
difference and assumed racial superiority were demonstrated in British patterns
of residence, apart from their Indian subjects, in 'white town’, in the bungalows
of civil lines, or supremely in hill stations where they took their holidays in an
environment as nearly like home as they could contrive. These assumptions
were also evident in the racially self-contained life of the British, whose
124
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standards and hierarchies were policed by the memsahibs as guardians of
English domesticity and gentility. The reverse of this was a distaste for Indian
society, particularly Hindu customs, a distaste which focused on religion, caste
and the treatment of Indian women. Indian society w as seen as decadent,
irrational, and dominated by religion. In political terms, Indians were seen as
almost irrevocably divided by religion, caste and language, lacking the civic
virtues of Victorian bourgeois England, and incapable of either national
127
sentiment or self-determination.”
India and other British colonies served as the site of difference against which a
dominant strand of British identity w as constituted and constructed. British colonies
were often depicted and portrayed in official reports, the media, popular books and
academic treatises as backward with economic and political systems that were either
non-existent, substantially undeveloped or despotic and tyrannical. Socially and
culturally, the inhabitants of these colonies were often classified and fixed in the
universal scheme of things as barbaric, irrational and childlike with no means of
advancing or progressing without centuries of external tutelage and help. The colonies,
in other words, were on the lowest rung of the civilizational ladder due to inherently
flawed national characteristics or culture.
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This was no different from other European states with empires during the eighteenth,
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For a general overview, see Cooper and Stoler
1997.
An influential treatment on the subject also argues that British identity, first constructed
through shared Protestantism and against the “Other” of Catholic France in a succession
of major wars during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was further strengthened
through the shared participation of the English. Scots and Welsh (and to a certain
degree, the Irish) in the imperial enterprise which marginalized the differences between
them (Colley 1992, 311).
The literature on the formation of British identity is vast and covers a broad historical
period. For a good review of the different theoretical perspectives in the literature, see
Connors 2001.
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In contrast, the British highlighted the rationality and growing capacity of their
stable and enlightened political system, and system of law. Economically, they
contrasted their economic growth, industrialization and high standard of living with the
poverty of their colonies. Their advances in science, technology and areas of medicine
were also held up as proof of their superiority. Socially, they contrasted their treatment
of women against some of the practices in their colonies, and highlighted their moral
leadership in banning the slave trade and encouraging the spread of Christianity through
129
the work of missionaries and their civilizing activities. These economic, political,
technological, organizational, ideological and cultural differences were considered
proof of their inherent superiority and place on the top rungs of civilization.
Through these Self/Other mechanisms in which the less civilized and developed
colonies were the Other, the British Self was presented and constructed as the heroic
conqueror, humane judge, and civilizing agent - politically, economically, socially and
morally exceptional people w ho had an unquestioned and “leading role as an agent of
civilization and progress.”' ° Britishness was thus equated with the superiority of
British character and ideas and the view that they had a special duty to fulfill in the
world because history had thrust a certain destiny upon them.' By the middle of the
nineteenth century, for example, this vision of Britain as not only having the right but
the need to “remake mankind in its own image” was shared by a wide swath of British
129
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society. " This was expressed quite succinctly by Lord Palmerston, Foreign Secretary
and later Prime Minister who said: “We stand at the head of moral, social and political
civilization. Our task is to lead the way and to direct the march of other nations.”
Besides this mechanism, there were other cultural and political processes which
sustained this construction of British identity. The empire, despite the lack of factual
knowledge which ordinary Britons possessed about their overseas possessions, was at
the heart of “both popular and high culture in Britain from the eighteenth to the mid-
.134
twentieth centuries.“ Imperial themes were implicitly and explicitly, a vital and
135
intrinsic part of British art, literature and music, the high culture of the nation.
Stories, images, sounds, and sentiments of the empire were also present in common,
everyday things ranging from tea towels, biscuit tins, soap advertisements, young
children’s adventure stories to music hall jingles.
Political processes initiated by the Conservative Party under Benjamin Disraeli
were also important in maintaining this constitution of British identity.
I (
’ In a famous
speech to the National Union of Conservative Associations at the Crystal Palace in June
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1872. Disraeli stated that the empire was not only one of the party’s three great
objectives but fundamental to Britain's raison d’etre.
“When you return to your homes, when you return to your counties and your
cities, you must tell to all those whom you can influence that the time is at hand,
that, at least, it cannot be far distant, when England will have to decide between
national and cosmopolitan principles. The issue is not a mean one. It is whether
you will be content to be a comfortable England, modelled and moulded upon
continental principles and meeting in due course an inevitable fate, or whether
you will be a great country, - an imperial country - a country where your sons,
when they rise, rise to paramount positions, and obtain not merely the esteem of
their countrymen, but command the respect of the world. ..You have nothing to
trust but the sublime instinct of an ancient people. You must act as if everything
depended on your individual efforts. The secret of success is constancy of
purpose. Go to your homes, and teach there, these truths, which will soon be
imprinted the conscience of the land... you will deliver to your posterity, a land
of liberty, of prosperity, of power, and of glory.”
137
In the years that followed, they did their best to redeem this pledge with the
expansion and defense of the British empire as guides in their foreign and economic
policy. During the late Victorian period, the Transvaal in Southern Africa was annexed
and war was declared on the Zulus in pursuit of a scheme to create a South African
federation. War was threatened against the Russians in 1877 to prevent the latter’s
expansion in the Balkans. In 1878, war was waged against Afghanistan to forestall the
Russian threat to the North-West Frontier.
I S
These policies, together with the
spectacular proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India in 1 876. became
outward projections of a British identity and national interests during the late nineteenth
century that was synonymous with a “spirited engagement with opportunities and
1
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commotions abroad; rugged leonine patriotism; land a] doctrine of adventure and
1 ^9
pluck."
The diehards' arguments about Britain’s destiny to extend benevolent and
enlightened rule to the ’chaotic’ masses of India and to spread civilization and progress
throughout the world was part of a process rooted in argument and rhetoric which
contributed to maintaining an idea of British greatness that was built and constructed
against the difference and 'Otherness' of India. Crucially, a key part of being British, as
conceived by the diehards. involved much more than this. In their arguments, the
diehards focused explicitly on the consequences of passing these reforms for what it
would mean to be British. The following passage is particularly revealing:
“At present the Government of India is responsible to the British Parliament
which is the oldest, the least unwise and the most democratic parliament in the
world. To transfer that responsibility to this highly artificial and restricted
oligarchy of Indian politicians would be a retrograde act. It would be a
shameful act. It would be an act of cowardice, desertion and dishonour. It
would bring grave material evils, both upon India and Great Britain; but it would
bring upon Great Britain a moral shame which would challenge for ever the
reputation of the British Empire as a valiant and benignant force in the history of
mankind. The faithful discharge of our duty in India is not only a cause, but a
symbol. It is the touchstone of our fortunes in the present difficult time. If we
cannot do our duty in India, be sure we shall have shown ourselves unworthy to
preserve the vast Empire which still centres upon this island. ... What we
require to do now is to stand erect and look the world in the face, and do our
duty without fear or favour.”
140
There is no doubt that a country’s greatness was certainly something that could
be measured in material terms. Churchill for example, did draw a parallel between the
much diminished Holland of the twentieth century and a Britain without India:
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“The loss of India, however arising, would be final and fatal to us. It could not
fail to be a part of a process which would reduce us to the scale of a minor
Power. Holland, once our equal, was outmatched in the world in spite of all her
sturdy domestic strength, and became a small continental state.”
141
At the same time. Britain was slowly losing its share of the India market, accounting for
1 42
only 30.5 percent of the sub-continent's total imports by 1939. Moreover. India no
longer had the same role it had in the international pattern of trade settlements. In the
past. India’s trade surpluses with most of the world was used to meet her deficit with
Britain which then enabled the latter to settle her accounts with other trading partners.
With the economic changes, India’s surpluses with industrial nations like Britain were
143
used lor deficits with countries that had become her source of raw materials. Thus.
Britain could no longer depend on its current economic relationship with India to settle
144
its deficits with the rest of the world.
Despite these changes, economic issues were rarely brought up in the
discussions or arguments of the diehards during this period. Their approach to the
severe economic problems in Lancashire is particularly noteworthy for the lack of
importance that they placed on them. Lancashire, as discussed in section 2.3. had an
economic sector which was greatly dependent on trade with India but changes giving
Indian autonomy to make decisions regarding tariffs as a result of provisions from the
1919 reforms adversely affected the relationship. Yet. the diehards did not make much
141
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of these issues, an indication here that economic issues or material factors more
generally, are sometimes only as important as the political actors make them out to be
For the diehards, Britain’s actions in India were instead, significant for they
were a ‘symbol' and a ‘touchstone’ of who the British were. Allowing the passage of
these constitutional reforms were characterized not as an indicator of Britain's material
decline as a world power but rather as the decline of will and character: “It is not that
our strength is seriously impaired. We are suffering from a disease of the will. We are
145
the victims of a nervous collapse, of a morbid state of mind." These reforms were in
other words, due to the “weak-minded and defeatist tendency of our present politics”
146
147
and the “lack of self-confidence and moral strength." Thus, what was necessary was
a “fundamental change in the intellectual and moral attitude of Great Britain and of the
148
Government of India....” This could only be accomplished by standing firm in the
face of demands from India and rejecting any proposals for constitutional reforms
proposed by other members of the British government.
Therefore, these reforms were against British interests not only because India
needed to be rescued from itself but because being British entailed staying there to
perform and fulfill its mission and duty to extend benevolent and enlightened British
rule to the ‘chaotic’ masses of its empire. In other words, Britain's identity as a truly
145
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great nation of exceptional people and character could not be separated from its actions
vis-a-vis India.
2.4.2 Baldwin, the Refomers and a Changing India
Fighting and leading the other side of the political battle over India were Stanley
Baldwin, Lord Irwin, Samuel Hoare, Oliver Stanley, Geoffrey Dawson, Sir John
Thompson, Sir Edward Villiers. Sir Alfred Watson, Sir Laurie Hammond. Lord
Brabourne, Sir Hugh McPherson, Lord Goschen as well as the Union of Britain and
India
,
an organization set up by retired officials with recent experience in India to
provide information on the White Paper proposals and counter the propaganda of the
diehards.
14 ’
The actual substance of the reforms that were being advocated reveal that there
were certain principles underlying the Indian constitutional settlement. The main
dominant principle in the report is the idea that political and social change should be
“ordered, gradual and a direct reflection of the nature of the social system to be
governed.”
150
In the introduction to the 1934 Joint Select Committee Report for the
White Paper written by Conservative MP Lord Eustace Percy, this principle is very
clear:
14 Ghosh 1972. 9. Due to their deliberate restriction of membership to men with
experience in India, the UBI sought to create a public image as an organization with a
body of experts on Indian affairs. The UBI was very active during the most vital period
of the intra-party struggle, i.e., from June 1933 to December 1934. when its speakers
addressed on an average almost one meeting a day and published the UBI Weekly
Bulletin.
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“If, then, the long collaboration of Englishmen and Indians during recent years
is to result in the enactment of a Constitution which will work successfully
under Indian conditions, we shall do well to discard theories and analogies and
instead, to base our scheme on the government of India as it exists today.... The
safest hypothesis on which we can proceed, and the one most in accordance with
our constitutional history, is that the future government of India will be
successful for an old one. but the natural evolution of an existing government
and the natural extension of its past tendencies.”
151
While these evolutionary views of political and constitutional change should
mean the absence of criteria for correctness in constitutions, the framers of the report
did not conclude that India was completely free to develop her own form of
government. Samuel Hoare, during the Round Table Conference and the deliberations
of the joint committee, specified the prerequisites necessary for the formation of a
1 ^
unitary cabinet and self-government. ' The first of these requirements was for a nation
to have a sense of national consciousness. Second, this consciousness had to override
all sectional concerns which threaten national unity. A third requirement and an
indicator of an emergent national identity was the development of political parties
divided on broad economic and ideological lines appealing to a relatively homogeneous
electorate.
These prerequisites were really based on an idealized understanding of Britain’s
political development. For the reformers, Britain was able to "build a strong
constitution which both assured national identity and guaranteed freedom"
1
’ due to its
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homogeneous population, small size, and freedom from foreign invasions. In
examining the conditions in India, the Conservative constitution-makers concluded that
a start toward the development of responsible government had been made but that these
154
conditions had not been reached. Hence, the devolution of power to the provinces
which was balanced by a stable conservative coalition in the centre would enable
responsibility to be learned and for these prerequisites to be met.
1 “ The constitutional
reforms for the 1935 Government of India Act were designed and engineered to create
and support the development of the requirements of this model.
While these reforms were not implemented to bring about the immediate end of
British rule in India, the substance of these reforms also indicate that there was more to
them than a means of prolonging the British hold on India. Notably, the forty-two
meetings conducted by the Cabinet Committee on India were focused on working out
constitutional measures and governing institutions which were thought to be most
suitable for the economic, social and political conditions in India.
1:56
Generally, the Act
ran counter to the pessimism of the Simon report and was modeled on the constitutions
of the Dominions. Moreover, it was parliamentary and reaffirmed the Montagu
Declaration of 1917. While it differed from the Dominion status of Australia and
Canada in areas like the Governor-General’s retention of power over foreign affairs and
defense, these reforms, as noted bv Sir Thomas Inskip, the Solicitor-General then, were
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“'not inconsistent with the ultimate attainment of the position of a Dominion within the
r • ,,,157Empire.
In public arenas like parliamentary debates and meetings of the Conservative
Party. Baldwin. Hoare and other reformers defended these constitutional reforms with
arguments that point to different ideas about India. One of the most apparent
differences was in their acknowledgment that political developments in India had taken
158
place and were irreversible. In an important speech to the House of Commons
defending the proposals after the publication of the White Paper against the increasingly
vociferous and unrelenting attacks from the diehard faction of his own party. Baldwin
stated:
“The unchanging East is not unchanging .... There is a yeast at work in the
whole of the East, and India cannot be isolated. The yeast is working there. It is
not the India of our childhood; it is not the India of our young manhood; it is a
I 59
new India, and that is the thing with which we have to reckon."
A critical part of this change was the arrival of nationalism. There was. Baldwin
declared, “a wind of nationalism and freedom running round the world and running as
strongly in Asia ... as in any part of the world.”
160
Samuel Hoare. in a parliamentary
speech to defend the adoption of some of the government’s proposals for India after the
second Round Table Conference in 1931, ranked nationalism as one of the most
important factors which had to be accepted:
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“It is an integral part of that great wave of nationalism which, particularly in
recent years, has swept over the world from one end to the other. It is part of the
same movement that we have seen in Europe, in such countries as Poland and
Czechoslovakia. It is part of the same movement that we have seen in Asia, in
Turkey, in Iraq, in Arabia.”
161
Besides nationalism, there were also other social, political, economic and
technological transformations taking place in the world. For example, Baldwin spoke
of the invention of cars, films, airplanes and the gramophone as revolutionary
technological changes that were creating a new world where ideas “Hash from pole to
pole with the speed ot light.” “ In the same speech, Baldwin highlighted Japan’s
victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War ( 1904-5) not only as an example but as a
the catalyst for change in the relationship between the West and the East for it was
“causing] a new spirit to burn in the whole of Asia."
16
’ The news of Russia's defeat at
the hands of Japan had traveled quickly and inspired many in the East. During this
period when ideas of Social Darwinism and racism were still part of political and
intellectual circles, Baldwin was acknowledging the contribution of this event to the fast
eroding legitimacy of the overtly racial and hierarchical order in world politics. They
realized that these changes were altering not only Britain but other countries and
Britain's relations with them.
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A second fact for the reformers was the arrival and importance of the ideals and
principles of democracy and self-government in India.
1( 4
Unlike the diehards who
argued that they were merely a veneer coating those heading the Indian nationalist
movement, Baldwin and the reformers recognized that this was real and had been
seeded by the British education of the country’s elites. Britain was thus reaping what it
had sown a hundred years ago as Indians were "asking us for that responsibility which
we have said time and time again is the goal to which they are to look forward.”
166
The most important fact then for Baldwin and the reformers was that India in the
1930s was no longer the India of the late nineteenth century. They argued that it was
not the India that Churchill and other diehards remembered from their childhoods - that
India had departed permanently nearly twenty years ago.
1
’'
Insisting that India in the
1930s had not changed, as the diehards were doing, was therefore, simply unrealistic
and the paternalistic form of governance associated w ith it, a major mistake. As Lord
Irwin noted:
“The day is past ... when Winston's possessive instinct can be applied to
Empires ... That conception of imperialism is finished, and those who try to
revive it are those who would fly a balloon that won’t hold gas.’'
16
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For them, it was clear that the political developments meant that “a policy of
1 68
realism and not a policy of sentiment” was necessary. Prewar forms of imperialist
assertiveness or what Baldwin “called 'rather sinister' and militaristic meanings of
169
imperialism" could no longer prevail. It was not and could not be “about jingoism,
'flag-wagging', "painting the map red', nor about exploitation, selfishness in public
policy; and ‘riding roughshod over the world'.”
170
Significantly, Baldwin considered these changes natural and part of an
evolutionary process where the empire and its components were organisms rather than
lifeless and inanimate entities. Instead of resisting them, these changes should be
absorbed. Baldwin reminded his own party in February 1935:
“I think it is particularly essential for us in our party on this side of the House to
remember, as some of us perhaps in the country are apt to forget, that the
Empire, if it is anything, is a living organism; that the Empire of today is not the
Empire of the first Jubilee of Queen Victoria. No man can see today, however
far-seeing he may be. what may be the position of the Empire fifty years hence.
It is no dead matter. It is an organism and alive, in a constant process of
evolution, a process which is being speeded up every day. Few could have
foreseen, even a few years ago. to what point that evolution would have brought
the relations of the great Dominions with the mother country, and it cannot be
supposed that, in this world of evolution, India alone is static."
171
Instead of the flag-wagging imperialism of old still brandished by Churchill and
the diehards, Baldwin and the reformers had by 1935, a new interpretation of the empire
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as something which would evolve into a commonwealth of nations, of which India
172
would he a member. ' Thus, British interests were linked to a resolution of the India
question in a way that would depend "on good will, sympathy, and understanding
173
between India and Great Britain....”
Like the diehards, references to Britain were also present in these speeches
focused on observations about the 'facts' in India. These rather significant sections of
their speeches were devoted to drawing parallels with the social and political changes
taking place in Britain. Baldwin, for instance, stressed that Britain had undergone
174
'three generations of political evolution' during World War I in these speeches.
Recalling his own cherished childhood when Britain had nothing but horses on country
roads and when it was difficult to go beyond a 10-mile radius of one’s home, Baldwin.
while wishing for it to come back, also knew that it was impossible for this was a
175
Britain that had "passed and gone forever.” He acknowledged these rapid changes in
Britain in a 1933 speech in support of constitutional reforms for India:
"Who would have thought when the War began that in 10 years we would have
universal suffrage in this country? Who would have thought in 1903, when my
honourable and gallant Friend the Member for Bournemouth and I were
supporting Joseph Chamberlain that in 1926 we should have an Imperial
Conference when the only threads remaining were threads of gossamer?”
176
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I hcsc i liangcs 111 Britain were understood, without question, as inevitable and
irreversible.
1
In addition. Baldwin also linked the future and survival ol the Conservative
Baity to how the India question was resolved, lie argued that the rapid ehanges
whirling through Britain had left many ( 'onservalives spinning giddily, ami
unfortunately, still without the ability to reeoneile themselves to the postwar world and
elinging to the ideas, beliefs and praelicesol the pre wat period. Churehill and the
dichards were still mired in the “Toryism of the times when he and I were young
" 1
and then views on India reflected tins. I )urmg one ol his numerous speeches on India
m the I louse ol ( 'ominous, Baldwin look the opportunity to expound on what a
(
'onservaltve is.
“The ( onservalive. as I understand him. is no Junker and no Fascist. I le is a
man who believes in constitutional progress, who wants to serve his country,
ami w ho w ants to see people contented and happy. There can be no better work
for out party than to devote themselves to. and see what they can make of this
'
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\ ast problem.
I I ms. Baldw in en\ isioneil a ( ’onsei v alive party that w on Id be able to enact rational and
progressive reform.
1 *"
In a world that was changing, so too must Conservatism.
Baldw m w as adamant that the parl\ adapt to the ehanges and align with the forces that
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had brought them about as the “party that does not realize it does not stand much chance
of being returned to power in this country.” ' Baldwin slated very clearly that Ins
decision to follow the route of constitutional reforms lot India “was the only one for a
progressive party - and a party must be progressive to live. I believed that the other
course led to the destruction of the parly
There was also considerable awareness that the changes in India and what was
being labeled by the reformers as the other great political experiment ol their time the
promise and fulfillment of self-government for India as embodied in the Montagu
Declaration of 1917 - were also taking place in tandem with the arrival ol full and
1 83
complete democracy with universal suffrage in Britain. I hough the new ness ol
these political developments in Britain may be hard to fathom in the twenty Inst
century, it was considered a precarious and new political situation, one which had
...... , j#4
hardly been tested and in which Britain s stability and unity were not guaranteed.
Critically, this awareness was accompanied by arguments linking the changes in Britain
to how they handled the political developments in India and its demands for self
government and independence. The manner in which they handled these developments
in India was crucially, understood as “more than anything else we shall have to lace, ...
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the supreme test of how fit we are for democratic conditions under which we have to
These arguments in support of reforms as a means of holding India to the empire
differed from those made by the diehards in two substantial ways. First was in their
understanding of the changes in India. The second lies in the vital links that the
reformers, and in particular. Stanley Baldwin, made between the w ay these changes
were handled and its consequences for democracy in Britain, the meaning of
Conservatism, and ultimately. Britishness. In order to understand how it was even
possible for these links to be made, these arguments have to be placed in the wider
context of an alternative form of British identity that was being promulgated by Stanley
Baldwin during the Interwar period. The next section of this chapter describes and
elaborates on the central principles and elements of this alternate form of Britishness by
drawing on secondary as well as primary sources. This is also supplemented by a
discussion of its pervasiveness in Britain through a general look at important cultural
markers in art, architecture, and literature.
2.4.2. 1 Constructing Unity: Britishness in Local Places and Democratic
Constitutionalism
Stanley Baldwin, leader of the Conservatives for most of the 1920s and 1930s.
was one of the central figures of Interwar Britain and the major political proponent of
the alternative to the dominant form of British identity rooted in superiority and
1X5
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greatness.
I Sh
In Baldwin’s vision, ways of being British were conceived in a less
explicitly imperial and more inward-looking manner. He imagined, depicted and
emphasized Britain as a place that was populated by people who were innately decent,
honest, truthful, honorable, moderate and underpinned by the centuries-old traditions
and political ideals of the British constitution.
Britishness, according to Baldwin, was embedded in and intrinsic to the
1 87
domestic landscape. It was a conception based on the belief that there was a deep,
timeless and organic relationship between the land and its people. In The Fairy Land of
England ( 1924), Christopher Hussey described true England as a beautiful "legendary
country”, of whose “the ‘dust we are made of, and to which we will return’.” ' Thus,
this compendium of soil, land and people was not only a landscape but significantly,
elements that were inextricably and organically linked together. Britishness in this
conception, was a part of places and landscapes, and their traditions and history. In
other words, there was “an organic and active relation between past and present ....
189
already an integral, constitutive and permanent feature of English culture.”
In one of his most famous and quoted speeches, Baldw in paints this picture of
England:
ISh
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“The sounds of England, the tinkle of the hammer on the anvil in the country
smithy, the corncrake on a dewy morning, the sound of the scythe against the
whetstone, and the sight of the plough team coming over the brow of a hill, the
sight that has been seen in England since England was a land, and may be seen
in England long after the Empire has perished and every works in England has
ceased to function, for centuries the one eternal sight of England. The wild
anemones in the woods in April, the last load at night of hay being drawn down
a lane as the twilight comes on, when you can scarcely distinguish the figures of
the horses as they take it home to the farm, and above all, most subtle, most
penetrating and most moving, the smell of wood smoke coming up in the
autumn evening, or the smell of the scotch fires; that wood smoke that our
ancestors, tens of thousands of years ago, must have caught on the air when they
were coming home with the result of the day's forage, when they were still
nomads, and when they were still roaming the forests and plains of the continent
of Europe. These things strike down into the very depths of our nature, and
touch chords that go back to the beginning of time and the human race, but they
are chords that with every year of our life sounds a deeper note in our innermost
,
• „ 190
being.
Rural England, as evoked by Baldwin in that famous passage above, was a
critical component in his conception of Britain and Britishness. It was also part of
wider, pervasive and well-established cultural trends rooted in the belief that the
solution to what was perceived and understood as an industrial, urban and racial crisis
191
was to be found in rural England with its fount ot healthy stock. The landscape that
eventually came to personify the country as a whole was that of rural England,
constructed and idealized very specifically as a place where there were patchwork
fields, thatched cottages amidst trees, shrubs and Bowers, meadows, village greens and
192
quiet country lanes.
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Though other parts of rural Britain like the Yorkshire Moors in no way resembled this
vision, it had become so emblematic by the early 1940s that a government report on the
109
Popular books on the countryside, following H.V. Morton’s trend-setting hi
Search ofEngland ( 1927) had photos capturing what were depicted as the
‘characteristic’ features of the rural landscape like “chequer-board fields, hedgerows,
191
copses and old buildings nestling in comforting hollows...” Other literary
contributions from authors like George Sturt and W.H. Hudson were also important in
establishing these images and ideals of rural England as the personification of the
194
country and its people.
Travel guides featuring the countryside as a site of holidays and leisure were
also another indicator of the growing fascination and presence of the rural in the cultural
life of Britain by the end of World War I. Londoners, for example, were no longer
satisfied with patches of green like Hampstead Heath in the outskirts of the city - the
1 95
growing ideal was to "discover rural England as it 'really was’, unspoilt and natural.”
By the outbreak of the Second World War. hundreds of publications like Arthur Mee's
The King's England, and the Shell Guides were being used by an increasing number of
people to visit the countryside.
1 f ’
These trends were also reflected in art and architecture. The ‘Tudor’ style,
characterized by diamond-paned or bottle-glass w indow's, half timbering, gable ends
revitalization of the rural economy presented it as the objective and true description
(Potts 167).
Potts 1989. 166.
1 94
Howkins 1986. 75.
1 )r>
Howkins 1986. 83.
i%
Howkins 1986. 83.
and rustic porches became the dominant national style of middle-class private
197
housing. Even well-known children’s books like the Beatrix Potter series portrayed
home either as a cottage or as mock-Tudor style houses. Generations bred on these
books learned to associate such houses as homes as well as with "an earlier and better
198
world of decency and honesty.” In art. the paintings ol John Constable ( 1776-1837)
supplanted J.M.W. Turner’s as paradigmatic representations of the English landscape
early in the twentieth century. Turner’s work was characterized by dramatic
seascapes and mountain views while Constable’s most well-known and reproduced
paintings like The Hay Wain and Dedham Vale Morning were of quiet, ordinary, placid
scenes of British pastoral life replete with mills, farmhands, cottages, cows and
. 200
horses.
While Baldwin and his oft-quoted speech, an aural Constable painting of words
and sounds, have become the uber representation of the construction of Britain as ‘Little
England’ during the interwar period, he was not a Little Englander. Baldwin did
consider the idealized landscape and life of rural England as the symbol of all sorts of
good things like “stability, continuity, tranquility, harmony, perspective, imagination
and honesty” in contrast to the “transience, turbulence, tensions, clamour, pretences.
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Constable, it should be noted, was “plucked up from the past, tidied up and tamed,
and then reconstituted as the father of an English landscape vision no one previously
had thought to conjure into existence” (Potts 168).
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divisions, shallowness, and materialism of urban life.” He spoke often about the
national characteristics that made Britain great as being found in the country where they
20?
were in the purest form, “preserved by an honest and traditional way of life.”
-
However, he was deeply aware that rural England had either vanished or was fast
?03
vanishing, and did not call lor its return." It was the "inherited memory, cultural
tradition, and continuing ideal” of rural life which he considered important as they
204
could continue to act as the spiritual home for the urban population.
“
Thus, Baldwin’s conception of Britishness and his vision of Britain went far
205 ~
beyond this supposed fixation on the England of old." ' Rural England had figured
quite prominently in his speeches because it was part of "his own imaginative sense of
?06
identity” and only as “an example of local allegiance for others.” Critically,
Britishness for him, could be found in each locality, county or region of Britain. They
were equally important and had their own distinctive virtues, all of which contributed to
20
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was an overall trend in Britain which contributed to Britain’s overall decline in
competitiveness and ultimately, its place as a hegemon.
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the rich diversity of their national inheritance and to the ‘common stock' making up the
?07
character ot the British race.
Each local place had its own charm, spell, genius as well as a continuous history
linking the landscape and its people all the way back to “the beginning of time and the
?08
human race." They thus formed Britons’ “natural foundation ot national values."
While local loyalties and allegiances were rooted in family, home, and locality, they
were not separate from each other in Baldwin’s view. Instead, they were described as
circles which widened and radiated outwardly to connect with larger loyalties of town
209
or county, country and nation, and finally, the empire and mankind. Rather than the
modern, divisive calls of class which were the realities facing British politicians early in
the twentieth century, Baldwin conceived and tried to persuade others that the most
powerful and natural sources of British identity were those rooted in locality and
210
community which were somehow shared by the entire nation.
These different locations in turn produced the ‘national character’ with these
qualities and values: independence, realism, truthfulness, honor, innate decency, a
profound sense of duty, justice and fair play, as well as respect for law and order. In
various speeches, Baldwin also depicted the British as peaceful people who were not
only great and persistent fighters if put to the test but made for times of crises and
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challenges which they faced with serenity, calmness and cheerfulness. Moreover, they
were 'the kindest people in the world' who sympathized with the under-dog and
exhibited brotherliness across classes. Thus, individuality would always be “tempered
21
1
by a 'spirit ot co-operation' and 'habit of working to common principles'.""
The final crucial pillar in this emerging construction of British identity was the
212
principle ot democratic constitutionalism and British institutions ot governance.
This pillar consisted of a distinct emphasis on the idea that democratic constitutionalism
was British in origin and development, evolving out of a unique history of the
213
“democracy of the village community and a distinctive Reformation.”- In the national
consciousness, it had “a mysterious, preternatural quality, inviting the belief that it has
been coeval with the land itself, born in ... 'the rich soil of culture' with which the
?14 .
English have been blessed.” In other words, the principles of the British constitution
was built into the physical being of all Britons and inseparable from Britishness. Its
innermost core "was carried in 'our hearts’, parliamentary government was 'flesh of our
°15
flesh and bone of our bone', and freedom was the 'air we breathe’.""
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Constitutionalism, as depicted here, was thus an inextricable part of a centuries-long
?16
British tradition that was a part of their being.”
This conception of Britishness did not emerge from thin air nor was its place and
power in the British political and cultural imagination automatic and uncontested.
Instead, it developed out of the very specific context of the challenges to the domestic
order in Britain and its international role. In the next section. 1 discuss the social and
political developments during this tumultuous period in Britain that led to the
destabilization of the dominant form of British identity as well as the politics involved
in the emergence of an alternative in ideas of Britishness. Particularly significant was a
seismic change in the country’s political order - the arrival of full mass democracy
which extended voting and political rights to women and the working-class and its
impact on Conservatism and Baldwin who feared their adverse consequences for the
stability and cohesion of Britain, a theme he visited again and again.
2.4.2.2 A Changing Britain: International and Domestic Challenges
Britain in the 1920s and 1930s was a very different place from the Britain of the
1 880s when it was the world’s leading economic power and possessed a far-flung
217
empire. Social, economic and political changes were already afoot in the 1870s
when American and German competition began to successfully chip away at Britain’s
share of the world market in manufacturing, and especially in the metal industries and
216
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heavy engineering." Britain’s share of international commerce, for example, fell from
219
25 percent to 21 percent between 1880 and 1900. Its growth rate had fallen to 1.6
percent per year between 1870 and 1913 while the United States and Germany were
growing at respective rates of 5 percent and 4.7 percent annually during that same
,
220
period.
There were also other developments which became visible signs of decline to
the political elite in late Victorian England. Huge armies on the European continent
with the capacity for rapid mobilization had emerged in the post- 1870 era and posed a
potential threat to Britain’s security. This vulnerability was in turn heightened by the
221
naval build-up of France. Russia and Germany. ' A disastrous start to the Boer War
( 1 899-1902) when the British army was unable to immediately dispense with a ragtag
army of Dutch farmers worsened fears regarding the state of Britain’s capabilities and
military preparedness. The social expectations or notions of success that were derived
from the dominant perspective of the British self as an exceptional, superior and great
country did not meet the experienced consequences of these changing international
economic and political developments.
Suspicions, fears and anxieties that all was not as it should be was reflected in
countless public and private discussions and publications regarding the decline of
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Britain. Intellectuals as well as the governing political circle, for example, began to
reassess Britain's military, financial and imperial capabilities and vulnerabilities vis-a-
111
vis the other great powers, and in particular, Germany. “ There were commissioned
government reports on the physical condition of the British population which concluded
that the British ‘race’ was degenerating and a cause of the growing enfeeblement of
113
their might and position in the world as a great power and a great empire. Drawing
on Edward Gibbon's enormously popular The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire ,
many other public intellectuals began to compare Britain with ancient Rome. In his
analysis. Gibbon pointed to the decay in Rome as the reason for the decline and collapse
124
ol its far-flung empire. ~ When these lessons ot ancient Rome were applied to Britain,
aristocratic and military circles concluded that London, the heart of Britain and the
Empire, was rotten to the core and leading to the decline of the British race, character.
225
and ultimately, the country and its empire.
The social expectations or notions of success associated with the dominant
perspective of the British self as an exceptional, superior and great country were also
upended by domestic challenges of the Edwardian period when Britain’s social and
political order was in great turmoil. This was a period which witnessed the advent of
universal suffrage and full democracy, an insurgent feminist movement, the rise of
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Labour, a right-wing Tory rebellion against parliamentary government based on the
opposition to the pre-war Liberal administration's plan to reform the House of Lords
??6
and the issue of Home Rule tor Ireland." The campaign of the suffragettes, for some
upper-class Edwardian men, “represented one of the most alarming symptoms of the
727
underlying malaise in British society.’ The growth of trade unions and the
assertiveness of the working-class movement invoked fears that parliamentary
2?8
government was under considerable threat by this new political force. " There were
also the constitutional problems that arose out of the rejection of the 1909 budget by the
House of Lords. The House of Commons, which had passed the budget by a large
majority, pronounced the actions of the upper House "a breach of the constitution and a
2?9
usurption of the rights of the commons.” " This was partly resolved by the Parliament
Act of 191 1 which dealt with “the veto powers of the House of Lords” but “left intact
230
the anomaly of its hereditary membership and its extraordinary political bias.”" Last
but not least was the crisis over Home Rule for Ireland. Beginning its passage through
the Commons in April 1912. the third Home Rule Bill had by 1914, “passed three times
6
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229 Pugh 1999, 157. This w as part of a larger problem when peers, many of whom
were Conservatives, were rejecting bills passed by a large majority in the Commons
regularly since the 1870s. At that time, peers had the right to amend and reject ordinary
legislation.
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It was resisted by the Ulster unionists and by
23
as required by the Parliament Act.”"
January 1914. a number of gun-running episodes put 350.000 rifles in the hands of
private armies against Home Rule, raising the possibility of a civil war with the setting
232
up of the Dublin Parliament.
The combination of suffragettes, strikes, antagonists in the constitutional crisis
over the House of Lords, Ulster unionists and Irish Nationalists posed violent
933
challenges to the authority of the British state and its institutions." Critically, it
provided the sense that Britain was becoming increasingly ungovernable - a state and
934
society “in the first stages of breakdown." The Edwardian crisis, as David Powell
argues, put Britain in a 'crisis of nationalism' as the state “responded to what were
perceived as external threats while struggling to preserve its unity in the face of the
235
renewed disruption associated with domestic national discontents.”
The end of World War I did not see an abatement of this crisis. Determined
efforts after the end of the war to re-establish the core components and pillars of a
system that had placed the country at the centre of the world's economy in the pre-1914
era failed due to unrealistic policies that were based on inaccurate and ultimately.
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wishful understanding of the state of the British economy. These, together with a
series of other problems like the disruption of its international economic and financial
systems, growing nationalist feelings in her colonies, mass enfranchisement of the
working-class and the possibility of socialist government only served to continue and
?37
confirm the shakiness ot its domestic stability and international power. During the
same period, there were fears and anxieties about whether mass democracy with an
electorate that was largely poorly informed, and overwhelmingly working-class would
approve “policies which were difficult to comprehend, which lacked a sensational
appeal, or more seriously, which might involve material sacrifice from a large number
. . . ?38
of voters” and be “dissuaded from succumbing to irresponsible stunts.””
As these developments unfolded, it become apparent that Britain would not be
able to return to its pre-World War I conditions of prosperity, progress, and imperial
939
power. These dramatic changes and challenges to its domestic and international
social and political order created an increasingly visible gap between reality and the
heroic and imperial-based British identity that had been so dominant. It became clear to
many in the public sphere that previous arrangements, assumptions, and expectations on
w hich ideas of Britain and Britishness were based were incongruent with w hat they
~' h
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?40
were experiencing. While these doubts converged into the growing realization that
fundamental readjustments were necessary, there was no obvious consensus of what
they should be.
2.-L2.3 The Politics of Conservatism and the Emergence of Baldwin's New Britain
As discussed earlier, an alternative conception of Britishness which emphasized
and constructed a united Britain based on the uniqueness and yet //btr-normality of
places and landscapes throughout the British isles and the principle of democratic
constitutionalism dominated public life during the interwar period. While reflecting in
part, an already existing nostalgia and heartfelt longing for an idealized and largely
?41
unknown rural past. the emergence of this alternative and its eventual pervasiveness
cannot be separated from the politics and difficulties experienced by the Conservative
party during the Interwar period or from the rhetoric and actions of Stanley Baldwin.
Politically, a series of changes appeared on paper to have dire consequences for
the future and survival of the Conservative Party. The first of these transformations was
the arrival of universal suffrage with the passage of the Representation of the People’s
Acts of 1918 and 1928. These acts expanded the electorate more than threefold
between 1918 and 1929. Second was the growth and expansion of the Labour Party
which was not only offering radical solutions for the nation’s ills but beginning to
compete successfully against the Conservatives and the Liberals. Third, the
Conservatives had experienced election defeats in 1905. 1923 and 1929. Across
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postwar Europe, there was revolutionary instability in the 1920s and the emergence of
totalitarianism in 1930s. Due to these changes and developments, many Conservatives
were apprehensive about democracy and believed that universal suffrage would lead to
?42
collectivist and socialist governments. In other words, the party was disoriented by
the arrival of universal suffrage and full democracy with no ready means of explaining
or even rationalizing how it would be able to win elections with a national electoral
243
base that now included the working-class as well as women.
Despite their apprehension and fears regarding the consequences of universal
suffrage, the Conservatives managed and enjoyed considerable success as a political
party during the Interwar period. For 1 7 of the 20 years of this period, the
Conservatives were in office, either independently or in governments which they
?44
dominated. For all these 1 7 years, they also enjoyed huge parliamentary
945
majorities. ' Explanations for this success range from the fact that they were fortunate
not to be governing when the 1929 depression hit to the argument that voting
?46
Conservative was the natural thing. These explanations are lacking." The latter for
example, runs against pre-1914 and post- 1 945 voting patterns when a Conservative vote
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was otten not the normal vote.
-
Arguments based on the depression cannot ascertain
if it would have had the same impact on the fortunes of Labour. All these explanations
are based on the assumption that the Conservative Party was the passive recipient of
structural changes or some mysterious force that seemed to be guiding the electorate to
vote Conservative.
The party was not a passive recipient of the social and political changes brought
?48
about by universal suffrage or international developments. Instead, these changes
were a significant catalyst in Conservative attempts to re-define their party’s goals as
well as a new vision for Britain. One of their most concerted and forceful attempts in
this struggle was in the form of the Tariff Reform League which emerged out of the
249
fears and anxieties related to British imperial decline. Tariff reform was aimed at
turning Britain into a global power by linking it. its colonies and dominions into a single
economic and trading bloc. Such a system with its protective duties, it was envisioned,
would protect British industry and the working-class from competitors while
simultaneously financing social reforms such as old age pensions. An essential part of
the program was the imposition of import duties on food and raw materials which was
950
necessary lor the overall success ol fiscal reform. These proposals however, divided
the party between those who found them an anathema and others who considered them
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the “only living thing in politics.”
-
Ultimately, these proposals were unpopular with
the public and the empire-based platform collapsed electorally. ideologically and
organizationally.
-:i-
Under the leadership of Andrew Bonar Law in the early 1920s, there was the
beginnings of a shift in the Conservative Party towards an emphasis on tranquility,
253
stability and a return to normality at home and abroad. ' While Bonar Law realized
that the old Conservative Party would “never have a future in the life of this
?54
country.” ' there was again, more consensus on the need for change rather than over
the nature of the change in the party. For example, there were top Conservatives like
Austen Chamberlain who insisted that "the threat of socialism had rendered the
?55
traditional party system defunct and in need of permanent political realignment.”
In contrast. Stanley Baldwin responded to the changes by portraying that “same
system as a symbol of British democratic values in a world increasingly dominated by
?56
extremism and dictatorship.” ~ He realized that the party would not be able to win
elections and therefore, fulfill its 'national' responsibilities if it were to ignore the
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?57
changes that had created new political realities in Interwar Britain." Through all this.
Baldwin was conscious of the necessity of transforming Conservatism and the
Conservative party to one which could absorb "the democratic and ethical values he
tried to exemplify.’'"
58
Politics aside, this emphasis on equating Conservatism and critically.
Britishness, with harmony, unity, tranquility, moderation and democratic
constitutionalism was also due to Baldwin's great concern over the issues of social and
political cohesion in Britain. The incorporation of democratic constitutionalism as one
of the key principles in Baldwin’s vision of Britain and his construction of British
identity was a central part of this effort to create the necessary conditions to ensure that
British politics and political parties did not descend into chaos, paralysis or extremism.
This is significant as Baldwin, when he became leader of the party, raised this
principle of democratic constitutionalism - where “the Conservative Party sets out to
abide by the constitution, to establish a working concordat with Labour in order to get
through the debates and committee business of parliamentary life and to represent - if
not the citizen - then at least the voter and public opinion” - to a position of absolute
259
centrality rather than dismantling it. Vastly different from Conservative policies in
the past, this position was based on the conviction that democracy "equaled the right to
257
Williamson 1999,219.
288
Williamson 1999. 219.
259
Schwarz 1984, 2-3.
vote in regular elections and the possibility that in the rotation of parties, the
260
independent representatives of Labour might take their turn in governing the nation.”'
Overall, the main components in Baldwin’s conception of Britain and
Britishness provided the means to portray the nation as one that had been and was both
harmonious and united, bound through time on the basis of the same principles and
values. The qualities presented in this conception of Britishness provided a divided
nation w ith an understanding of themselves that would "soothe aw ay the sores of class
261
politics and industrial conflict” and support and emphasize “the nation’s ability to
26°
integrate and tolerate diverse groups within its ranks” " in a difficult period.
Thus, the inconsistencies between the social expectations of the British identity
based on greatness and the experienced consequences of the domestic and international
changes of the turbulent Interw ar period prov ided the space for alternative forms of
Britishness to arise. However, Baldwin's alternative also emerged out of the specific
conditions arising out of the developments and changes within Conservative Party and
British politics. Despite its ascendance and the challenge it posed to the dominant
British identity based on notions of greatness, the former was by no means accepted and
recognized by all. The question of India was very much a part of this process of
identity contestation as well as the battle for its recognition.
As discussed earlier, the diehards constructed their conception of Britishness
against the Indian ‘Other’ and critically, insisted that British greatness could only be
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sustained if they remained on the subcontinent to fulfill their 'duties' and
'responsibilities'. The next section places the reformers’ approach to the issue of
change in India within the larger context of Baldwin's vision of a new Britain.
2.4.2.4 Change, Democratic Constitutionalism and India
The introduction to the Draft Report submitted to the Joint Select Committee on
Indian Constitutional Reforms began by addressing the issues raised by the diehards
directly:
"We cannot indeed complain if those whom we fail to convince lay stress upon
the possible consequences of another policy. It has been, and will be urged that
no Dominion has ever been faced within its border at one and the same time
with all the problems that India has to deal: with the ever present risk of
hostilities on her frontier; with the cleavage between communal interests; with
innumerable differences of race and speech; with a financial system largely
dependent for its credit on centres outside India; and with a vast population in
every stage of civilization."
Critically, the acknowledgement that "all these things are true" did not mean
following the path of resistance to Indian demands advocated by Churchill and
the diehards:
“[A]nd yet even the sum of them does not seem to us to conclude the argument.
An answer has still to be found to the questions asked a century ago bv a great
servant of India, in a speech of which it was said that to have heard it might
console the younger members of the House for never having heard Edmund
Burke: "Do we think that we can give the people of India knowledge without
awakening ambition? Or do we mean to awaken ambition and provide it w ith
no legitimate vent?” The answer has now to be given: and we hold strongly that
it is more consonant with the dignity ofParliament and with the traditions of the
British people , if. when the time has come for Parliament to share its pow'er with
-63
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those whom it has sought to train the arts of government it should do so not
ungraciously nor in any grudging spirit.'"
14
The report goes on to say:
“There are moments in the affairs of nations when a way is opened for the
removal of long-standing differences and misunderstandings for the
establishment between people and people of new relations more in harmony
with the circumstances of the time than those which they replace. Adjustments
of this order, when they involve a transference of political power, must
755
inevitably provide a sharp test ot national character;...
’
In justifying the reforms that they were advocating in the face of criticism from
Churchill and the diehards. the report not only acknowledged that there was a growing
nationalist consciousness and movement in India but concluded that the only way to
handle it was to share power once responsible self-government was possible because it
was the way that was consistent and befitting the dignity of Parliament, and the
traditions and of the British people. The manner in which they adjusted to these
changes was in itself a fundamental test of the national character. What were these
traditions, these dignities of parliament and the test it was providing to the national
character? After all. Churchill and the diehards had also made direct links between the
importance of rejecting these reforms to the maintenance of what they argued w ere
specifically British characteristics.
In his first major address on India. Baldwin stated that the way in which Britain
handled the India question was “the supreme, the acid, and ultimate test of how fit we
14
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are for ... democratic conditions.” According to Williamson. Baldwin meant "on the
one hand Labour readiness to countenance imperial government, and on the other
267
Conservative recognition oi the inevitability and advantages of reform.” In other
words, how the issue of India was handled was crucial for reconciling the arrival of full
parliamentary democracy and Labour as a political party and force on the political scene
268
with the maintenance ol imperial administration.
These reforms were therefore not distinct and separate from British politics. In
Baldwin's efforts to fashion a new Britain in the face of all the tumultuous changes
during the first decades of the twentieth century, the principle of democratic
constitutionalism was particularly important. However. Britain’s political development
and constitutional order hardly unfolded continuously and harmoniously throughout its
history. During the modern period, especially in the first three decades of the twentieth
?69
century, constitutional politics was in fact, under siege from both the right and left.
Democratic constitutionalism and its taken-for-granted association with modern
Conservatism, modern British politics and Britishness did not begin to acquire its
270
settled state until the 1920s.“
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While Baldwin may have depicted British parliamentarism as “‘the natural
outcome, through long centuries, of the common sense and the good nature of the
English people, who have always preferred committees to dictators, elections to street-
fighting, and talking shops to revolutionary tribunals,” he was very aware and terrified
?7 j
that “‘street-fighting and revolutionary tribunals were just around the corner.”" In a
widely quoted and revealing 1927 letter to a friend, Baldwin wrote: “’Democracy has
arrived at a gallop in England and I feel all the time it is a race for life. Can we educate
?72
them [the mass of the electorate] before the crash comes?
”"
As he explained to the Cambridge University Conservative Association in 1927:
“There is no people with a surer political sense: but you must remember that,
however innate that sense might be, there are large masses in this country who
have not ... yet had time to develop a keen political sense themselves. And they
are only too prone to be led away by really skilful and clever propaganda ... to
">73
ends they would be the last to desire if they realized what those ends were."
Baldwin was extremely concerned that these new developments “'had brought
274
our people and other peoples to a political status in advance of their cultural status.’”
The advent of mass democracy in Britain w as therefore, “a struggle between the innate
common sense and political quietism of her people and the lure of the fantasies induced
275
bv lack of education and demagogues.”
-
This fear and identification of anarchy as the
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other side of the coin of mass democracy was something which featured prominently in
?76
his public speaking throughout the course ot his career.
Far more crucial were his attempts to counter and reconcile what he considered
were the potentially negative consequences of these domestic political developments
through influencing and changing Britain’s political culture as well as that of the
Conservative Party through the promotion of what Philip Williamson has called a
'public doctrine' based on a set of shared principles in national life that would promote
both harmony and unity and become the source of the country’s and his party’s
277
salvation. Baldwin and his narratives ol the national character and way ot life that
were inextricably linked to the landscape, history, traditions and cultural memories of
Britain played a dominant role in writing out and erasing the ruptures and conflicts in
Britain’s political development, and eventually succeeding in rooting and linking
278
Britishness to constitutionalism in an idealized history.
These efforts alone were insufficient to ensure that such a form of British culture
and Britishness would take hold. For Baldwin, these principles of democratic
constitutionalism had to be demonstrated in actual practices in the very conduct of
Conservatism and British politics. Politically, this took the form of building a culture
based on moderation and constitutionalism where all the parties, especially "the
Conservative Party sets out to abide by the constitution, to establish a working
775
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concordat with Labour in order to get through the debates and committee business of
parliamentary life and to represent - if not the citizen - then at least the voter and public
279
opinion.” The norm of moderation and constitutionalism, quintessential elements in
Baldwin’s vision of Britishness was reflected in his reactions towards the new British
electorate and the Labour party. The India question, seen as it was as the test of
Britain's democracy, was another situation which would require the parties to be guided
i ,
280
by these norms.
It was only in acting this principle of constitutionalism could Baldwin’s
construction of Britishness be recognized by fellow Britons and sustained. Baldwin’s
understanding and response to the developments in India were heavily influenced by
what was seen as its significance for the fundamental requirements of the British
domestic politics and his vision for the character of Britain. British politics and
Conservatism. It was also inseparable from Baldw in’s attempts to construct not only a
new Conservatism but a new British political identity in a period of tremendous flux
and turbulence.
This is evident in his approach to other crucial issues he faced as leader of the
Conservatives. These included the Conservative Party’s break w ith the coalition they
had formed with David Lloyd George’s Liberal Party in 1922. Baldwin's position on
the issue of the political levy imposed by the trade unions in 1925 in opposition of the
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majority of his party, as well as the abdication crisis of 1936.“ In all these issues, he
“chose to appease, using that word in the sense of reconciliation rather than concession”
282
in the interests of stability, peace and tranquility.
- -
He succeeded by all counts as
“democracy ceased to be something Conservatives would simply have to accept,
and had become a state of affairs they were principally responsible for
defending.... it was even becoming synonymous with Englishness and national
i ,
«-283
character.
As Schwarz argues, “the Conservative articulation of people and nation was
°84
constitutionalized.”
In summary, these domestic political debates, while ostensibly about India, were
also, at another level, fundamentally about different visions of Britain and British
identity. However, these arguments over the reforms also point to the need to perform
certain actions in other to sustain or maintain an identity. The diehards’ argument that
British exceptionalism and its role as a great power with a world role could only be
retained if they stayed in India to continue performing their mission was part of a
process to maintain their construction of Britishness. Similarly with the reformers,
handling the developments on the basis of democratic constitutionalism was the only
way in which they could pass their own test as a full democracy.
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Thus, different visions of Britain and identity principles can be invented and
constructed through different processes like Self/Other mechanisms or the active
narratives of politicians. However, they cannot simply be declared into being. These
identities have to be accepted and recognized by others as well. Part of this latter
process involves performing actions that are consistent with such an identity. The battle
between the reformers and the diehards over their different approaches to the India
question was in part, a battle to ensure that their particular idea of Britishness could be
enacted into being.
2.5 Parliamentary Institutions and Contested Territorial Policies
In 1934, Samuel Hoare admitted to the then Viceroy of India, Lord Willingdon,
that “there were 'no more than thirty’ Conservative MPs 'genuinely keen to go on with
the Bill, that the great mass is very lukew arm and that a very strong minority is actively
?85
hostile.”’ ' While the dissenters did not form a majority in any section of the Party,
they did span its entire spectrum from three previous Conservative Secretaries of State
for India to retired Indian civil servants and army or police officers who were active
figures in their local Conservative associations. Moreover, this cleavage was very real
as this formidable combination of diehards and rebels w as focused on “capturing these
key regions of Conservative support as the means of stampeding the Party.”
Contestation on the issue of India, however, did not lead to a quagmire or a
bloody and violent end in this particular phase of the struggle in British politics. Why
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was this the case even though the battle was the longest and most bitter struggle that had
ever been fought over a colony in Britain? This section examines the proposition that
domestic institutional structures also affect the dynamics through which the processes
of contestation are played out. More specifically, democratic governments w ith few
veto players will have greater latitude to change territorial policy.
Generally, the British political system has been classified as one where there is
only one veto player." Its unitary government and parliamentarian system where the
executive and legislative branches are functionally linked, the supremacy of the laws
from parliament, the lack of judicial review and the dominance of the House of
Commons over the House of Lords create a system where there are no constitutional
veto points. Partisan veto points are also largely limited, usually to one, due to single-
member districts and ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral rules which have generated a largely
two-party system for a greater part of the twentieth century. These electoral rules and
the two-party system also ensure that parties attempt to be ‘catch-all’ parties in order to
->88
cater to multiple constituencies to gain the relative majority." Hence, parties with
agendas and interests that are focused on narrow issue areas are less likely to be
politically viable.
Parliamentary systems are also characterized by a great deal of party discipline
which minimizes rebellion or deviations from the party line. Besides the party whip
and deference, a third crucial factor which contributes to discipline is the possibility of
7X7
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new elections and electoral defeat should challenges to the governing party lead to its
">89
fall. Since there is a likelihood that the party that comes into power may have
policies that are far worse or radical than those at the root of one’s defection from one's
own party, disagreements within a party may be voiced but they are ultimately
290
muted. Thus, the prime minister and cabinet in the British system are usually able to
govern with considerable leverage over their own party and the legislature. This
combination of factors creates just one partisan veto player and therefore, one decision
point in the British system.
As noted above, there is usually one veto player in the British system. The
period examined in this chapter however appears to be an exception to this rule. The
1929 general election gave the Liberals 7 seats, the Conservatives, 260 seats and
791
Labour, 288 seats. As such, a minority Labour government dependent on the Liberal
Party was in power between May 1929 and 1931 . While there was one veto player in
the system, it was vulnerable to no-confidence motions that could have been initiated by
the other two parties and therefore, heavily dependent on them.
The 1929 Irwin Declaration, the first controversial measure of the period, was
supported by the vulnerable minority Labour government. The Conservative leader,
Baldwin supported the Irwin initiative but he faced tremendous misgivings and
dissension from significant men within his own party with some experience of India
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affairs, Lloyd George and others in the Liberal party, some liberal leaders in the House
?92
ol Lords, Irwin's predecessor as Viceroy, Lord Reading, and from the Daily Mail.
While Baldwin was extremely persuasive and successful in his speech during the
Commons Debate on the Declaration, diehards within his party appeared prepared to
?93
join the same hostile lobby as Lloyd George il a division had been called." However,
this was avoided because "the Party’s hands were largely tied by Baldwin's
294
commitment, even if it had been only personal.”" Moreover. "Baldwin succeeded in
keeping discontent under control by exploiting the loyalty owed to the Party leader ...
995
and the instinctive aversion to disunity.” ' The attempt here by the Liberal Party to use
the issue to bring down the Labour government by plotting with Conservative diehards,
and therefore, to halt any change in Britain’s India policy failed because the Liberals
were only as strong as their ability to persuade the Conservative leader and frontbench
to follow along. However, their failure is “a clear indication of the enormous personal
power of the Party leader, for Baldwin’s decision gave his followers little room for
manoeuvre by making the issue as much one of confidence in himself as leader as of
?96
support for Irwin.”
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Even in the early months of 1931, one of lowest points of Baldwin’s position
over India, he was able to contain the dissenters by drawing on "the prestige and power
297
of his position as Party leader, and the trust and loyalty to which he would appeal.”"
Men like Hailsham, Austen Chamberlain and Lord Salisbury who could have
?98
potentially led the revolt but chose not to out of party and personal loyalty. This was
repeated in the parliamentary ranks of the party. For example, only five MPs, out of the
hundred that were present at a meeting of the parliamentary India committee held after
the Commons debate of 12 March, voted against a resolution approving Baldwin’s
?99
position. The rest, especially the Party centre who may have been hesitant in their
support of his India policy were, as Churchill noted ‘“are all afraid of being labeled
disloyal’.”
300
In August 1929. a severe financial and political crisis led to the resignation of
the minority Labour government but Ramsay MacDonald was persuaded, with support
from the Conservatives and Liberals, to form what was intended to be a temporary
National coalition before a general election which would be fought separately by the
parties. However, almost the entire Labour party went immediately into opposition
while the other parties decided to contest the election as a National government w ith
candidates of each party withdraw ing in favor of the sitting MP. This election resulted
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in the Conservatives winning 471 seats, the Liberal Nationals, 35 seats, the Liberals, 33
seats and National Labour, 12 seats.
'01
Therefore, the National government, while a
coalition, was one which was dominated by an overwhelming Conservative majority.
In the Cabinet, the Conservatives held eleven out of twenty positions while McDonald's
tiny National Labour had four, the Liberal Nationals, two and finally, the Liberals,
three. After a year, the Liberals withdrew from the coalition but MacDonald remained
Prime Minister until 1935. Despite the number of parties in the National coalition
government, there was really only one veto player - the Conservative Party. It was the
only one that mattered as all the other parties could have left the coalition without
altering the Conservatives’ overwhelming majority.
From 1931 to 1935, the diehards turned to the base of the Conservative Party
and attempted to influence public opinion when they realized that it was the only means
of "breaking the solidarity of the parliamentary consensus over India.” ° First, the
diehards tried “to use their support in the Conservative constituency associations to gain
control of the organs of the party caucus to which the associations sent
304
representatives.” Here, they targeted the Central Council, the governing body of the
National Union of Conservative Associations as it was the platform from which a direct
Butler 1986, 47; and Stevenson and Cook 1994, 1 19.
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power challenge to the party leadership could be launched. Second, the diehards tried
using “activity in the constituencies to influence the voting intentions of their MPs.”
3<b
At the first test of the effectiveness of their campaign amongst party activists, a
meeting of the Central Council on 28 June 1933, the diehards failed by a large margin
to reject a motion from Baldwin that delegates should not intervene on the issue of
Indian reforms until the Joint Select Committee had ended their deliberations.
306
Despite their opposition to the constitutional reforms for India, the delegates, as the
Conservative MP. Cuthbert Headlam noted, were not going challenge Baldwin's
307
leadership because it would “run the risk ol destroying the National Government."
The diehards’ attempts to begin to reverse the changes did not end with this failure but
continued at the Party conference in October that same year. Once again, they failed as
the conference decided "by 737 to .344 (with 121 abstentions) to follow the now familiar
line that it was not competent to comment on party policy until after that policy had
308
already been settled." For observers at the conference, the reformers were saved by
Neville Chamberlain who argued that the diehards’ motion represented a direct
309
challenge to the Government. Similarly, a dissident attempt to overturn the motion
that discussions and interventions on the issue of Indian reform should only take place
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alter the deliberations of the Joint Select Committee at a Central Council meeting in
March 1934 failed because of the "impression ... that a call for a debate was a direct
110
revolt against the party leadership and thus, the stability of the government itself.”
Overall, it was the leaders of the party and the frontbenchers who were
responsible for the direction of Indian policy. As commented by Lord Hugh Cecil:
"The main reality is that the decision about Indian Government will be taken
here in England; and that the real sovereignty of India lies here ... I suppose if
ten persons or thereabouts on Front Benches come to any decision about India,
that decision will in fact operate. No doubt public opinion on some questions
greatly influences and sometimes overbears Front Benchdom: but at present, at
any rate, public opinion is not excited.”
1
1
With the party leaders standing firm, it was clear that change could only come if they
were repudiated. Part of the price of such a challenge would be the fall of the National
government and their overwhelming majority. The diehards were never able to
summon sufficient support from the top echelons of the party or even from its base to
do so.
Therefore, the leverage of party leaders over their own party and the fear of
electoral defeat that could arise from challenging one’s own party were ultimately
deciding factors in ensuring that Baldwin, Irwin. Hoare and the small group of
Conservative frontbenchers who were in favor of constitutional reforms for India
carried the day while the bitter differences it engendered remained within the party.
From 1929 to 1935. the leadership of the Conservative Party was able to lead its
members in a direction which many of them may not have wanted to go instead of a
310
Stewart 2001, 172.
Ball 1988, 1 14.
141
quagmire precisely because of the structural proclivities of a parliamentary system and
its consequences for a party's electoral fortunes.
2.6 Conclusion
During the late nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth
century, Britishness was associated with superiority, exceptionalism, and greatness. It
was an imperial-based identity emphasizing that Britons were politically, economically,
socially and morally exceptional people who had a special duty to fulfill in the world.
During the turbulent interwar years however, international and domestic developments
created an increasingly visible gap between the expectations associated with this
identity and the reality on the ground, providing the space for alternative
conceptualizations of Britishness to emerge. The main alternative to this dominant
heroic and imperial-based British identity emphasized Britishness as being rooted in the
places and landscapes throughout the British isles and the principle of democratic
constitutionalism. While it reflected in part, well established cultural trends and an
already existing nostalgia for an idealized and rural past, the emergence of this identity
was also inseparable from the turbulent political and social conditions of the time and in
particular, its consequences for the politics and difficulties experienced by the
Conservative party. The leader of the Conservatives for most of the Interwar period,
Stanley Baldwin, was particularly important in the construction of this identity.
Baldw in, greatly concerned about the arrival of mass democracy and the problems of
social and political cohesion in Britain, provided a conception of Britishness that
emphasized harmony, unity, and the timelessness of its principles and values. The
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emergence of this alternative did not, however, lead to the automatic marginalization
and disappearance of the imperial-based identity from politics or political discourse.
Between 1929 and 1935, these identities were politically contested through the
long battle fought by the diehards and the reformers over constitutional reforms for
India. Spelling out Britishness was however, only the first half of these arguments. The
second half focused on what being British would entail vis-a-vis India. For Churchill
and the diehards, the constitutional reforms had to be prevented at all costs as they
would lead to the abrogation of British responsibility but more importantly, the end of
Britishness that they associated with greatness, superiority and exceptionalism. Being
and critically, staying British, entailed remaining in India and performing its benevolent
and civilizing mission, a mission that would continue to confirm and sustain this
conception of Britishness. For Baldwin and the reformers, the importance of
democratic constitutionalism for their conception of Britishness necessitated that the
very conduct of British politics should follow and abide by the rules of a parliamentary
democracy. This drove their approach to the question of India which was characterized
by the determination to follow principles of democratic constitutionalism.
After six years, this battle over India and British identity concluded with the
passage of these constitutional reforms. Baldwin's position as the leader of the
Conservative Party in a parliamentary system had provided the structural conditions that
enabled him to guide and lead his party to a position which the majority did not support.
The structural conditions of the British political system constrained the contestation
between the two factions, ensuring that opposition to the reforms remained within the
143
confines of the party. It also ensured that their differences over India did not become
bogged down in a quagmire.
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CHAPTER 3
FROM INCORPORATION TO DISENGAGEMENT: EAST TIMOR ANI)
MAKING INDONESIA, 1975-1999
3.1 Introduction
For twenty-four years, Indonesia retained a firm and unyielding grip on East
Timor as its twenty-seventh province. This intransigent policy which had been
primarily focused on protecting Indonesia from the threat of 'communists’ and 'security
disturbing mobs’ gave way in a rather sudden and unexpected way first in June 1998
when an offer of autonomy was made to East Timor, and later, in January 1999 when a
more radical step was taken to give the people of East Timor the opportunity to decide
their own future in an indirect referendum. Self-determination for East Timor however,
came at a great price - the Indonesian military and Indonesian-backed militias left
violence and destruction in the wake of Indonesia’s withdrawal from the territory. In
this chapter, I focus on the following three questions: Why did Indonesia, a country
proud of, and constituted by its anti-colonial history, annex East Timor and retain it for
twenty-four years even in the face of widespread international condemnation? How and
why did the policy change in 1998 and 1999 come about? And why was the withdrawal
marked by so much violence especially after a decision to allow the indirect referendum
had been made?
Section 3.2 provides a background of this relationship through a chronological
description of the events that have played a major part in its development and evolution.
Section 3.3 then proceeds to examine various factors that may provide a better
understanding of the difference in approaches between Suharto’s New Order period and
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the transitional government helmed by B.J. Habibie from 1998 to 1999. Section 3.4
focuses on the Indonesia’s view and position on East Timor during the Suharto period
while section 3.5 examines the shift leading to a resolution of the issue in 1999. The
final section of this chapter takes on the task of examining why Indonesia's
disengagement from East Timor was so violent even after the decision to allow the
referendum had been made.
3.2 From Incorporation To Disengagement
East Timor became a Portuguese colony in the sixteenth century and remained
so until the 1974 Carnation Revolution brought down the Caetano regime in Lisbon and
ushered in a new government that was committed to the decolonization of Portugal’s
remaining colonies. Distantly located in the eastern half of the Indonesian archipelago.
East Timor responded to these developments by initiating processes that would lead to
self-determination. Indonesia’s military and intelligence services however, believed
that an independent but vulnerable East Timor, together w ith the presence of the
popular but leftist-leaning political party Freitlin ( Frente Revolucionara de Timor Leste
Independente), would turn East Timor into a beach-head for subversive communist
activities in the middle of the Indonesian archipelago and threaten its security, stability
and unity.
1
In August 1975, the fragile union of Freitlin with the UDT (Timorese
Democratic Union) party disintegrated due to the machinations of the Indonesian
intelligence services. Subsequently, a civil war between the two parties broke out only
1
Schwarz 2000, 201; and Taylor 1999.
In contrast, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry declared in a letter to Jose Ramos-Horta, a
member of Freitlin that East Timor’s sovereignty as an independent nation would be
respected by its largest neighbor in the first few months after Portuguese intentions
became known.
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to end three weeks later with a Freitlin victory and its unilateral declaration of
independence on 28 November 1975. Within nine days of this declaration, Indonesia
invaded East Timor. A year after the invasion. East Timor was formally incorporated
into Indonesia as its twenty-seventh province.
Over the next twenty-four years, the Indonesian military attempted to eradicate
the East Timorese resistance in a brutal campaign which left between 1 20.000 to
200,000 people, a third of its pre-invasion population, dead." Within East Timor,
resistance to Indonesian rule continued and intensified during this period. Non-
governmental organizations in the U.S., Britain, Ireland and Portugal supported the East
Timorese by disseminating information about human rights abuses and lobbying their
governments to stop supporting the Suharto regime and its activities.' In Indonesia, a
small but growing group of radical university students, intellectuals and activists who
were also affiliated with the country’s pro-democracy movement favored and supported
4
self-determination tor East Timor. For them, the democratization of Indonesia was
inseparable from the support for East Timorese opposition against Indonesian
occupation and its self-determination. Intellectuals like George Aditjondro as well as
others from the government research institute LIPI (the Indonesian Institute of
Sciences) and ICMI (the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) for example,
began to evaluate the rationale, cost and consequences of Indonesia’s policy in East
Timor in their research, publishing some of their conclusions in books and newspaper
2
Cotton 2000, 3.
1
Smith and Muetzelfeldt (2000).
4
Uhl i n 1997, 197-8; Fukuda 2000, 24; and interviews with Rachland Nashidik on 21
July 2004; Munir on 21 July 2004; and Wilson on 27 July 2004.
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columns/ While they were by no means in full agreement on the issues surrounding
Indonesian involvement in East Timor, many began to contemplate the need for major
policy changes.
At the very top levels of the Indonesian government however, new departures in
policy were vetoed as the half-island was considered an integrated part of Indonesia and
an indisputable component of the archipelago’s sovereignty." President Suharto refused
to contemplate changes, brushing off all requests to review Indonesian policy towards
East Timor despite significant international condemnation from states as well as non-
governmental organizations during the 1990s. The military, which was involved in the
original planning, invasion, and the subsequent task of integrating East Timor, was also
similarly against any changes. The original conviction of President Suharto, and the
Indonesian military and intelligence services in 1975 that the potential of communism
in East Timor threatened Indonesia remained throughout its occupation albeit in a
slightly different form.
8
Critically, the Indonesian military was also convinced that the
majority of the East Timorese wanted to be Indonesians. They concluded that the East
Timorese resistance who fought for independence either with guns or through political
and diplomatic means were either communist-inspired diehards or a small group of
Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 21 July 2004; Interview with Indria Samego, 19
July 2004. Also, see Crouch 2000, and Tapol Bulletin , no.151 (March 1999): 2.
6
Cotton 2000, 4.
Ali Alatas, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, had brought up the idea of autonomy for
East Timor in the early 1990s. See Alatas 2006, 99-104.
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9
frustrated and uneducated East Timorese susceptible to the former’s influence. Hence,
continued resistance to integration could only be due to generous but poorly
implemented integration and development policies or the actions of a small but vocal
and ungrateful minority.
10
In June 1998, B.J. Habibie, the man who had just succeeded the disgraced
Suharto as president of Indonesia, told Reuters and the BBC in an interview that he was
ready to consider giving East Timor special status. 1
1
In mid-June, this offer, which
entailed giving East Timor its own semi-autonomous administration and a significant
increase in political freedom, was formally confirmed by Ali Alatas, Indonesia’s
Foreign Minister, at a meeting with the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan and
1 ?
Portuguese government representatives. ~ During the next six months when ministerial-
level talks were held between Indonesia and Portugal on the former’s proposal for East
Timor’s autonomy, the Indonesian government did not consider any suggestions or
proposals of a referendum as a viable option. 1 ' Instead, they maintained that a
referendum was unnecessary because the East Timorese had already opted for
'
Moore 2001 and McRae 2002.
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See official Indonesian publications like East Timor: Building for the Future: Issues
and Perspectives, 2nd Edition (Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia,
1996).
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'Greenlees and Garran 2002, 25.
1
9
Portugal and Indonesia had been locked in fruitless diplomatic talks for more than a
decade due to disagreements over fundamental parameters for a negotiated settlement.
See Alatas 2006.
1
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integration in 1976.
14
In addition. Indonesian diplomats and officials also argued that a
referendum would result in the emergence of pro- and anti-integration factions, civil
war and the possible division of East Timor.
In late January 1999, these previous refusals to contemplate a referendum were
put aside. President Habibie made a move that was surprising but critical to East
Timor's path to independence. On January 27th. the Habibie government announced a
'second option" where East Timor could choose between autonomy and independence.
In March, further diplomatic negotiations led to the agreement that the East Timorese
would be ‘consulted’ through a direct ballot where the rejection of autonomy would
mean independence. On August 31 1999. the people of East Timor voted for
independence when they rejected the option of autonomy in overwhelming numbers.
What accounts for the wide differences in approaches to East Timor exhibited
by Suharto’s New Order and the Habibie period? How did the decision to allow the
indirect referendum come about? Over the last few years, several accounts, usually
focusing on either the efforts of a transnational network of activists or the significantly
different economic and political conditions under which Indonesia had to operate after
the rupiah and the economy began their freefall in 1997. have contributed to our
understanding of various facets of these events. The next section turns to these various
factors and evaluates the relative significance of each.
3.3 Alternative Explanations
Great importance has been attributed to the contributions of the transnational
network of activists who took up the East Timorese cause after the 1991 massacre of
14
The selection was marred by interference from the Indonesians.
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unarmed civilians by Indonesian military forces in Dili. During the first fifteen years of
the occupation, the East Timorese were unable to garner much attention or support in
their fight for self-determination due to Indonesia’s successful efforts at keeping it
physically isolated from observers. More importantly. Indonesia was able to manage
and suppress the issue of East Timor in international forums like the United Nation with
the support of countries like the United States and Australia.
16
This attempt at erasing the East Timor issue was however, reversed in
November 1991 when video footage smuggled out of the country showed the
indiscriminate massacre of civilians who were gathered at the Santa Cruz cemetery in
Dili, the capital, to commemorate the death of a pro-independence supporter. 16 In
capturing the brutal nature of Indonesian rule in a way that previous reports trickling out
of East Timor never could, this video documentation of the Santa Cruz events
galvanized international attention and in particular, that of transnational activists.
In time, these activists were able to produce two crucial changes which some
argue were pivotal in "bringing about political change in East Timor.”
17
First, they kept
the issue of East Timor alive in the international arena by lobbying national
governments and regional institutions like the EU.
IS
In the U.S., a singularly important
arena, transnational activists were particularly effective in persuading members of
Congress, who from the mid-1990s, voted to cut off various forms of aid and training
15
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19
for the Indonesian military. In 1993, the U.S. supported a resolution passed by the
UN Human Rights Commission censuring Indonesia for its poor human rights record in
East Timor.
20
Other countries and international aid agencies signaled their disapproval
by either reducing or suspending their aid programs.”
1
Second was their success in
broadening the narrow public focus on human rights to encompass self-determination
77
through framing it "in the discourse of unfinished European colonialism"' and by
using persuasive moral arguments.'
3
While the transnational East Timor solidarity network did make these crucial
contributions and was an undeniable and critical actor in this story, explanations solely
focused on their role must be tempered by an important consideration - the Suharto
regime was immune to their efforts while Habibie chose to offer autonomy to East
Timor within his first week in office. Suharto for example, responded to growing
pressure and signals from a U.S. Congress that had been heavily influenced by activists
by rejecting the ‘expanded' version of IMET which focuses on human rights and
civilian control of the military, and halting a proposed US$250 million purchase of
1 ’
Simpson (2005) and Cotton (2000: 4).
However, it was not entirely successful as the Congressional ban on IMET had been
sidestepped by allowing Indonesia to purchase the training and the continuation of US-
Indonesia exercises. Throughout the Clinton administration, Indonesia was considered
strategically and economically more important than East Timor (Nevins 2005. 61 ).
See also footnote 37 for U.S. support of the Indonesian military in 1999.
20
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American F- 16 jet fighters. In his letter to President Clinton, Suharto “stated that he
?4
would not accept restrictions on military transters based on human rights.”" Hence, the
transnational East Timor solidarity network may have partially cleared and paved the
path for ending the Indonesian occupation by refraining the issue but these efforts
would have remained inadequate in the face of continued resistance from Indonesia. In
other words, processes within Indonesia cannot be discounted and are an important part
of the equation.
Realist-based approaches which do take Indonesian agency into account argue
that it was the drastic change in the country's material circumstances during the Asian
financial crisis of 1997 which was pivotal in forcing a recalibration of the country’s
interest. More specifically, this perspective argues that the currency crisis, which had
deteriorated rapidly into a full-blown financial crisis of failing banks, non-performing
loans and technically bankrupt conglomerates, quickly eroded Indonesia’s resistance
because they produced two broad effects. One. Indonesia found that it had limited
negotiating power with international donors bent on self-determination for East Timor.
Second, the cost of occupying East Timor had magnified in a country where the crisis
had left 27.8 million Indonesians unemployed at the end of February 1998. 79.4 million
living in poverty and an economy that was expected to shrink by between 10 and 20 per
cent of GDP in 1998 alone.
4
Scheiner 2000, 122.
This argument is made by Kivimaki 2003. See p.229.
The figures are from Robison and Hadiz 2004, 150. and Schwarz 1999. 4.
It is also interesting to note that Simpson 2005 acknowledges that this change was
important.
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In the face of such overwhelmingly difficult economic conditions, it is easy to
assume and conclude that Indonesia, acting rationally, had little choice but to initiate the
changes vis-a-vis East Timor. Before arriving at such a conclusion, the following
questions have to be addressed. Was there international pressure exerted by the IMF.
the U.S., Japan and the EU on Indonesia to change its East Timor policy?26 If pressure
was exerted, how did Indonesia respond? Finally, did the cost of the occupation
become a factor?
In the 1990s, Japan was Indonesia’s most important trading partner, largest
foreign direct investor, and largest supplier of official development assistance (ODA).
disbursing for example, $496.9 million to the latter in 1997 and $828.5 million in
1998.' Despite its considerable economic leverage over Indonesia, Japan did not place
any pressure on the latter regarding the issue ot East Timor." In the period leading up
to and after Suharto’s fall, Japan did not veer from past priorities which centered on the
stability of Indonesia and the region rather than East Timor.' ’ For Japan, this translated
into getting the Indonesian economy back on track either by emphasizing the necessity
26
Australia, though an influential actor in these events, is not included in this list as its
influence was non-material and came from its past support of Indonesia on the East
Timor issue.
27
Germany, the next largest donor, disbursed $1 15.2 million to Indonesia in 1997 and
$212.8 million in 1998. The U.S. in contrast, did not disburse any ODA funds to the
Indonesia from 1992 to 1997.
Tg
See Nevins 2005. 67. Note that this was however, different after the violence and
bloodshed that followed the August 1999 ballot.
29
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In fact, Japan differed from the G-7 countries regarding IMF policies towards the Asian
countries embroiled in the financial crisis. See Blustein 2001, and Lee 2006.
154
of compliance with IMF conditionalities or providing special financial assistance
outside the IMF framework.'0
Like Japan, the EU was also far more concerned about economic issues rather
than human rights protection in East Timor. The former was considered central to "the
future stability of Indonesia, and by extension, the whole ASEAN region.”' 1 An
indicator of this concern was the crucial economic support which it pledged during the
ASEM II (Asia-Europe Meeting) in London on 3-4 April 1998."
The IMF and the United States were the other two key international actors with
the political power and economic leverage to influence Indonesian policy on East
Timor. The former, initially invited to Indonesia as a means of restoring market
confidence, imposed orthodox austerity measures like tight monetary and fiscal policies.
Pressure exerted by members of the IMF board representing western industrialized
countries also led to the imposition of unorthodox ones which went beyond the Fund’s
mandate. These measures, aimed at curbing the corruption, cronyism and nepotism
(or korruption, kronyism and nepotisme, KKN) endemic in the Indonesian economy,
included amongst other things, the phasing out of import and marketing monopolies
0
Gorjao 2002, 759. At the same time, Ryutaro Hashimoto, the Japanese Prime
Minister, had also promised Indonesia aid during a mid-March visit to Jakarta, thereby
providing it with another source of aid.
1
Ward and Carey 2001, 52.
32
Ward and Carey 2001, 66. Domestic interests of EU member countries were also at
play here - the UK and France for example, continued their arms trade with Jakarta
during this period.
33
Blustein 2001, 101 . According to Blustein, the U.S. representative on the board was
particularly assertive.
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held by BULOG. the state agency responsible for the distribution of many key
34
foodstuffs and raw materials.
When Suharto resisted the IMF’s plan in several ways, the latter, citing lack of
progress in the implementation of the program, postponed the payment of the second
US$3 billion tranche of its bailout package planned for March 15. ° Subsequently,
Suharto was forced to back down and adhere to IMF conditionalities. While this was
certainly a clear reflection of the ability and power of the IMF and through it. the U.S.,
to impose its will, there are no indicators that the U.S. attempted to use these economic
problems to press for a change in Indonesia’s East Timor policy during the height of the
crisis. The State Department, the Pentagon and some members of the National Security
Council were against making any moves, including pressing for political reforms, “that
smacked of trying to undermine Suharto.”
6
Even in February 1999. some key players
in the U.S. State Department and positions of influence in Washington, D.C. were still
4
Blustein 2001, 106. However, it must also be noted that the Indonesians who were
responsible for the negotiations did not balk at the conditions as some of them saw it as
a means of tackling long-standing economic problems that had been a source of
efficiency, waste and corruption.
° Robison and Hadiz 2004. 158. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank
followed suit and withheld US$1 billion and US$1.5 billion respectively.
6
Blustein 2001, 229-30. See also Nevins 2005. 61 &. 115.
The Clinton administration, in fact, continued to back the Suharto regime in the second
half of 1997 and early 1998. William Cohen. Secretary of Defense went to Jakarta in
January 1998 where he did not call upon the Indonesian military to exercise restraint in
responding to street demonstrations.
In 1999. this support continued even when militia activity in East Timor had been
racheted up. Senior U.S. military officials like Admiral Dennis Blair and Admiral
Clemins, for example, offered Indonesia new military assistance in the form of U.S.
training programs. See Allan Nairn's congressional testimony published in “U.S.
Support for the Indonesian Military. Congressional Testimony.” Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars
.
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looking into alternatives to a referendum in East Timor. Moreover, the pressure that
was exerted by the Treasury Department for reforms in order to restore market and
38
investor confidence did not extend to the realm of Indonesian foreign policy.
Now. let us consider the possibility that the issue of East Timor had been
addressed in direct conversations between the U.S. and Indonesia through
representatives and envoys sent to Jakarta and President Clinton himself. Even if this
had been the case. East Timor was never mentioned by Suharto during his last few
months in office even as the financial crisis reached a peak in his last months in office -
there was no automatic recalibration of Indonesian interests in relation to East Timor,
contrary to what realists would expect.
In contrast to Suharto. Habibie floated the possibility of autonomy for East
Timor within his first week in power w hile facing what were essentially the same
economic and political problems as his predecessor. Seven months later, this offer of
autonomy grew to include the option of independence if the people of East Timor
rejected autonomy within the Indonesian republic. Instead of being integral to the
security and sovereignty of Indonesia. Habibie and his advisers considered East Timor
'historical baggage’, an issue that had to be resolved for the country’s political and
economic health.
For realists, Habibie, unlike the increasingly out-of-touch Suharto, was merely
acting rationally in the interest of Indonesia. More specifically, this argument is based
These views were apparent during a working dinner hosted by Madeleine Albright for
a group of Indonesia scholars. See Nevins 2005, 1 1 5.
Blustein 2001, 228; and Rubin 2003, 248-49. For example, Rubin states that they
were not pressing for Suharto ouster.
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on the assumption that the cost of the occupation, and the dependence on much needed
economic aid from western donors led to the rational conclusion by Habibie and his
advisers that East Timor could easily be sacrificed for the benefit of an Indonesia that
was in the throes of an acute crisis. Such an argument however, is problematic due to a
number of reasons. First, it is unable to fully account for the offer of autonomy that was
made in June 1998, their persistent refusal to consider any other options during the next
six months, and the sudden change that took place in January 1999 when the option of
independence was also placed on the table. Since aid from the IMF was being
dispensed after July 29 1998 and material circumstances did not undergo any further
deterioration during this six-month period, this change in policy is especially
puzzling. It state interests are based on calculations ol power and material wealth,
why was there one policy in June 1998 and another in January 1999? In addition, why
were there contrasting responses from Suharto and Habibie since both men were
confronted by the same material circumstances?
These questions indicate that the impact of Indonesia's economic crisis
understood within a theoretical framework based primarily on a unitary state acting on
the basis of cost-benefit calculations and pre-given national interests cannot fully
account for how' these events unfolded. Here. I am not arguing that the dire economic
conditions faced by Indonesia were completely irrelevant. Instead, I will suggest that
an account that situates these material difficulties in a larger social environment will be
able to provide more insight into these differences. More specifically, the impact of
these material difficulties can be better understood if they are also embedded in
39
For a chronology ol the crisis, see http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/econ/crisis.html
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processes and mechanisms that take the social into account. Section 3.5 will provide a
more thorough and in-depth discussion of this point.
The next section begins the task of examining the considerable differences in
approaches between Suharto and Habibie by first outlining and examining the
arguments made during the New Order regarding the need to invade East Timor, the
nature of the East Timorese resistance to integration with Indonesia, and the
corresponding conclusion to dismiss them throughout the shelf-life of the regime.
Section 3.5 will then turn its focus to the changes initiated by Habibie and some of his
advisers between 1998 and 1999.
3.4 Suharto’s New Order and East Timor
During the New Order. President Suharto and ABRI. the Indonesian military,
40
had control and power over the country’s security policies. This was no different for
the case of East Timor, whose annexation and integration had been planned and
executed by Major-General Ali Murtopo, General Benny Murdani. Yoga Sugama,
41
Suharto, Harry Tjan, and Liem Bie Kie. While this initial group of men was replaced
by other high-ranking military and intelligence officials during the course of the twenty-
four year occupation, all of them equated an independent East Timor and the East
40
Suryadinata 1996; Anwar 1998; and Dassel 1997 on the importance of the president
and the military and their beliefs in the making of foreign policy during the New Order.
Dassel though argues that organizational imperatives and interests were the factors
underlying the policies of the New Order.
41
Cablegram to Canberra, 24 Feb 1975. “Portuguese Timor” [NAA; A 10463,
801/13/1 1/1, x]. Doc 95 in Way (ed.); and Letter from Furlonger to Feakes, 3 July 1974.
fNAA; A 1 1443, |1]|. Doc no. 12 in Way (ed.).
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Timorese independence movement not only with communism and ‘security disturbing
4?
mobs’ but more importantly, with the threats that they posed to Indonesia’s security.
Between 1974 and 1975, Murtopo. Murdani, Sugama. Suharto, Tjan, and Liem
were concerned about the rise of leftist-leaning Freitlin. In particular, the prospect of
having to share a common border with a Freitlin-led independent state generated "deep
43
apprehension at a possible threat to the security of the Republic." Second, they also
insisted repeatedly in documented conversations with Australian government officials
that an independent but economically poor and militarily weak East Timor would be
extremely susceptible to external sources of communism.
44
In a meeting w ith Gough
Whitlam. the Prime Minister of Australia and a trusted friend, Suharto laid this out:
“If Portuguese Timor were to become independent, it would give rise to
problems. It was not economically viable. It w;ould have to seek the help of
another country but [it] would be of interest only because of its political
importance. There w as a big danger that communist countries - China or the
Soviet Union - might gain the opportunity to intervene.”4 ^
42
‘ On the pervasiveness of communism and ‘security disturbing mobs’ in Indonesia’s
discourses on East Timor, see Cabral 2000: and McRae 2000.
43
Leifer 1983, 155.
44
Suryadinata 1996, 54: Van Der Kroef 1976, 471; Simpson 2005, 286; Schwarz 2000,
201: Lloyd 2000. 84: and Taylor 1999. See also Dispatch to Willesee, 2 June 1975,
“The Portuguese Timor Problem as seen from Jakarta" [NAA: A 1838, 3034/10/6/9. i]
Doc 137. in Way (ed. ); Record of Conversation Between Tjan and Taylor. 10 March
1975. [NAA: A10463, 801/13/1 1/1. viii]. Doc 109 in Way (ed.): Cablegram to
Canberra, 24 Feb 1975. “Portuguese Timor” [NAA: A 10463, 801/13/1 1/1, x]. Doc 95
in Way (ed.): and Letter from Furlonger to Feakes, 3 July 1974. [NAA: A1 1443. [ 1 ]],
Doc no. 12 in Way (ed.).
Record of Meeting between Whitlam and Soeharto. 6 September 1974, [NAA:
A 10463, 801/13/11/1, iii]. Doc no. 26 in Way (ed.).
East Timor was known as Portuguese Timor while it was still a Portuguese colony.
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Yoga Sugama - the head of Indonesia’s intelligence services and regular
chairman of the Special Committee on Portuguese Timor which brought the men
involved in this policy together under one umbrella - also expressed this fear of
communism and its consequences for Indonesian security in a conversation with the
Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, R.A. Woolcott. Reported at length and almost
verbatim by Woolcott in a cablegram to Canberra, Sugama was quoted as saying:
“there is 'too much at stake for us.’ We cannot permit an Angola situation on
our doorstep... If the Soviet Union involved itself in the issue Indonesia would
also be in a position not unlike that which Kennedy had found himself at the
time of the Cuba crisis.”46
Therefore, the Indonesian military and intelligence services viewed the possibility of an
independent East Timor with great alarm during the Suharto period. This alarm was in
turn, rooted in the conviction that Freitlin's leftist political leanings would turn East
Timor into a beach-head for communism and used as a launch pad for subversive
activities in the middle of the Indonesian archipelago. 4 '
In the late 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. East Timorese claims for self-determination
continued to be associated with the threat of communism. ABRI pronounced all
resistance to integration with Indonesia and calls for independence by the East Timorese
as the work of the remnants of communist Freitlin or GPK/Freitlin (Gerombolan
Pengacau Keamanan/Freitlin or ‘security disturbing mob/movement’).48 Freitlin.
A A
Cablegram to Canberra. 14 August 1975. “Portuguese Timor” [NAA: A 10463,
801/13/1 1/1, xi], Doc 166 in Way (ed.).
47
Schwarz 2000, 201; and Taylor 1999.
48
McRae 2000, 40-1; and Moore 2001, 12. See also “Menunggu Hasil Komisi
Djaelani" Tempo , 30 November 1991; and “Suasana Natal Sangat Tepat Untuk
Berdialog.” Kompas
,
13 Desember 1991.
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while a greatly reduced force, was still considered a dangerous threat to Indonesian
security which not only required continued vigilance but justified military action. For
example, Indonesian officials, while acknowledging that Indonesian soldiers were
responsible for the shooting and deaths of East Timorese demonstrators in the Santa
Cruz massacre in 1991. also pointed to Freitlin as the puppet masters behind the
49
demonstration and therefore, ultimately to blame tor the tragedy. Instead ot
questioning their policies in East Timor, their conviction that Freitlin was pulling the
strings behind the demonstration led to the conclusion that even greater vigilance and
security was needed from ABRI forces stationed there.
°
What however, did Indonesia have to secure itself against? For Suharto and the
military elite, the danger came from the intention of communists to subvert and
overthrow governments.
51
Thus, the potential presence of communism in East Timor
was considered a serious security threat because it would jeopardize Indonesia’s
5?
“prolonged and continuing struggle tor national unity and stability.”' More generally,
communism was considered a threat to national unity, social order and Pancasila, the
philosophical basis of the Indonesian nation.
'
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“Belangsungkawa di Santa Cruz,” Tempo , 21, 39 (1991 ): 24.
"
"Lupakan masa dulu dan lihat ke masa depan,” Angkatan Bersenjata
.
28 Desember
1991.
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Leifer 1983, 155.
5 ^
" Cablegram to Canberra. 14 August 1975, “Portuguese Timor” [NAA: A 10463,
801/13/1 1/1, xi]. Doc 166 Way (ed.).
^ Anwar 1998. 478.
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In the 1990s. the Indonesian military also gave a great deal of credence to the
ability of Freitlin or GPK/Freitlin to manipulate the larger population whose
clamourings for independence had become increasingly visible and apparent. These
calls for independence from large sections of East Timorese society were viewed as the
result of Freitlin-engineered manipulation of what they considered was a mindless,
gullible and apolitical population. In both internal and external forms of
communication, the military unfailingly described the East Timorese resistance as
consisting of easily influenced and impressionable young people and students who were
merely "naughty children" (anak naked ) venting their frustrations or just poorly
educated.' In an internal military report for example, resistance to integration was
depicted as the result of the lack of understanding from these individuals regarding:
“integration and the meaning of independence, whether as a result of being left
out of the integration process or lack of proper explanation, in addition to their
youth and high hopes and desire for a better life, they are easily influenced by
issues and propaganda so that consciously or unconsciously, they want to stage
anti-integration demonstrations.”
55
These arguments were repeated even in the face of many pro-independence and
anti -integration demonstrations in the months after Suharto's fall from power. Internal
Indonesian military reports attributed the numbers to a small number of misguided
youth and gullible people who had either "been manipulated by the pro-independence
4
Moore 2001. 30; and McRae 2002. 28 and 45. See also "Pangab Menjawab Roberto
Dakrus,” Berita Buana
,
16 Desember 1991, and "LSM Yg Bekerja Untuk Negara
Asing, Menjual Negara,” Angkatan Bersenjata, 16 Desember 1991.
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Moore 2001, 12.
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clique during an economic and political crisis”
56
or forced “at gunpoint to support the
resistance.”
57
ABRI's response to these demonstrations even in the last months before
the ballot indicate that East Timor’s demands for independence were still being viewed
as the result of the manipulation of a small group of communists and security disturbing
mobs, and therefore, an unreliable and inaccurate reflection of the true wishes of the
people of East Timor.
Was there any basis for their arguments regarding the impending infiltration of
communism from East Timor into Indonesia in 1975. the presence and threat of
communism and 'security disturbing movements’ there in the 1980s and 1990s, or the
portrayals of the East Timorese desire for independence as the behavior of an ignorant
and gullible population?
During the mid-1970s, Freitlin may have been a leftist-leaning party but it was
one that was gaining popularity in a small territory whose population was preoccupied
with economic and social development. Hardly able to defend East Timor, it was
unlikely to pose a danger to Indonesia which was far more powerful. Moreover, it was
not sponsored by any major powers - over the course of the twenty-four year
occupation, Freitlin in fact, resisted and fought its Indonesian occupiers on its own; 8
Within Indonesia, there were also few signs of a communist revival whether in the
1970s, the 1980s or the 1990s. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). one of
Indonesia’s most effective political organizations, was physically annihilated when
56
Moore 2001, 12 and 30.
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Moore 2001, 37.
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Cotton 2001. 127.
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500,000 communists were killed in the months following the 1965 coup/ 6 Attempts by
remnants of the party to re-group in 1968 were also crushed. By the 1970s, the few
remaining members of the PKI had either been killed or imprisoned. During the 1980s
and 1990s, its few survivors "did very little to disturb the state and were usually
preoccupied with a pitiful struggle for simple survival.”
60
There were also few signs
that China, believed by Indonesia to be its most dangerous and likely external source of
subversion, was supporting a communist revival in the archipelago. 61 Contrary to the
constant warnings of Indonesia’s military and intelligence services in the 1970s, China
no longer had any links with the PKI/ It had also decreased its support for regional
communist movements significantly by the mid-1970s. 6
’
What about questions regarding East Timor’s ability to remain viable as an
independent state and the nature of its independence and resistance movements? There
is no doubt that East Timor was relatively undeveloped when Portugal declared its
50
Cribb 2001,233.
The scholarly literature on this important part of Indonesian history, one of the worst
massacres of the twentieth century, is still small as it was a closed subject during the
New Order. Cribb notes that the killings have been misconceived by some as reprisals
for personal grudges rather than political in function. He also argues that most grudges
had a political dimension as “the Communist Party had been so successful in taking
sides in social conflicts across the breadth of the archipelago. All the evidence that we
have indicates that the killings were precisely directed against the broad category of
peoples whom the army identified as enemies, that is, the members and close associates
of the Communist Party...” (2001: 234).
60
Roosa 2003, 315.
61
Sukma 1999, 138.
62 Sukma 1999. 200.
63 Sukma 1999, 200.
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intention to begin decolonization processes for the remnants of its empire. However,
nationwide development plans in areas like education, health and politics in which
indigenous society and culture had central roles were already being formulated and
implemented in East Timor. Besides these plans, Freitlin's literacy campaign that
promoted Tetum as the lingua franca of East Timor was also helping to forge a nation
and build a common identity.
,0
Finally, Freitlin's economic strategies and policies, if
fully implemented, were also creating "the infrastructure for a successfully planned
economy, based on the indigenous needs of the population.”
1
Wl
Hence, there were clear
indications in the mid-1970s that East Timor was a society with newly established
institutions, nationalist ideologies and aspirations for independence, as well as the
political, economic and social structures in place for its development and survival as a
viable sovereign state.
h
Moreover, the tenacious resistance movement in East Timor, contrary to the
depictions of the Indonesian military, did not just consist of a few hold-outs from the
mid-1970s and a small number of susceptible and frustrated members of the population.
Instead, East Timorese nationalism had grown stronger under Indonesian rule, fueled in
part by the brutality of the military, the lack of economic opportunities and the absence
64
See Hill 2004 for details on these plans as well as information on the nationalist
movement that existed at that time.
65
Taylor 1999. 65.
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of desirable employment.
68
The resistance, which had begun as a guerrilla movement.
had reshaped itself into an urban-based, non-violent movement that eventually
69
encompassed and united all tactions under one nationalist umbrella.
In the face of these realities in East Timor. Indonesia and the region, it may be
tempting to conclude that these New Order arguments regarding East Timor was part of
an elaborate but absurd propaganda front masking and justifying what some argue was
really a land grab. However, the regime’s convictions that communists and ‘security
disturbing mobs' in East Timor were a threat to Indonesian security were very real
during the twenty-four year occupation. In 1975. R.A. Woolcott, the Australian
Ambassador to Indonesia stated that fears of communism:
“existed] and [were] held by President Soeharto and by other Indonesian
leaders, particularly in the powerful military and intelligence communities.”
70
In the 1980s and 1990s, these convictions, as discussed earlier, had not
disappeared. While they may appear particularly doubtful after the collapse of
communism in 1989, a huge cache of Indonesian military documents found by the
human rights organization Yayasan Hak in East Timor after the 1999 referendum show
that there was little to differentiate the private and internal communications of the
military from what it told the outside world regarding East Timor.
71
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In fact, the New Order’s pre-occupation with the general issue of internal
security and its obsession with the dangers of communism were neither unique nor
72
specific to its relationship with East Timor. " Instead, the New Order w'as noted and
defined by its permanent pre-occupation with domestic threats to its security and
73
especially the threat ol communism. Indonesians, even as late as the 1980s and
1990s. were constantly warned by the state regarding the constant and latent danger
(bahaya laten) of communists who were said to be part of formless organizations
(Organisasi Tempo Bentuk or OTB) that were constantly lurking about and plotting to
sabotage economic development, create political instability and destroy the unity of
74
Indonesia. As the chances ol a communist revival let alone a communist revolution
were virtually impossible in Indonesia after 1965. how then can we understand these
fears of communism as a threat to Indonesia’s security?
Critics of the regime argue that the constant invocation of communism as a
threat was a tool used to repress political dissent, maintain its legitimacy and remain in
power.
75
However. I argue, following Ariel Heryanto that it was not merely a political
tool.
76
Such arguments are weakened by the implicit assumption that witch-hunts are a
~ See Heryanto 2006: and Roosa 2006.
Anwar 1998: Alagappa 1995a: Sebastian 2006: Schwarz 1999: and Vatikiotis 1998.
Heryanto 2006 covers this in great detail.
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van Langenberg 1990. 128: and Roosa 2006. 13.
° For example, anti-communism reached a peak in 1988 when there were divisions
within the ruling elite.
76
This section draws heavily on Heryanto 2006. See also Bubandt 2005.
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means of transforming a weak state into a strong one through the terrorization of a
population. Besides requiring immense state strength in order for them to be
effective, they do not necessarily benefit the state in long-run and have in fact, been
counter-productive.
8
Moreover, its perpetrators also depend on collaborators and
79
therefore, the active participation of victims in their own victimization.
Critically, anti-communism in Indonesia, even if it had begun as an instrumental
tool of the elites in some cases, had taken a life of its own. Among Indonesians, even
the end of the New Order did not put a death knell on the belief that communism was a
security threat.
80
Polls, newspaper headlines and letters to the editor were unremitting
regarding the dangers of communism. 81 Perhaps most telling is the extent to which the
fear of communism and the nature of its modus operandi had become part of the
conceptual discourse and language of Indonesia's secondary elites or common people, a
language which reveal, as Idith Zertal argues, “the mentality of a given group, its self-
82
image and conceptual discourse.” “ Below are two quotes that illustrate this:
77
Heryanto 2006, 168.
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Heryanto 2006, 168.
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For more, see Heryanto 2006. 168.
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McGregor 2002. 409; Zurbuchen 2005. 15: and Van Klinken 2005, 243.
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Heryanto 2006. 49.
Communist resurgence for example, was ranked number one for the question: “What is
the single most important domestic threat to Indonesia?” in polls conducted in 1984 and
1985 by Tempo, the highly respected Indonesian news magazine
82
Zertal 2006. 109. See Heryanto 2006 for an in-depth discussion of how anti-
communism was part of the conceptual discourse of Indonesians.
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“It’s not easy to recognize the behaviour of communists. This is especially so
when they operate ‘underground’ [inverted comma in the original]. Under
unfavorable circumstances, while they are vulnerable, they can reportedly
transform themselves into chameleons, or become wolves in sheep's clothing, or
take on two faces... they take all means to achieve their goal. In other words,
their ends justify their means. In real operations, it is no longer secret they
infiltrate organizations or institutions that they can use to advance their
endeavours. This is the so-called 'cell system' that they adopt is in all arenas
before they take control of them: political parties, mass organizations, the armed
forces, government institutions ... they disappear, disguise themselves, infiltrate
and move underground. Then before you know it. they restore their power.
After G-30-S/PKI was defeated for instance, they adopted the tactics of GTM
(Gerakan Tutup Mulut, ‘silent movement’) and OTB (Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk,
‘formless Organizations’)."
S '
“because it's not easy to recognize the behavior of communist’, so the logic
goes, one should neither underestimate the danger, nor be too sure that it is not
there right next to us. Because communists are good at “infiltration” one should
never assume that the danger of communism is somewhere at a distance. In fact,
it is possible that they might turn out to be innocent-looking people around one’s
home, or work place, or community. We must be ever-vigilant about everything
around us, so the message suggests. If necessary, we must take the initiative to
watch for, suspect, and perhaps take action against these insidious threats, before
it is too late. Finally, because of their strategy of being “silent” and “formless”,
we must not trust our own intellectual capability or our own perception to
recognize their existence. Mercifully, the New Order has anti-communist
intelligence to keep us alert, as recently reported in the media, and will do all
that is necessary to protect us from the calamity that we have failed to
comprehend. As the Minister of Defence and Security, General L Benny
Moerdani stated, ‘following the elimination of the physical force of the G-30-
S/PKI. what next deserves our attention is those movements that continue to be
carried out by the residual G-30-S/PKI, namely those movements that attempt to
84
whitewash their traces and to infiltrate’....”
How did communism assume such ability, power and more importantly, danger
in the New Order imagination? More generally, why was the New Order characterized
and defined by this pre-occupation with domestic threats to its security?
Tempo, 12/11/1988: 28, quoted in Heryanto 2005, 36.
G-30-S/PKI refers to the 1965 coup attempt which will be discussed in greater detail in
section 3.4. 1.1.
84
Suara Pembaruan, July 19 1988. quoted in Heryanto 2005. 36.
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3.4.1 Narratives of Indonesian Nationhood, National Security and East Timor
History, as noted by many scholars of the Indonesian military and Indonesian
security policy, had a pivotal role in the New Order’s conception of national security.
More specifically, they argue that the military’s experience with events like the War of
Revolution ( 1943-1949), the Madiun uprising of 1948. and the attempted coup of 1963
shaped their understanding of what constituted the gravest threats to Indonesia.' These
insightful accounts are however, incomplete as the significant question of how these
experiences influenced security concerns have been left unaddressed. More
specifically, what were the processes and mechanisms linking these events to security
concerns?
During the New Order, these specific historical events were interpreted,
organized and cohesively connected into a narrative regarding Indonesia’s origins, life
o/
history and nationhood.' More significantly, this narrative provided Indonesians with
the means to "locate themselves within a shared or congruent storyline,” and imagine
themselves "within a constructed historical space, and a space that is distinct from the
85
For work focused on national security doctrine in Indonesia, see Anwar 1998:
Sebastian 2006. For work on the Indonesian military, see Sundhaussen 1982; Said
1991; and Kingsbury 2003.
For more on the role of the Indonesian military in Indonesia’s political structure, see
section 3.6 of this chapter.
For a comprehensive treatment of the role of history in Indonesia’s efforts at nation-
building, see McGregor 2002. See also Reid 1979.
For the most current and comprehensive treatment on this subject, see McGregor
2002. See also Zurbuchen 2003; Van Klinken 2003: Van De Kok et al 1991. Schreiner
2002; Schreiner 1997; and Reid 1997.
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storyline that defines other nations and collective communities.’"*
7
In so doing, this
narrative was an important part of the process which constructed an identity for
88
Indonesia that was based in turn on interpretations of historical events. Crucially, this
narrative of Indonesian identity which bound Indonesia’s emergence as a state in the
twentieth century with danger, also simultaneously constructed the dangers and threats
that enervated the regime’s national security concerns.
The next section turns its attention to this narrative, and how it constructed both
an identity for Indonesia as well as security threats to the country. This will involve
outlining the historical events that were a part of the narrative, the New Order
interpretation of these events, and a discussion of the constructed Indonesian identity
and security threats that emerged out of these processes. Section 3.4. 1 .2 follows with a
discussion of how the construction of this threat shaped the New Order’s understanding
of national security, and its approach to East Timor.
3.4.1. 1 Narrating Indonesian Nationhood, Constructing Danger
The New Order narrative of Indonesian nationhood was a constant in the
89
everyday life of Indonesians. It was told and retold in dioramas in a network ol
* Barnett 1999, 13.
88 On narratives and stories in the construction of identities, see a body of literature
ranging from the work of IR scholars like Barnett 1999 and Dunn 2003. to that of
political scientists like Rogers Smith 2003, and sociologists like Till v 2002 and Somers
1994.
Sy
McGregor (2002: 49).
History in the service of nation-building did not start with Suharto. During Sukarno’s
time in office, he was heavily involved in planning and setting up the Museum Sejarah
Monumen Nasional, or the National Monument History Museum (Museum Monas), the
172
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museums, commemorative exercises held on national holidays, popular history
91 92
books, street names, films like The Treason of G30S/PKI,
~
courses like “History of
the National Struggle" in Indonesian elementary and high schools, stories regarding
first museum in Indonesia to present a progressive and visual narrative of the country's
history (McGregor 2002: 49). The history presented at Museum Monas which was
located at the base of the obelisk-shaped National Monument in Jakarta had a national
purpose and was directed at “fulfilling] the criteria set by the monument committee
that the monument should ‘contain Indonesian identity’” (McGregor 2002: 49). A
member of the committee responsible for the selection of material for the museum said:
“we wanted to improve historical awareness for the purpose of nation building,
for our unity and integrity. That was it, we chose scenes according to this goal,
to give people spirit. Certainly it could be said to be subjective but this was not
an academic matter, it was a certain mission, history as an instrument only."
[Quoted in McGregor (2002: 58)]
90
The most prominent are Museum Monas , Museum Monumen Pancasila Sakti (Sacred
Pancasila Monument), Museum Pengkhianatan PKI (Museum of PKI Treachery),
Museum Keprajuritan Nasional (National Soldiership Museum), Museum Waspada
Purhawisesa (Museum of Constant Vigilance). At the Museum Monumen Pancasila
Sakti for example, there are there are 37 three-dimensional dioramas which portray
scenes of communist cruelty during the 1965 coup as well as a series of earlier events
involving them since 1945.
91
McGregor 2002; and Leigh 1991. Sedjarah Singkat Perjuangan Bersendjata Bangsa
Indonesia (A Concise History of the Armed Struggle of the Indonesian Nation) was one
of these texts.
92
' The Treason of G30S/PKI, was not only compulsory viewing tor students across
Indonesia when it was first released but also screened annually on the state-owned
television station, as well as all private stations, on the night of 30 September.
For an analysis of this film, see Heryanto 2006. For the role of films in the New Order,
see Sen 1988; and Sen and Hill eds. 2000.
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Leigh 1991.
Education during the New Order was focused on "Indonesian language and literature,
history, religious education and Pancasila education. The subject “history” is focused
on Indonesian history and includes material covered in the more specific subject
"History of the National Struggle". Each of these subjects places an emphasis on
Indonesia as a newly independent nation with a moral imperative to respect the unity of
the nation above all else. This imperative operates with regard to history, the co-
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certain Indonesian heroes, and even a walking pilgrimage (The Napak Tilsas
Panglima Bescir Sudinnan) tracing the journey of one of their greatest heroes. General
Sudirman, during his battle against the Dutch in 1948-49.
Anchoring one end of this narrative was the very important four-year War of
Revolution ( 1945-49) when Indonesians fought the Dutch who were determined to re-
impose colonial rule on the archipelago after the end of World War II. In this narrative
of their life history. Indonesia’s success in battling and finally driving out their more
powerful Dutch colonizers to emerge as a sovereign state and people was a seminal
event. The emphasis that was placed on the success of their struggle against colonial
rule was however, also accompanied by the equally significant theme of danger to this
sovereignty and independence. Here, two episodes that occurred in 1948 represented
this danger. The first w as the Madiun uprising of September 1948 when communists
proclaimed a rebel government in East Java at a time w hen the Dutch were preparing to
95
re-conquer the archipelago. The second episode revolved around the Dutch attack on
19 December 1948. their capture of Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta and the rest of the
civilian leadership and the decision of the Indonesian army and its commander. General
ordinating. cohesive event being the Indonesian revolution against the colonial Dutch
power” (Leigh (1991, 24).
94
Schreiner 2002.
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Sebastian 2006, 33.
Madiun began when armed clashes, catalyzed by insurmountable policy differences
between the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the Sukarno-Hatta government,
broke out between communist irregulars and regular troops. The PKI argued that their
actions were a means of preventing Sukarno and Hatta from signing away full
independence in their negotiations with the Dutch.
174
96
Sudirman, to engage in a guerrilla struggle instead of surrendering. In both episodes,
internal threats - first, by communists in Madiun. and shortly after that, the lack of
resolve of civilian leaders during the Dutch attack of 1948 - almost jeopardized their
heroic struggle for independence.
This overarching theme of threats to its survival as a sovereign state also
dominated the New Order's interpretation of the ‘Old Order' ( 1949-1965), the first
fifteen years of Indonesia's independence. During the parliamentary democracy period
of 1950 to 1959. Indonesia was characterized by a "kind of permanent round-the clock
politics in which mass organizations competed with each other at every conceivable
97
level without there being any real resolution." Governments tell with alarming
frequency and there were regional rebellions ranging from the Islamist revolution
generally known as Darul Islam on the island of Java to others waged by the
Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of Indonesia - PRRI) on West Sumatra, and the Piagam Perjuangan Semesta
98
Akim (Universal Struggle Charter - Permesta) in North Sulawesi.
Despite the obvious complexity of these early years of nation- and state-
building, this period was summed up in history courses, textbooks and other sites as
“The Age of Survival". First, liberal democracy, the system of governance in place at
that time, was described by a senior Education Department official during a 1984
96
Six months alter the attack, the Dutch withdrew their troops and began the
negotiations which culminated in Indonesia’s formal independence in 1949.
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Schwarz 2000, 1 1
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guidance session for prospective teachers of the compulsory “History of the National
Struggle" course as:
“a system of government which was not in tune with the character of the
Indonesian nation which gave rise to instability of government marked by
constantly changing cabinets which made development very difficult. Divisions
99
became apparent. Domestic security disturbances occurred.”
Besides the failure of liberal democracy, the narrative also focused on the
regional rebellions and ‘security disturbances’ across the archipelago.
100
More
importantly, this narrative stressed that Indonesia’s existence as a nation was neither
safe nor secure during its first decade of independence. Instead, its survival and
security continued to be threatened by domestic threats such as separatists. Islamic
radicals and liberal democracy, a form of government that was alien to the traditions
and national character of Indonesia.
101
The last six years of the Old Order. Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, was similarly
plagued by chaos and instability despite the implementation of the 1945 constitutional
framework which provided for a strong presidency. In the New Order’s narrative, the
increasing turmoil and political factionalization of the period and the risk that it posed
to Indonesia’s unity was attributed not to the political system but to its incorrect
99
Quoted in Bourchier 1994, 53.
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Bourchier 1994, 54.
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Bourchier 1994, 53. While I do not debate that this period in Indonesian history was
clearly tumultuous, the examples highlighted and the issues that were marginalized
were clearly directed at supporting this theme of danger.
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implementation, the “corrupt [ion] by Sukarno’s personal ambition and the persistence
1 02
of ideologically driven party politics.”
In the narrative, the Old Order, depicted as a disastrous time in Indonesia’s life
history climaxes on the night of 30 September 1965. a night considered so important by
the New Order that it was committed to the national imagination through a plethora of
sites that included such prominent ones as its own national monument and museum
complex, the Monumen Pancasila Sakti (Sacred Pancasila Museum), an annually
screened movie. The Treason ofG30S/PK1, and an annual commemoration day, Hari
Kesaktian Pancasila (Sacred Pancasila Day).
10
’ As it was considered one of the most
important events in Indonesia’s history by the New Order, I shall discuss it in some
detail.
On 30 September 1965 or G30S/PK1 (Gerakan 30 September/PKI), the acronym
by which it is known in Indonesia, six senior generals and one lieutenant of the
Indonesian military were kidnapped by a small group of middle-ranking officers in
Jakarta and later killed at a place which became known as Lubang Buaya (Crocodile
Hole).
104
At some point during the night and for reasons that remain unclear, Aidit.
chair of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and President Sukarno were also
present. Calling itself the 30 September Movement and announcing that it was
representing the Revolutionary Council during a 7 a.m. government-run radio
102
Bourchier 1994, 55.
10 ^
For more details on the complex and Hari Kesaktian Pancasila , see McGregor
(2005).
104
This description of the events of 30 September 1965 draws heavily on Heryanto
2006.
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broadcast, this group explained that it had acted in order to pre-empt a coup d'etat by a
group from within the right-wing and American-backed Council of Generals. Within
hours however, this attempted coup collapsed after Suharto, who was little known at
that time, took control. In the months that followed, almost 500,000 members of the
PKI and its affiliated organizations as well as sympathizers were killed across
Indonesia.
I<b
Despite the mystery and controversy surrounding the politically and historically
significant issue of whom and which organizations were responsible for the events of
the night and the pogrom, G30S/PKI was portrayed as a coup attempt by
communists.
106
In events associated with the commemoration of Sacred Pancasila Day.
dioramas and the has relief at the complex at the Sacred Pancasila Museum, the
kidnapped Indonesian generals were depicted as heroic figures who were tortured,
sexually debased and mutilated by the PKI and members of the communist-aligned
women's group. Gerwani before being killed and their bodies, dumped into a disused
Heryanto 2006. 8.
The killings, w hich were especially concentrated in Central and East Java and the
islands of Bali and Sumatra, resulted in the obliteration of “one of the three ideological
and social streams w hich had competed for domination of the idea of Indonesia since
the early twentieth century” (Cribb 2001, 237). It altered the balance of power in the
country’s political landscape fundamentally and paved the way for the rise to power of
Suharto and the developmental ist army.
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Heryanto 2006. 7.
In scholarly research conducted in this area over the last thirty-five years, there has been
little consensus on this matter - the chief suspects featured have ranged from the PKI
and factions with the military, to Sukarno and even Suharto. See Dake 1973; Anderson
and McVev 1971. and Wertheim 1970.
A recent monograph by John Roosa suggests that while Suharto may not have been
directly involved in the coup, he and the military took advantage of it. See Roosa
(2006).
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well.
107
Additionally, the real victims of the massacres, the Indonesian Communist
Party and its political allies, were somehow made responsible for the huge scale of these
1 08
killings in 1965-66 and the chaos and disorder of the period that followed.
There are three major themes or threads present in the New Order’s
representation of what it had consistently portrayed as one of the most important events
in Indonesia’s history. First, the torture, unspeakable honors and death associated with
it epitomized the Old Order’s instability and danger. Second, it was the “spontaneous,
heroic, and interest-free” Suharto-led military counter-attack which “rescuefd] the
nation-state not only from a communist take-over, but also from chaos, terror and social
disintegration.”
104
Third, the peipetrators were the evil and immoral communists who
in 'betraying’ the nation, seventeen years after Madiun, confirmed their anti-national,
power-seeking and traitorous behavior. Hence, communists were not only villains in
this tale but more importantly, the threat extraordinaire to the unity, security and
survival of the fragile and vulnerable collectivity that was Indonesia.'
10
However, the horror and betrayal of this day, one of the worst in the nation’s
history ends in the narrative with the dawning of 1 October 1965. the day of the coup’s
defeat in this narrative of Indonesian identity. The most important date in the annual
107
Drakeley 2000, 3; and McGregor 2002, 42.
For an analysis of the New Order’s untruthful depictions of the sexual perversions
performed by the Gerwani women, see Drakeley 2000: and Wieringa 1988.
I(,s
van Langenberg 1990, 126-7.
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Heryanto 2006. 9.
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See McGregor 2002. 50; Heryanto 2006: Goodfellow 1995; and van Langenberg
1990.
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calendar of state commemorations, 1 October 1965. designated Sacred Pancasila Day.
was, according to Suharto in a 1967 speech:
“a day on which people’s certainty in the truth and kesaktian of the Pancasila, as
the only life view which can unite the entire nation and Indonesian people, was
strengthened and instilled.”
1 1
1
In other words, 1 October 1965 was the day that Indonesians rejected communism and
confirmed Pancasila, the five principles of Indonesian nationalism first enunciated by
1 12
Sukarno in 1945, as the basis ot their peoplehood and their identity.
The New Order regime ( 1965-1998), critically, situated itself within this overall
narrative, by casting itself as the nation’s savior from destruction at the hands of the
communists, its restorer of order, truth and national unity, the ‘guardian of Pancasila*
and the authentic heir of the values and goals of the 1945 Revolution and their battle for
independence. More specifically, this translated very concretely into upholding
Pancasila as the philosophical basis of the state and nation which Suharto believed,
would enable Indonesia to put away the ideological and religious conflict that had torn
1 13
at its fabric in the past. The New Order also situated its main goal ol development
(pembangunan ) as just part of the process involved in fulfilling the original goals of
McGregor 2002, 44. On its importance in the annual calendar of state rituals, see
Bourchier 1994, 54.
11 ^
The five principles are Indonesian unity, humanitarianism, Indonesian democracy
through consultation and consensus, social justice, and belief in God. For a detailed
discussion of these five principles, see Ramage 1997.
1 13
Bourchier and Hadiz 2001. 14.
In order to ensure this, the Suharto regime pushed through the law on Mass
Organizations where “all social organizations and political parties were legally required
to make Pancasila their sole principle, or asas tunggal" in the mid-1980s (Vatikiotis
1998. 95).
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associated with their battle for independence.
1 14
Moreover, the New Order also argued
that the political system that it had created based on ideas of integralism paralleled
indigenous structures of authority and modes of social organization found within
traditional Indonesian families and orderly villages where social obligations were far
more important than individual rights or constraints on the powers of government.
1 1:>
As such, the authoritarian political structure built by the New Order regime was merely
returning Indonesia to a system that was Indonesian in scope, content and practice. In
other words, the regime was claiming that the New Order way of ordering Indonesia
philosophically, politically and socially reflected the Indonesian character and was
merely a restoration of the system to how it should be. In doing do. the regime was
representing itself as the personification of what it meant to be Indonesian.
1 1(1
Therefore, this was a narrative which consisted primarily of a series of historical
events where Indonesia’s survival as a state and nation was endangered by internal
threats ranging from Islamists, advocates of liberal democracy to the most dangerous of
114
Schreiner 1997, 1 10.
The Suharto Government was also known as the "Development Order’ and its cabinets.
"Development Cabinets'. On a practical level, national development entailed achieving
a higher standard of living for all Indonesians and in that process, a just and prosperous
society (masyarakat yang adil dan makmur) w hich was also the fulfillment of
Pancasila’s fifth principle of social justice (keadilan social) (Bertrand 2004. 39).
1 ^ Bourchier 1997. 160; and Bourchier and Hadiz eds. 2001, 8.
1 U>
van Langenberg 1990. 127.
Singapore and Malaysia are two other states where there is a conflation of regime and
identity. See Ganesan 1998 and Nathan 1998. For an interesting theoretical exploration
of this which examines the link between security and nation and state-building in
developing countries, see Ayoob 1991.
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all. evil communists.
1 17
Explicitly summed up as a “History of National Struggle
,
i S
this was a narrative of Indonesia's origins and life history which located Indonesians
within a constructed and distinct historical space where they were in a continuous battle
for survival against a range of dangers and threats. Through this shared storyline,
Indonesians were able to imagine themselves as a community, albeit a community with
an identity that had been constructed and constituted as a state in constant peril.
Critically, the construction of an identity that w as inseparable from danger posed
by a range of domestic threats and especially communism across a broad spectrum of
sites resulted in a process which simultaneously constructed threats to the Indonesian
collectivity. Therefore, the New Order's threat assessment and conception of national
security did not just arise from the military’s experience w ith specific events like the
Madiun uprising of 1948. the regional rebellions of the 1950s and the 1965 coup.
Rather, the inclusion of these events in the narrative of Indonesian identity created a
process w here specific threats to Indonesian security in the form of communists,
separatists, and extremist Muslims were constantly constructed and reproduced. As the
identity was constructed and produced, so too was the danger to the community which it
,
119
represented.
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Van De Kok et. al. 1991. 84.
1 1
8
This was the title of a compulsory course on Indonesian history w hich all students
had to take through all grade levels.
I 19 r.
Both Bubandt 2005: and Heryanto 2006 allude to this connection but unfortunately,
do not explore it.
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3.4.1.2 Fast Timor: Communism and National Security During the New Order
For the entire period of its existence, the New Order regime headed by President
Suharto was guided by threat assessments that were underpinned by danger to the
collectivity than had been constructed in the form of internal threats like Muslims
PO
extremists and communists. “ Its longstanding security doctrine. Ketahanan Nasional
or National Resilience, was designed to develop a strong national identity, society,
PI
economy and military that would remain resilient against mostly internal threats.
Besides these resilience-building measures, the military also undertook more direct
means in the form of ‘internal operations’ which included Intelligence Operations,
Combat Operations and Territorial Operations, to contain and eradicate internal threats
1 ??
to the unity of the nation and the territorial integrity of the state.
Communists, through the narrative of Indonesian identity, loomed especially
large as an evil, dangerous and insidious threat which required constant vigilance from
the Indonesian people. The contours of this threat and the appropriate response was
institutionalized in the Indonesian military in various ways. At the beginning of each
soldier's career for example, he takes an oath "to uphold principles exemplified by the
120
Vatikiotis 1998a, 65.
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Anwar 1998, 478.
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Sebastian 2006, 70.
Such operations usually begin with intelligence operations that encompass activities and
measures ranging from the collection of information and data, the creation of a
situation or climate needed for the achievement of the desired objective to taking
measures to oppose or frustrate the operational arrangement of enemy intelligence. 1 ” If
effective, they would move on to territorial operations which were geared towards the
political and ideological consolidation of the affected area. If they were ineffective, the
military undertook combat operations in order to eliminate the threat.
183
123
crushing of the treacherous communists at Madiun...” This call was not left
unheeded particularly after the 1965 coup when A.H. Nasution. the most influential
ABRI theorist during the early decades of Indonesia’s independence, “called for the
1 24
elimination ot the PKI 'down to its very roots so that there will be no third Madiun."'"
In the few short months after the coup, approximately 500.000 communists were
massacred. During the course of the New' Order, hundreds of thousands of other
Indonesians who were accused, whether rightly or wrongly, of having ties to
communism were either imprisoned or killed. 1 ^ Others lost their jobs, spouses and
other personal and professional relationships because they or members of their family
w'ere suspected of being influenced by communism or having personal involvement in
1 ?6
the PKI. “ In its external relations, tear ot communist subversion resulted in the
1
11
suspension ot diplomatic ties with communist China from 1967 to 1990.
In East Timor, the possible presence of communism and security disturbing
mobs, whether in 1975 or in the last months leading up to the 1999 referendum, evoked
the same response to contain or eliminate the danger that they posed to Indonesia’s
security and unity through the use of the New' Order’s standard 'internal operations’. In
1975. the threat posed by the potential presence of communism to Indonesia’s security
Vatikiotis 1998a, 64.
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McGregor 2002. 146.
van Der Kroef 1976. 463: Cribb 2001, 237: and Heryanto 2006. 35.
1 “ (1
Goodfellow 1995, 26: and Heryanto 2006; 36.
1 27
‘ For an analysis of Indonesia’s relations w ith China, see Sukma 1999.
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were
1
">8
and its “prolonged and continuing struggle for national unity and stability”
considered so great by Suharto and his key advisers that they were willing to invade
East Timor in order to contain it despite the consequences of such an action on
Indonesia’s own support for the principle of self-determination and its international
129
image.
Communism and Freitlin continued, in the 1990s. to be perceived as threats to
Indonesia with the attendant consequences. The Santa Cruz massacre was understood
as the inevitable outcome of demonstrations that had been deliberately organized and
130
engineered by Freitlin to incite disturbances and disorder. In its aftermath, the
Commander of the Armed Forces, General Try Sutrisno commented:
“If people who have been led astray continually disturb society, then ABRI has
the duty/obligation, all over the homeland, to protect and uphold Indonesian
sovereignty. If the area is not safe, it must be pacified. We are aware who are
causing disturbances.”
1
1 s
Cablegram to Canberra. 14 August 1975. “Portuguese Timor” [NAA: A 10463.
801/13/1 1/1, xi]. Doc 166 in Way (ed.).
)
See also Cribb 2002, 231 ; and Anwar 1998. 32 on this fear and the response it
engendered. See also Record of Conversation Between Tjan and Taylor. 10 March
1975. [NAA: A10463, 801/13/1 1/1, viii]. Doc 109 in Way (ed.).
1 ° Original quote: “Semua pihak menurutnya menyesalkan terjadinya peristiwa tragis
itu. kecuali mereka yang telah dengan sengaja merekayasa bagi timbulnya kerusuhan,
kekacauan dan keresahan masyrakat) dengan menvulut. menhasut, menjerumuskan dan
menipu serta membakar emosi sebagian rakyat. khususnya para pemudanya, sehingga
timbul peristiwa yang sama sekali tidak kita inginkan bersama itu.” from "Lupakan
masa dulu dan lihat ke masa depan,” Angkatan Bersenjata, 28 Desember 1991.
See also Dua Jenderal Diganti Karena Peristiwa Dili.” Editor, no. 16. 4 January 1992.
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“Pangab Menjawab Roberto Dakrus,” Berita Bnana, 16 Desember 1991. See also
“LSM yg Bekerja untuk Negara Asing, Menjual Negara,” Angkatan Bersenjata. 16
Desember 1991.
185
“In the end. their behavior could not be tolerated. Wherever it takes place, if the
security apparatus is attacked, our last measure is to overcome the situation.
With whatever it takes despite the consequences. The result has now has been
controlled. We are not willing to stand aside when the security and order of the
132
nation is disturbed...”
Perhaps most indicative is the reply of Rudolph Samuel W'arouw, Operational
Command Officer in East Timor in 1999. When asked about the deaths of the East
Timorese at the Santa Cruz in an interview, Warouw replied:
“But what glasses should we be looking at it through? They [the deceased) were
Freitlin. If for example you were marching under a tlag apart from the
133
Indonesian one, what would you expect?"
In 1999. the demonstrations for East Timor's independence w^ere viewed as the
result of devious manipulation by the GPK/Freitlin. Once again, the military adopted
"internal operations” procedures to counter w hat were considered internal security
problems rather than real demands for independence from the East Timorese.
1 4
These
Original quote: "Tugas ABRI di seluruh tanah air mepunyai kewajiban melindungi, dan
menegakkan kedaulatan Indonesia. Kalau daerah itu tidak aman ia harus diamankan.
kita sadarkan pada pihak-pihak yang menganggu.”
139
“ Interview with Commander of the Armed Forces, General Try Sutnsno, Tempo , 23
November 1991: 24-25. Original quote: “Ya. akhirnya tingkah mereka tak bisa
ditolerir. Di man pun. kalau aparat keamanan sudah diserang, tindakan terakhir kita
harus bisa mengatatsi keadaan. Dengan apa pun risiko yang teijadi. Walhasil, sekarang
sudah bisa dikuasai. Kita tak rela kalau keamanan dan jetertiban masyarakat diganggu
oleh sekelompak ”
1 1
Interview with Rudolph Samuel Warouw. Operational Command Officer, the top
military officer in East Timor at the time. Original quote: “Tapi harus dilihat dari
kacamata mana. Mereka itu Freitlin. Kalau misalny anda berjalan di bawah salah satu
bendera yang bukan Merah Putih, bagaimana.” In Tanggungjawab Saya': Wawancara
dengan Warouw,” Tempo
,
21. 42 ( 1991 ): 39.
1 4
For more on the nature, scale and scope of intelligence activities undertaken by the
Indonesian military, see chapter 2 of Sebastian 2006 as well as Tauter 1991 ).
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procedure included the use of counter-intelligence activities like the use of militias to
convince the East Timorese that "the army remained firmly in control and that many of
their fellow East Timorese were solidly behind the army.”
1 ° Major-General Adam
Damiri, the regional commander of the area that included East Timor, for example,
wrote in an internal report after the militia show of force in Dili on April 17 1999 "that
the majority of East Timorese [had] bec[o]me loyal supporters of Indonesia ... because
they could see that the pro-integration side had many supporters.”
1 6
The unchanging response of the Indonesian military to Freitlin and the
independence movement over twenty-four years reflect the difficulty of imagining or
understanding them differently in a nation where the processes which constructed
Indonesian identity through narratives of internal threats in the form of the especially
malignant and dangerous communists also constructed them as dangers to the
collectivity. For the regime to change its policy on East Timor, it would have had to
see the East Timorese independence and resistance movement with a fundamentally
different lens, one that did not arise from processes that were intimately related to the
construction of an identity based on a narrative regarding constant threats to its survival.
In the next section of this chapter, I focus on the processes and mechanisms that
challenged the New Order's narrative of Indonesian nationhood, its influence on the
direction undertaken by Indonesia when regime change took place after Suharto’s fall
from grace in May 1998, and the changes engendered by the Habibie administration on
Indonesia’s policy towards East Timor.
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3.5 ‘A Line of Separation from the New Order’: Habibie, East Timor and Re-
Making Indonesia
Between 1998 and 1999. a new approach to the East Timor issue was initiated
by B.J. Habibie who had become President of Indonesia after Suharto was forced to
resign in the midst of a terrible economic crisis and mass mobilizations on the streets of
Jakarta and other major cities across Indonesia. In June 1 998. Habibie offered East
Timor autonomy within the Indonesian republic. This initial proposal, which became
the focus of ministerial-level talks held betw een Indonesia and Portugal under the
auspices of the United Nations during the last half of 1998. was supplanted six months
later by the even more radical offer of independence should autonomy be rejected by
the East Timorese in January 1999. These initiatives were nothing short of unexpected
for non-governmental organizations, states like Portugal and Australia as well as top
Indonesian diplomats like Ali Alatas and Nugroho Wisnurmurti. all actors who had
been deeply involved in shaping the East Timor issue over time in varied ways.
In his important accountability speech to the Indonesian House of
Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) on September 21 2000 when he had to
explain his decision to allow the 2-ballot option. Habibie began by arguing that it was
necessary for Indonesia to do so since “no less than 8 resolutions of the UN General
Assembly and 7 resolutions of the UN Security Council on East Timor have been
adopted, which demonstrate that the international community has not all recognized
East Timor as part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia." 1 ' Continuing to
137
Singh 2000. 321.
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maintain the status quo vis-a-vis East Timor would only lead to Indonesia’s isolation by
the rest of the world. 1
lS
Habibie and his advisers also stressed that the world was no longer dominated
by the Cold War. Instead, it had been radically transformed to one dominated by
increasing attention to issues of human rights and democracy. In such a world, the East
Timor question was an unavoidable part of the international agenda. It was also one
where “Indonesia’s claim that the East Timor issue has already been solved could not
hold ground.’’
1 '
' Implicitly, this was an acknowledgment that Indonesia’s handling of
the East Timor issue was now very much tied to human rights and democracy. More
specifically, they realized that the East Timor issue had resulted in international
perceptions of Indonesia as an illiberal and non-democratic country which flouted basic
human rights. In order to “restore Indonesia's image," Habibie and his advisers were
convinced that they had “no other choice but to try and solve the East Timor problem in
140
a manner acceptable to the international community.”
Habibie and his advisers wanted to restore Indonesia to its “true intent”
141
which
was a nation and state that was oriented towards pursuing "its original course, as
mandated by the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution.” 14 " According to Dewi Fortuna
Anwar, a political scientist and an influential member of Habibie’s inner circle, who
' 48
Singh 2000, 325.
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later became the Assistant Minister/State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and
spokesperson on foreign affairs, they wanted to renew and restore Indonesia to the
conception or original vision of the founding fathers of Indonesia and the 1945
constitution which stressed democracy and justice.
14 "
Many skeptics have rightly thrown doubt on Habibie's claims regarding his
ambitions for remaking Indonesia into a democracy. First, he had been a faithful
member of Suharto’s cabinets. Second, his position as President, acquired by sheer
virtue of the fact that he had been Vice-President when Suharto resigned, was
precarious as forces that had brought down Suharto continued to demonstrate and call
for elections, military reform, democratization, and an end to the corruption, collusion
.144
and nepotism that had characterized the Suharto period, especially in its later years.
As a result, it is feasible to conclude that Habibie was an opportunist and a survivor
who merely “cast himself as a reformer who was capable of reading the sign of the
145
times and stronger aspirations for democracy.”
It is however, also quite feasible that Habibie could have, quite simply, decided
that democracy was the right path for Indonesia to take. After all. Habibie and his team
did not form and determine their preferences and actions in a social vacuum but in an
environment where democracy and human rights were increasingly the norm.
Interactions with other actors and the social environment may very well have provided
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them “with models for self-definition and appropriate behavior.” As Hans Peter
Schmitz points out,
“What precisely is the source of uncertainty that moves them to choose
democratization and not another course of action? Democratization cannot be
reduced to a mere exchange of strategic information among elite groups; it also
requires parties to make normative choices and expose themselves to shifts in
their self-identifications and changes in their fundamental preferences.”
147
Moreover, resolving the East Timor issue was unlikely to score points for
Habibie across the political spectrum in Indonesia. It was not high on the agenda of the
different opposition groups at the peak of their demonstrations and protests against the
Suharto regime. These actors were mostly concerned with political and economic
reforms within Indonesia. Moreover, two important actors who stood at opposite ends
of the political spectrum - the pro-democracy leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and long-
time New Order pillar, the Indonesia military - were both utterly convinced that East
Timor was an integral part of Indonesia and opposed Habibie’s proposals
vehemently.
I4N
Furthermore, most Indonesians who did not have basic and accurate
information about Indonesia’s involvement in East Timor due to censorship and a news
blackout, believed that East Timor’s incorporation had been at the latter’s own
146
Schmitz 2004,418.
147
Schmitz 2004.418.
I4S
Taylor 1999, xviii.
191
request.
141
Unlike the rest of the world, they did not see their East Timor policy as an
act of colonization.
1 Ml
Here, it is important to note that I am not arguing that Habibie was a democrat at
heart or that he was acting in his own self-interest. As pointed out above, both
scenarios are quite feasible. Rather than speculating endlessly about his motives which
are impossible to prove or disprove at this stage, it is far more important to begin with
what we do know. First, Habibie’s time in office was marked by a flurry of domestic
political reforms which set Indonesia on the transition to democracy.
1 ^ 1
Second,
democracy also featured strongly in the East Timor issue for Habibie and his advisers.
More specifically, they were concerned about the importance of Indonesia’s image, the
need for both Habibie and Indonesia to be identified with democracy, and the link that
had been made between this image and the resolution of the East Timor issue. Where
did this image for Indonesia come from? And how did East Timor come to be linked to
Indonesia’s fate in such a different way?
In order to understand how this developed, it is important to first understand
how and why democracy assumed such significance to the identity and politics of
Indonesia in 1998. The next three sections of this chapter will take on this task.
Section 3.5.1 will outline the alternative vision of Indonesia and Indonesian identity
based on democracy that was being voiced in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s and discuss
how it emerged to challenge the New Order's construction of Indonesian nationhood
149
Anwar 2000, 18.
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See Hosen 2003 for a more detailed discussion of these reforms.
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and identity over a long gestation period. Section 3.5.2 will then provide a brief
examination of the conditions surrounding Suharto’s fall from power and Indonesia’s
transition to a nascent democracy.
3.5.1 An Indonesia Based on Human Rights and Democracy
By the late 1980s and 1990s. there were increasing challenges to the New
Order’s construction of Indonesian identity which was based on a narrative emphasizing
the threats to its existence as a sovereign and independent state, the prioritization of
Pancasila as the philosophical basis of the state and nation, and the argument that the
regime’s authoritarian features were inherently Indonesian. In particular, this
Indonesian identity that was becoming increasingly conflated with the regime’s
characteristics was being contested by an alternative conception based on the ideals of
democracy and inclusionary interpretations of Pancasila.
While by no means monolithic, there were certain themes that dominated the
discourses on democracy of this alternative conception. First, there were calls for
restrictions in the arbitrary nature of the state and the implementation of the rule of
law.
l:>
" Second, there were demands for free and fair elections.
1X1
Third were calls for
"a considerable reduction of the military’s political power” and these ranged from the
views of radical pro-democracy activists who were strongly anti-militaristic to more
conservative views who demanded a “limitation of the political role of the armed
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154
forces.” ~ Particularly important to all was the issue ot human rights, whether in the
realm of individual, political or collective socio-economic rights. They shared the
perspective that human rights as well as basic democratic principles and values were
universal rather than culture and context-specific. Adnan Buyung Nasution. an
influential human rights lawyer and critic of the New Order, stated that “when human
rights are ‘freed from all cultural, religious, political and ethnic differences [ there] rests
its core, called basic human rights, for instance, right to life, right to express one's
thought in speech or writing.”*
1:0
By the mid-1990s, demokrasi (democracy), keterbukaan (openness) and hak
asasi manusia (human rights) had emerged not only at the centre of the agenda of these
groups but as “key themes in public debate, [that were] discussed and promoted by the
media, academics, a wide range of semi-oppositional political groups, and elements
from within the government itself."' It had also spread out beyond highly populated
areas like the island of Java to other parts of the archipelago.
How did this challenge to the dominant construction of Indonesian identity
come about? In the 1970s, 1980s. and 1990s, intellectual developments as well as
political and economic changes slowly created widening disjunctures between what was
being experienced and the social expectations derived from the New Order’s
construction of Indonesian-ness based on danger. Pancasila and authoritarianism. These
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disjunctures created the conditions and opening for a viable alternative of Indonesian
identity to emerge.
Significant intellectual challenges came from critical new studies of Indonesian
postcolonial history from Indonesian scholars.
1 ' 7
In his 1989 thesis, Hegelian Elements
in the Integralist View of the State. Marsillam Simanjuntak examined the constitutional
debates of 1945 closely and debunked the New Order’s contention that the 1945
constitution, on which the regime was based, was a realization of integralism.
1 S
In
fact, Marsillam pointed out that the inclusion of political rights in the constitution in
159
1945 negated the validity of such an argument.
Another crucial challenge came from Adnan Buyung Nasution’s massive study
of the debates of the Constituent Assembly from 1956 to 1959. His study was critical in
revealing “the depth of commitment to political rights and freedoms among the elected
delegates to the assembly.”
160
These debates were instrumental in countering the New
Order's claims “that notions of human rights and democratic checks on executive
authority d[id] not have a legitimate basis in Indonesian history ...”
161
During this period, prominent human rights lawyer, Mulya Lubis also added to
these counter-histories. In his doctoral thesis, Lubya not only argued “that the concept
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of universal human tights was widely accepted in the mid to late 1960s” but maintained
that "it was the New Order’s preoccupation with order and stability, rather than any
fundamental incompatibility between human rights and indigenous culture which saw
popular rights come under sustained attack at both the ideological and political levels
169
during the tenure ol the Suharto government."
In showing that the liberal ideas and system of a mostly independent judiciary,
fair and peaceful elections, a free press, politicians committed to democratic values, and
a respect of human rights were in place and favored during the 1950s and 1960s, these
intellectual developments provided those who were promoting an alternative Indonesia
based on democracy and human rights with the basis to argue that these concepts and
principles were not alien to the character, history or tradition of Indonesia.
'
1 ’
Besides these intellectuals, students and activists also challenged the hegemony
of the regime’s interpretation of Pancasila and its construction of Indonesia nationalism
during this period. Activists like Munir consciously deconstructed the nationalism
propounded by Suharto and the New Order in order "to focus or frame nationalism as
one that was against colonialism and imperialism and for justice.”
1,4
Instead of the
integralist and nativist elements which had taken on increasingly authoritarian features,
these activists were consciously expounding a new interpretation of Indonesia life
history and origins that differed from the dominant narrative disseminated by the
military and state. They presented a vision of and for Indonesia that was "related to
l(
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justice, humanitarian issues, to Indonesia’s principles at independence and Indonesia’s
history.”
1 66
Economically, the government’s development program had led. by the 1970s, to
rising prices, and the displacement of many medium- and small-scale indigenous
businesses.
166
It was also characterized by mismanagement, corruption and wasteful
extravagance. Later, the patrimonial and oligarchic elements of the regime also became
far more pronounced as Suharto’s cronies and children began to treat Indonesia as their
own private economic fiefdom. 167 For example, they were involved in almost every
single infrastructure project that was awarded in the country. Typically, Suharto’s
children, acting as local agent, would enjoy a 10-15 percent stake in them without
paying for them. By the time of the 1997 economic crisis, they had connections with
hundreds of companies. 168
In Indonesia, these economic changes were leading to widening differences
between social expectations derived from Pancasila's principles of social justice, and
promises of rational, fair and efficient economic development with what was actually
taking place. In the late 1970s, many non-governmental organizations initially formed
as a means to participate in the modernization of Indonesia were pointing to the
economic disparities that had developed out of the regime’s development policies as
well as the arbitrary actions of its state agencies as a contravention of Pancasila's
166
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principles of social justice, and consultation and consensus respectively. 1
"
' By the mid-
1980s. many of these NGOs were arguing that "political and social problems were a
product of deep inequalities which called for more than mere policy adjustment, but
rather fundamental reconstruction of government, society, and the economy."
1
" By the
1990s. the regime’s increasingly pronounced patrimonial and oligarchic elements as
well as the worsening of inequalities already present in Indonesia’s social structure
magnified in vivid ways the disjunctures that existed between the stated principles and
ideals of an identity for Indonesia based on an integrated family where everyone, united
by Pancasila. worked together towards common goals of social justice and equality and
what was actually unfolding.
Changes in the political arena also enlarged these discrepancies. The rise of
Sukarno’s daughter. Megawati Sukarnoputri in the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party)
in the mid-1990s was one such significant development. For many Indonesians.
Megawati was closely associated with her father, now a symbol of opposition to
President Suharto and the New- Order regime. 1 1 Unlike Suharto and the increasingly
coiTupt and nepotistic conditions of his rule, Sukarno and by association, Megawati,
were perceived as devoted to and a part of the people who would never use their
positions to enrich themselves or their families.
1
" Megawati’s own repeated attacks on
corruption and social and economic injustice made her the representative of the poor.
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When there were suggestions that Megawati should be nominated for President
of Indonesia, the regime reacted by engineering her overthrow as head of the PDI. a
position to which she had been popularly elected. Despite the fact that she posed little
credible threat to Suharto who had control of the popular process, the regime’s reaction
underscored that there would be no tolerance of such political challenges, however
minor.
1 1
Her unjust removal was conceived “as symbolic of a general pattern of
injustice in society" 174 by her supporters. Moreover, the regime’s efforts to portray itself
as one that was based on ‘Indonesian-style’ democracy and the principles of consensus
and consultation was also debunked in a highly visible manner by these events.
Finally, the fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
restoration of Indonesia’s diplomatic ties with China in the 1990s called into question
the claims that communism still posed a real security threat to Indonesia. These
momentous changes in the international system challenged the regime’s obsession with
communists and other "security disturbing mobs’ that had resulted in the massacre of
500.000 Indonesians between 1965 and 1966. the extrajudicial killings of an estimated
3.000 to 5,000 petty criminals between 1983 and 1985, the deaths of 2,000 alleged
members of the Acehnese separatist movement between 1989 and 1991, and the deaths
of more than 200,000 East Timorese.' ° More importantly, these developments
undermined the New Order construction of Indonesian identity that had been
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constituted through a narration of nationhood under constant threat, particularly through
the specter of communism.
While these new developments posed considerable challenges to the credibility
and integrity of the New Order's representation of Indonesian identity, the fusion of the
authoritarian regime’s characteristics with this identity meant that part of a successful
challenge to it would also require a successful challenge to the regime. Despite the
impunity of the military and the growing excesses of Suharto, his coterie of family
members and close aides, this was by no means automatic or guaranteed for three
reasons. First. Suharto had been able to draw strength from the fact that Indonesians
had enjoyed steady economic growth and improvements in living standards under his
leadership, a sharp contrast to the Sukarno period.
1 f>
Second, the New Order
government had restored order and purpose to what had previously been a chaotic and
ineffective system. Third, it had also been able to foster a greater sense of nationhood
which had strengthened national unity. According to Adam Schwarz, many
Indonesians “would say that an extended period of restricted political activity and
circumscribed press freedom - in which public expressions of ethnic and religious
animosities are not welcome - has helped lower the temperature in sensitive areas."
177
A great many Indonesians had therefore, been w illing to pay the price of less political
freedom in exchange for economic growth, political stability and order. Hence, these
challenges may have remained challenges in a long line of challenges if not for the
convergence of a set of conditions that lined the path to the fall of Suharto. The next
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section discusses these conditions as they are particularly important for understanding
how the alternative conception of Indonesia based on the ideals and principles of
democracy and human rights finally emerged as the dominant option.
3.5.2 Regime Change: Exit Suharto; Enter Habibie
During the last months of 1997, Indonesian society began to feel the acute
effects of the Asian financial crisis. When the Indonesian rupiah lost 58 percent of its
value within a six-month period, poverty levels escalated. In the beginning, the
economic crisis did not appear insurmountable as the Indonesian government had taken
measures in August and September that were widely praised internationally. This was
short-lived as Suharto’s unwillingness to take concrete actions against the corruption
and nepotism of his regime led to a gradual but continuous erosion of public and market
confidence. Despite rising unemployment and poverty rates, Suharto put up fierce
resistance against the dismantling of the business empires of his family and cronies.
During the first five months of 1998, Suharto faced growing opposition in the
form of many small groups which, although ready to challenge the regime, were
hampered by the lack of unity and the absence of leaders with a national profile who
could have “become a symbolic rallying point for people who opposed Suharto.” 180
Obvious national figures like Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri never
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1 8
1
adopted that mantle. Hence, organized opposition remained weak despite the
increasing opposition to the regime between January and March 1998.
In the end, it was protests in university campuses across Indonesia that broke the
1 82
impasse. As these protests escalated and students became the voluble and
determined center of a broad middle-class coalition, some elite critics of the regime like
Amien Rais began to speak openly about mass movements to bring about change while
others publicly withdrew their support from Suharto. The climax of these protests came
on May 12, 1998 when 4 students of Jakarta's Trisakti Univerity were shot dead by
snipers, sparking off what were at that time, two days of the most serious rioting
1 8 ^
experienced by modern Indonesia. In the week after the riots, very large student
mobilizations took place in cities across Indonesia and Suharto was abandoned by
184
almost all ol the ruling elites. On May 20. 1998. he resigned and was replaced by
B.J. Habibie.
Since the fall of Suharto took place within a year of the worst economic crisis
Indonesia had ever experienced, it is tempting to conclude that the economic crisis was
a direct cause of Suharto’s fall and regime change in Indonesia. While the acute effects
1 8
1
Aspinall 2005, 215. Wahid for example, remained publicly reconciled with Suharto
while Megawati remained preoccupied with invalidating the leadership of the man who
had replaced her as party chairman with the machinations of the New Order through
legal means.
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of the economic crisis in the form of escalating employment and poverty drove a range
of social and political forces into action and was important in hastening Suharto’s fall, it
is unable to explain the way in which Suharto was driven from power. Second and
critically for the purposes of this chapter, why was Suharto's fall followed by a
democratic transition instead of a reconstituted version of authoritarianism like in
. . .-,185
Malaysia?
In Indonesia, Suharto was brought down by loss of support from the ruling elite
who abandoned him in increasing numbers as the costs associated with having the
former in power escalated when the May riots and student mobilizations which brought
Indonesia to the very edge of serious violence. ‘ When confronted by a stark choice
between abandoning Suharto or escalating unrest, the elite chose the former.
187
Without their support. Suharto knew that he was no longer able to hold on to power.
Why however, was Suharto's resignation followed bv a democratic transition?
The most important factor here was the fact that the alternative discourses on human
rights and democratization, themes propagated by opposition groups over the 1990s
regarding Indonesia, had “slow ly but perceptibly shift[ed] the terrain of legitimacy
under the government’s feet.”
‘
' During the 1990s, this shift in the official political
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sphere in Indonesia could be discerned at the behavioral, rhetorical and communicative
i i
189
levels.
In 1993. for example, a National Commission on Human Rights was established
in Indonesia. As Anja Jetschke points out, this was a highly significant concession on
the part of the Indonesian government for it was institutionalizing human rights within
the Indonesian state, a clear illustration of its growing receptiveness and acceptance of
1 90
these norms in its domestic context. At the rhetorical and communicative levels.
Indonesia began to openly acknowledge that it had a human rights problem in
international foras like the United Nations after years of making culture-specific
counter-arguments, invoking the principle of non-interference, and questioning the
legitimacy of international jurisdiction. After the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 for
example, members of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and Indonesian
delegates arrived at a common description of the human rights situation in Indonesia
191
and developed ways to address it. In 1992. the Indonesian human rights delegate at
the UN Human Rights Commission stated that their motivation was "to learn and
benefit from such a visit in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the practice of torture in
19?
Indonesia." ~ This statement was significant for two reasons. Firstly, it was the
Indonesian government’s first public acceptance of allegations of torture in the
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country. Secondly, it was an acknowledgment of the validity ot the international
norm. Moreover, discussions were later conducted on the basis of the consensual norm
of human rights and consequently, on matters of norm compliance and
194
implementation. Rhetorically, regime leaders were also “routinely acknowledging]
.195
that demokratisasi was unavoidable by the mid-1990s.” ‘ In short, democracy and
human rights were becoming increasingly legitimate norms at all levels of Indonesian
society.
Critically, the opposition’s broad demands for democracy and human rights
could not be avoided by the surviving ruling elite once Suharto’s presidency collapsed.
Democracy became the only game left in town and substantial democratic reform had to
be initiated.
1 >(1
Politically however, the emergence of alternatives based on ideas of democracy
and human rights did not result in the immediate emergence of leadership from the
opposition ranks. Instead, the dispersed and fragmented state of the opposition created
a situation where it was impossible for the opposition to coalesce around a central figure
197
or a single political platform to represent a viable alternative government. As a result
of this as well as his “offer to hold free and fair elections as the way to resolve the
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political crisis,” Habibie was left with the reins over Indonesia for this transitional
period.
When he began the process of governing, one of the first matters Habibie chose
to tackle was the resolution of the East Timor issue. In the next section, I examine how
and why this change took place.
3.5.3 The Habibie Interregnum: East Timor and Re-Making Indonesia
By the time Habibie came into power, he was much more aware of the
significance of the East Timor issue. During his time as vice-president of the country,
he was placed in charge of global affairs and East Timor was always raised whenever
199
he met foreign leaders. Moreover, his chief advisers while he was vice-president
were Dewi Fortuna Anwar. Indria Samego and Umar Juoro, academics and intellectuals
he had known from their connections w ith 1CMI and its think-tank. C1DES (Centre for
200
Information and Development Studies).'
Anwar and Samego in particular, had already been critical of Indonesia’s East
Timor policy in their private capacity as academics before Habibie’s rise to power.
Samego had been personally critical and skeptical of the government’s reasons and
justification for the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. While many in the New
Order saw East Timor as Indonesia’s twenty-seventh province. Samego understood East
198
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on Habibie.
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Timor to be “culturally, historically and from the perspective of international law, not
?01
related to Indonesia.”' In an op-ed, Samego wrote:
“In order that the decolonization of East Timor is considered suitable for
universal standards and Indonesia’s intervention can be met well, it will be
advisable to weigh East Timor’s wish to decide its own fate. Maybe this will be
2(p
better lor us.
’
“
Anwar had conducted research on East Timor and other conflict areas in
?03
Indonesia while she was with the Center for Regional and Political Studies at LIPI.'
'
There, the researchers had concluded that the root causes of the conflict in East Timor
arose from the fact that historically. East Timor had never been part of Indonesia but
had been incorporated into the republic through what Anwar described as a problematic
military intervention that had never been internationally condoned. Moreover, they
recognized that the continuing East Timorese resistance only resulted in greater military
domination and repression. It had evolved into an increasingly violent, untenable and
cyclical situation where resistance led to military repression and human rights abuses
9()4
which in turn invoked more resistance as well as international criticism and so on." At
LIPI. Anwar and her colleagues had already concluded that it was essential to end the
cycle of violence. Self-determination had also been discussed. At CIDES. they were
also coming to similar conclusions. Various studies conducted on East Timor showed
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that the situation was unsustainable and “a solution that would be just to East Timor and
just to Indonesia” was needed.
Therefore. Habibie’s advisers, coming from the liberal wing of ICMI, which he
chaired from its founding until he became president, had already thought of the East
Timor issue in ways fundamentally different from the military and Suharto when the
New Order collapsed. Dewi Fortuna Anwar who became senior foreign policy adviser
and many say. the 'real' Foreign Minister during Habibie's time in office, likened the
unresolved East Timor issue to an appendix, mostly useless when dormant but highly
?06
dangerous to the rest of the body politic when 'infected'. In fact, it was considered
an infected appendix that had to be removed for Indonesia to recover, stay healthy and
achieve its national interests which were “the consolidation of democracy,
•>07
strengthening ol national unity, and economic progress.”" In other words, retaining
the status quo vis-a-vis East Timor would block efforts to restore and renew Indonesia.
For these policymakers then. Indonesia’s national interests were tied to a resolution of
the East Timor issue. The question that remains then is this: how exactly did the two
become entwined?
Politically. Habibie and his team were faced with the urgent matter of initiating
democratic reforms in a domestic climate which would accept nothing less. At the
same time, the collapse of the New Order where regime and nation had been conflated
also meant that being Indonesian was no longer synonymous with the New Order
"*06
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207
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construction of Indonesian identity." The opposition's promotion of democracy and
human rights for Indonesia had not only become the only legitimate way of organizing
Indonesia politically but the basis for a new Indonesian identity.
In the time that he was in office. Habibie and his team removed controls on the
media, freed dozens of political prisoners, annulled the ban on political parties, called
for new parliamentary elections in mid- 1999, and the selection of a new president by
the end of 1999. In addition, a team of seven political scientists was also put together to
work on three laws which would fundamentally reconfigure Indonesia’s electoral and
political system. These laws - the Law on Political Parties, the Law on General
Elections and the Law on the Composition of the MPR. the DPR and DPRD - were
significant for building the structural framework that would provide the basis for pulling
Indonesia out authoritarianism into a new regime type which would include, at the very
least, the elements of an electoral democracy.
Economically, Habibie and his advisers were faced with urgent economic
problems. In approaching these problems, they were convinced of three matters. First,
the financial crisis had increased Indonesia’s dependence “on the outside world,
particularly the western world countries.”" More importantly, they were far more
concerned that this was an outside world that had never recognized Indonesia’s
9J0 • •
continuing occupation of East Timor. " The East Timor issue had in tact, inflicted
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considerable damage to Indonesia's image and would continue to do so especially in a
world where norms of human rights and democratic governance had emerged as the
common standard for domestic conduct.'
1
1
In order to reverse the damage and get the
help that they needed, they were convinced that they had to restore improve Indonesia's
212
image in the eyes of the world. " During the early days ol Habibie's time in office,
part of the path involved in the restoration of Indonesia's image was the resolution of
213
the East Timor issue in a way that was acceptable to the international community.
At one level Habibie's decision to offer autonomy to East Timor was due to
economic reasons - he did so in order to obtain the help that Indonesia required for its
economic recovery. However, this was a decision, as their statements show, that was
also rooted, in the awareness that Indonesia was operating in a larger international
context where democratic and liberal norms for domestic conduct were on the
ascendant. In other words, resolving the East Timor issue was a means to signal to the
rest of the world that Indonesia had changed and was no longer the Indonesia of the
Suharto period. It also provided them with a way to align Indonesia with what Habibie
and his advisers understood to be the broader normative structure of international
politics.
Thus, this was a decision where strategic thinking on the part of Habibie and his
advisers played a part - they chose to initiate a policy that would enable them to
perform their self-described identity as a democracy to convince the rest of the world
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that genuine politieal changes were afoot in Indonesia, and therefore, to obtain the
economic help that they needed. At the same time however, this was also a decision
where they utilized their knowledge and awareness of the social context to act in a way
that would correlate to the norms of the situation in service of particular ends. More
specifically, the broader social structure of international politics where democracy and
human rights had become de rigeur for domestic conduct provided both the wellspring
for their actions as well as the constraints on them. This was therefore, a decision that
was also profoundly embedded in the social.
For six months after Habibie’s initial proposal, Indonesia and Portugal discussed
?14
a model of wide-ranging autonomy for East TimorA By December 1998. Indonesia
was “prepared to accept some kind of autonomy for East Timor while leaving the door
? 15
open to the resolution of the final status ol the territory.” ~ It was however, not ready
to discuss self-determination or independence for East Timor. In January 1999. all this
changed. A letter from Australia led to a re-evaluation of this offer and to the
subsequent announcement that Indonesia was ready to give East Timor the much more
216
radical option ol becoming an independent state should they reject autonomy.'
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Indonesia’s plan called for defense, diplomacy, and fiscal and monetary policies to be
reserved for the central government in Jakarta. Negotiations between Indonesia and
Portugal were to be conducted 'without prejudice to their basic positions on the issue of
sovereignty’.
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By all accounts, the letter from Howard played a role in this change. See Alatas
2006; Anwar 2000; Gorjoa 2001, 107; and Greenlees and Garran 2002.
Australia, the only western state to formally acknowledge Jakarta’s claim of
sovereignty over East Timor, had retained its position even after Suharto’s resignation,
repeatedly arguing that East Timor should remain an integral part of the Indonesian
republic during this period. In addition, it "affirmed confidence in the unilateral
ability of Indonesia’s armed forces to maintain order and security in the province,
and actively sought to moderate the vocal international criticism of Jakarta that was
gathering at this time.”"
1
*
It was not until the last weeks of 1998 that a shift took place
in Australia's overall stance on East Timor.
In a letter to Habibie which signaled this change, the premier, John Howard,
emphasized that “Australia’s support for Indonesia’s sovereignty [was] unchanged” and
that “it has been a longstanding Australian position that the interests of Australia.
Indonesia and East Timor [were] best served by East Timor remaining part of
Indonesia.” More importantly, he also noted that “there was a decisive element of
East Timorese opinion [which was] insisting on an act of self-determination.”" 0 As
such, he suggested that "it might be worth considering, therefore, a means of addressing
the East Timorese desire for an act of self-determination in a manner which avoids an
early and final decision on the future status of the province.” In regard to this.
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Howard referred to France’s Matignon Accords with New Caledonia as a model for
222
Indonesia on the issue of East Timor.
For Habibie, the parallel Howard drew in his letter between Indonesia’s situation
with East Timor and France’s colonial relationship with New Caledonia was
particularly startling. After receiving more information regarding the Matignon
Accords from Foreign Minister Ali Alatas at an initial meeting to discuss the letter.
Habibie responded:
“But New Caledonia is a French colony and that was a colonial arrangement.
923Why does he compare us with France and East Timor with Caledonia?””
Like many other Indonesians, it appears that Habibie was unaware of the full
circumstances surrounding East Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia.
At the cabinet meeting convened to discuss the letter in late January 1999,
Habibie, reportedly, asked the following rhetorical question: "What are we doing in
East Timor, because this is actually violating our own commitment to our constitution
to oppose colonialism.”'"
4
Anwar, who was also present at the meeting, described the
impact of this comparison in the following way:
“There was also sadness and irony in the realization that the East Timor issue
had badly damaged Indonesia’s international image and Indonesia’s entry into
East Timor violated Indonesia’s commitment to oppose all forms of colonialism.
It is a sad fact that Indonesia, which prided itself on being a country born our of
post-colonialism, as a country that came out of an anti-colonial revolution and
999
' Howard suggested that if Indonesia adopted and successfully implemented a model
based on these accords which gave New Caledonia autonomy with the possibility of a
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has in fact specifically stated in its preamble to the Constitution that Indonesia
opposed all sorts of colonialism, that it was accused of doing exactly the same
thing in East Timor. This was never really fully understood and more
information came out and Indonesians became much more aware of
2^5
international perceptions of what Indonesia was doing,...”
Hence. Habibie’s initial puzzlement and even anger over the parallel drawn
between colonial France and Indonesia had given way to the realization that Indonesia,
through its actions and policies on East Timor, had come to be perceived as an
aggressive and colonial state by the world community. Concurrently, they also realized
that the offer of autonomy for East Timor and the important democratic reforms and
laws that had already been initiated were insufficient for convincing the rest of the
world that the Indonesia under Habibie was becoming democratic and was no longer the
2^6
Indonesia of the Suharto period.
"
At the meeting, the suggestions in Howard’s letter were taken in a direction that
even the Australians had not anticipated - the decision to allow the 2-ballot option
where independence would be granted should the East Timorese reject special
2^7
autonomy within the Republic ol Indonesia. “ Habibie, according to Anwar, believed
that “... giving East Timor the two options to decide their own future was a very
important move to establish Indonesia's democratic credentials and show that things
:2
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had really changed.” Moreover, letting East Timor go was “a very rational and
229
logical step to take."" In fact, it would be “very irrational of Indonesia to do
230
otherwise for it would be against the constitution" and for building an Indonesia that
would be democratic and just. Again. East Timor had become a means of convincing
other states that Indonesia, as self-described, was indeed democratic. Their realization
that Indonesia’s identity had remained unchanged in the eyes of the world even after the
initial offer of autonomy led them to up the ante.
At the very least. Habibie and his advisers believed, both in June 1998 and
January 1999. that Indonesia had to act in ways that were consistent with a country that
was professing that it was on the way to becoming a democratic nation committed to
human rights. The actions they had taken vis-a-vis East Timor was part of a social
process to perform Indonesia’s nascent identity as a democracy which had yet to be
recognized and acknowledged by other countries in the international arena. Thus, the
resolution of the East Timor issue was initiated by actors who were acting strategically
but within and through the confines and limitations of a wider social structure of norms
and identities.
If the Habibie government’s attempts to perform this new Indonesian identity
based on the norms of human rights and democracy was so critical in changing the
course of the country’s East Timor policy, why was the withdrawal process
characterized by a campaign of violence and intimidation rather than respect and
22s
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acceptance of the democratic process underlying the referendum and its outcome? The
next section turns its attention to this question and will focus on how the military was
able to work against the decision of civilian leaders and policymakers who were
running Indonesia.
3.6 Oligarchic Political Systems and Contentious Territorial Policies
Between January 1 and October 25 1999. leaders as well as supporters of the
independence movement in East Timor were systematically murdered, tortured and
raped."
’
1
Perpetrated on a wide scale, this violence often descended into indiscriminate
killings." Early April 1999 witnessed the massacre of 57 unarmed civilians and the
wounding of 35 others by a large pro-autonomy paramilitary force in a church in
Liquisa which had been sheltering 2,000 East Timorese displaced by the violence. By
early August, the United Nations Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET), and
the Catholic Church separately estimated that 60.000 - 80,000 people had been
displaced, and 3.000 - 5,000 killed by pro-autonomy militia groups. '' Violence
however, peaked in the period between September 4. when the results of the referendum
were announced, and the end of the month when security was finally restored to central
and eastern East Timor by INTERFET ( International Force for East Timor) forces. Pro-
independence supporters were attacked and approximately 70-80 percent of Dili's
business district and 50 percent of its homes were torched and destroyed during the
231
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month-long orgy of violence." 4 Hundreds were killed, and more than 500,000
Timorese, or more than 60 percent of the entire population, were displaced and forced
to evacuate in what appeared to be a forced event. The consistency and similarities of
the evacuation processes across East Timor, the scale of the logistics involved as well as
direct witness testimony point to the systematic and planned nature of the operation.' 0
By November 1999, East Timor’s entire administrative and social order - the basic
infrastructure of an entire community and society- had been completely destroyed.' °
General Wiranto, head of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) at that time,
claimed that the killing and destruction in the post-referendum period were the
“spontaneous reactions of disappointed supporters of integration.”" ’ Documents that
have emerged in the past few years however, confirm the existence of formal and
informal links between ABRI and the pro-integration militias who were visibly
involved in much of the violence in East Timor in the period before and after the
ballot.
0
Patterns in the behavior of the militia, the police, and ABRI. as highlighted by
many observers, investigators and analysts present during and after that period, are also
strong indicators that the Indonesian military or at least parts of it was responsible for
the co-ordination and planning of the intimidation, violence and destruction that
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occurred."
4
Finally, evidence pieced together from interviews and observations in East
Timor render protests of innocence from ABRI suspect for they were involved from as
early as October 1998 when high-ranking officers ordered, organized and coordinated
militia activity. In December 1998 and January 1999. these activities were stepped
up with the formation and arming of more militia groups by the military.' 41 The
military also launched Operasi Sapu Jagad (Operation Clean Sweep) around this time
to assert the irreversibility of East Timor’s integration with Indonesia through a
campaign of violence and intimidation against pro-independence leaders and
supporters.'
4
" Fronted by East Timorese paramilitary death squads created, trained and
armed by ABRI. it was hoped that the violence would generally intimidate people into
supporting autonomy and “show to the world that the East Timorese rejected the
referendum.” 24
'
Hence, ABRI, clearly against the decision to allow the 2-ballot option to take
place, was able to contravene the cabinet-level decision of January 27 1999 to give the
East Timorese the opportunity to vote on their own future. In this case, contestation on
the issue of East Timor, led to a bloody and violent end for this particular part of the
disengagement process. How did the disengagement end in such a bloody fashion?
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This section examines the proposition that domestic institutional structures also affect
the dynamics through which the processes of contestation are played out.
3.6.1 Indonesia’s Domestic Political Structure during The New Order
The New Order operated under the auspices of Indonesia's 1945 constitution
which guaranteed a strong president with wide-ranging executive power that was
balanced by a parliament, the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or
DPR), and the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Pennusyawaratan Rakyat or
MPR) which functioned both as an electoral college and to a degree, a 'super-
parliament'. Under this system, the president has predominant authority which rested
on very broad legislative powers as well as extremely wide-ranging and absolute
powers of appointment to independently hire and lire all Cabinet members, senior
military commanders, bureaucrats, judges, and senior state enterprise managers.
The five hundred-member DPR had responsibility over legislation and its
approval was required for the annual budget submitted by the government.' All of the
DPR’s representatives were automatically members of the thousand-strong People's
Consultative Assembly which was the country's highest governing body. The other
five hundred members of the Assembly were appointed to represent Indonesia's regions
as well as its functional and social groups."4 ^ Assembling every live years, the MPR
elected the president and vice-president and set very broad normative guidelines for
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state policy for the next five years.
4,1
While the President was not subject to the
confidence of parliament, the MPR. w ith its constitutional power, could remove the
former from office.
Under Suharto however, these formal rules governing the relationship between
the country’s political institutions became mostly irrelevant and insignificant for
understanding the distribution and balance of power in Indonesia. In terms of decision-
making and constitutional veto points within the New Order's political system, almost
all the roads led to the presidency and in particular, the person of President Suharto.
The MPR. theoretically intended as the highest authority and representative of
the people's will, was completely controlled by the government. Its 500 non-DPR
members, constituting half of the Assembly, w ere not elected but appointed by the
government. Even some of its DPR members had been appointed rather than elected to
parliament - 100 or 20 percent of its seats in 1987 and 1992 for example, were reserved
for military officers appointed by President Suharto."
4
Moreover, the other 400 or 80
percent of its elected seats came mostly from the state party. Golkar, and a party system
and election process that had been systemically weighted in their favor. Hence, the
DPR was never a wholly elected body. Despite its role as a legislative body, the DPR
did not initiate a single bill or even veto any proposed by Suharto in thirty years. W ith
its legislative and veto powers severely choked and marginalized under the political
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framework developed during Suharto’s long rule, the DPR was little more than a
rubber-stamping legislature. 24s
During the New Order, elections were contested by only three parties - Golkar,
the Development Unity Party {Parted Persatuan Pembangunan
,
or PPP), and the
Indonesian Democratic Party {Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
,
or PDI). The PPP and
PD1. the other two political parties allowed to take part in elections, were each formed
in 1973 after the New Order forced several preexisting organizations to amalgamate.
Four Islamic parties were merged to form the PPP while the PDI was formed from pre-
existing nationalist and Christian parties." The forced fusion of these ideologically
disparate parties left each of them deeply divided and unable to pose a serious challenge
to Golkar. They were also badly disadvantaged by the fact that they were forbidden
from having branches below the district level in contrast to Golkar which was
represented wherever there was a government office. This translated into a presence in
virtually every village in the country.
2M)
Lacking independent policy agendas and
politically hamstrung, the PPP and the PDI were only able to attract a modest share of
the vote." Hence, the composition of the DPR was highly skewed in favor of Golkar
by formal and informal rules and arrangements and therefore, hardly the result of a truly
fair and multi-party political system and election process.
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Golkar, created in 1964 by army officers to co-ordinate anti-communist
organizations, was able to incoiporate functional groups like labour, peasants, women.
-)c-)
youth, intellectuals, artists, etc within four years of its founding. “ Despite these
functional groups and the New Order's claims that it represented the nation's interest.
Golkar was partisan and really the political face of the state. Public employees,
including elected village leaders were not only mobilized for nation-wide elections
every five years but prohibited from joining the other parties. These links with the state
were further tightened by the fact that local, regional and national Golkar leaders were
recruited from the ranks of civil servants and retired military officers.2x’ However,
Golkar too had little impact on policymaking despite its position as the country’s
leading party. Besides being an insignificant generator of ideas or policy preferences, it
and the corporatist bodies which it encapsulated operated within a state-dominated
framework. As Andrew MacIntyre notes, these corporatist bodies operated
“primarily as institutional arrangements for political containment rather than as
institutions for aggregating sectoral interests and injecting these interests into the
policy-making process.”2^
Hence. Indonesia’s political parties, in contrast to those operating under
democratic conditions, did not play the crucial role of “providing the institutional link
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between voters and the machinery of government.'”' v> Despite the presence of political
parties and elections in Indonesia, the system of parties and corporatist bodies had been
constructed in such a way that they limited rather than met the demands placed on the
state by societal groups."
67
Instead of providing contending packages of policy
proposals that aggregate and represent public interests in their electoral campaigns, they
were unable to exert much influence at any stage of the policy formation process and
050
could not function as partisan veto points on matters that were contested."
Since autonomy of these political institutions and parties was mostly non-
existent during the New Order, influence over the policy process was concentrated
within the structures of the state, and especially the presidency and the person of
Suharto.
260 An important reflection of this is the fact that the main source of executive
action in Indonesia came from decrees issued by the president and not from laws
ratified by the legislature.260 In sum. the channels for broader societal demands had
been extinguished by the combination of a strong executive provided by its constitution
and more importantly, the commandeering of other political institutions to serve the
interests of Suharto and the New Order regime. Indonesia’s political system under the
New Order was therefore, one where power was mainly concentrated in "the person of
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the president rather than in political institutions."
M
Unlike other presidential systems,
the president was the only constitutional veto player in Indonesia.
' "
3.6.2 A Second Veto Player - The Military
There was however, one other significant actor in this authoritarian system - the
military. For many years, ABRI was a vital part of the New Order, maintaining the
regime’s domination over society and supporting its goals. It was however also a
powerful political actor in its own right, wielding tremendous power and authority
through the implementation of its politically interventionist dwifungsi or dual function
doctrine which defined the military’s role as the maintenance of Indonesia's 'political
stability’ through “defending the state and helping to administer it." -0 ' In effect, this
doctrine gave the military a socio-political role in Indonesia and expanded its say in
national and local politics dramatically.
Developed in the chaotic conditions of Sukarno’s rule during the late 1950s and
early 1960s by General A.H. Nasution and in seminars at the Staff and Command
College, dwifungsi was based on the belief that the Indonesian armed forces has “two
closely related roles: to defend the country not only from conventional military threats
originating abroad, but also from domestic dangers of any kind, military, political,
socioeconomic, cultural, or ideological.
”
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Democracy’ period and the 1965 coup attempt provided the basis for sealing the central
role of the military in Indonesian political life with the institutionalization of this
doctrine after the arrival of the New Order.
This was enabled through the placement of active and retired military personnel
throughout the Indonesian political system. Approximately 20 percent of the DPR.
MPR and the regional legislatures were occupied by serving officers who reported
directly to their superiors in the chain of military command. In addition to positions
in the provincial and district administrations, they were also placed in every state
institution ranging from the cabinet to ministries and the diplomatic service."'
1
' They
have also tended to fill pivotal positions in these institutions especially in the areas of
political, legal and security affairs.
By the late 1970s, 78 percent of director-generals and 84 percent of ministerial
secretaries were ABRI appointees."' 7 Military men also formed half the cabinet, over
two-thirds of the regional governorships, and 56 per cent of district officers. In the
foreign service, military officers had been appointed to half of the country’s
ambassadorships by 1977."'
s
While these numbers tended to decline by the 1980s and
1990s with a rise in the number of educated and experienced civilians, key ministries
like the Department of Home Affairs, which was responsible for regional government
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and the surveillance of political and social organizations in the provinces and districts,
stayed in military hands. In 1996, retired or serving officers still held 25 percent of
cabinet appointments and a larger percentage of second-tier ministerial positions.
Almost 50 percent of the most important civilian government positions in the regime -
provincial governorships and district headships - were held by the military .
~
M
The military also played a leading role in Golkar through positions of formal
and informal authority. Moreover, it ensured that "civilian officials carried out their
Golkar assignments, provided security for Golkar campaign events, and obstructed PPP
and PDI meetings and rallies.”'
0
One of the most critical features of the way the military was organized was its
territorial command structure that shadowed the state’s governing structure all the way
from the national to the local levels. This structure divided the country into ten
command zones - four covered densely populated Java alone while the remaining six
encompassed the twenty-two sparsely populated provinces of the outer islands. Each
command w as in turn divided into several layers of subcommand with the lowest of
these matching the government's sub-district, the equivalent of "a township or suburb in
the United States.”" Hence, this command structure enabled the military to be
involved in each level of government either directly or through its parallel system. In
this way, ABRI had considerable influence over a spectrum of decisions at the local
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level ranging from population issues to the production of food and strategic materials.272
Its domination of local politics was made possible by the fact that individuals had to
obtain its permission in order to travel, organize meetings, deliver sermons or issue any
publication.'
7 .
Critically, this territorial command structure, covering as it did the entire
archipelago from Jakarta to villages in its outermost islands, enabled the military to
monitor social and political developments carefully and keep the population under
274
surveillance."
Hence, the military had tremendous structural power in the Indonesian political
system which was derived not only from its monopoly on state coercive power but from
the institutionalization of its participation within the country’s politics and political
processes which stretched all the way down to the village level. ' This sociopolitical
function and its command structure provided it with the basis as well as the means to
function as the other veto point in the system.
3.6.3 The Military and Violent Disengagement
In the immediate months after the fall of Suharto. Indonesia’s highly centralized
political system built during the New Order was coming apart. The disintegration of
this authoritarian structure provided the space for identity contestation to take place as
its only constitutional veto point - President Suharto - had become increasingly
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illegitimate and was ultimately removed from the system. However, the removal of the
heart of the structure and its substitution with a politically weak Habibie left the system
in a state of flux. While it provided the opening for the transition from an authoritarian
regime to a different one and the implementation of new policies, the process of
contestation was also embedded in an extremely uncertain political context - Habibie
was heading what was ultimately a transitional administration albeit one that was in the
process of attempting to fundamentally transform the country’s entire political
architecture from authoritarian rule to a new democracy." While there was general
consensus among a portion of the political elite regarding the need to integrate
democratic ideals into Indonesia’s political culture, identity and institutions most visibly
and perhaps most quickly through reducing the power of the executive branch, giving
the legislature greater power, and political parties freedom and autonomy, the country’s
political institutions had not assumed their proper roles and functions. Moreover, some
political actors were still operating with the political rules and norms of the New Order
as their reference point. In other words, democratic rules and norms had not yet come
to govern the outcomes of political contests for all actors in the system. The military, in
particular, was reluctant to embrace these changes.
Their involvement in the kidnapping, torture and murder of activists in 1997 and
the Trisakti University shootings of 1998 had indeed, begun to turn the tide of public
opinion against them. This had the effect of ensuring that they had no choice but to
accept the need to rethink their political role and the dual function doctrine. Despite
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the push in this direction, discussions and debates held at the Armed Forces Staff and
Command College at Bandung in September 1998 showed that the military was still
resisting their complete withdrawal from politics. While there were differences on this
issue within the organization, its statements stressed what they saw as their continued
responsibility for the welfare of the nation and their right to revert to a ‘security
approach' if the situation warranted it. Throughout 1998 and 1999, “their language
reflected their ongoing preoccupation with stability, unity, order and the dangers of
communism."278 Hence. ABRI continued to resist any changes to their position within
Indonesian politics despite the fact that its dwifungsi doctrine was being assaulted on
different fronts by the reformasi movement. As they resisted these calls for reform,
they were able to retain the main components constituting its structural power, enabling
them to still function autonomously in many ways and remain a veto point.
When Habibie made his decision to allow East Timor to decide its own future,
senior military figures who were present at the cabinet meeting did not lodge much of a
protest against the decision. However, there was a large group of serving and retired
officers who held on to the irreversibility of East Timor’s integration into Indonesia.
These included a number of local military commanders in East Timor as well as active
top-ranking officers like Adam Damiri. commander of the territorial military command
which included East Timor, Lt-General Tyasno Sudarso. head of military intelligence,
as well as Lt-General Zacky Anwar Makarim, former head of BIA." Finally, retired
Bourchier and Hadiz eds. 2001. 280. It was only in 2000 that the military was able
to declare an end to their socio-political role.
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officers including Generals Benny Murdani and Tri Sustrisno, as well as the sacked Lt.
General Prahowo were also known to be part of this faction.
The military, it appears, allowed the vote to take place for a number of reasons.
First, General Tanjung, a very senior military figure in the Habibie cabinet, and
members of the Indonesian intelligence were optimistic that the majority of the East
Timorese favored autonomy and continued integration with Indonesia rather than
independence. Tanjung’s assistant had written in a leaked memo of July 1999 that
initial military estimates had 75 percent of the East Timorese voting in favor of
integration. In military documents discovered by an East Timorese NGO. the
explosion of pro-independence demonstrations attended by tens of thousands of people
after Suharto’s fall were attributed to the "gullibility' and ‘stupidity’ of the East
Timorese public “who had been manipulated by the pro-independence clique during an
economic and political crisis.”'*’ The students and leaders of these demonstrations
were "naughty children' (anak naked) who were venting their frustrations. Ironically.
Indonesia’s leaders were viewing the East Timorese, as Benedict Anderson points out,
“in the way that the Dutch colonizers used to view Indonesians.” Such analyses gave
the military reason to brush aside the real concerns and desires of the East Timorese as
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those of irresponsible and mischievous children who clearly did not know or understand
what they were doing. It also provided them with the conviction that the majority of the
East Timorese were loyal to Indonesia. S(
’
In an analysis that filtered its way up the army hierarchy and became part of a
confidential booklet issued by the intelligence office of military headquarters in Jakarta.
Major General Adam Damiri stated that the militias’ show of force gave the majority of
East Timorese the courage to defy the resistance and become loyal supporters of
->87
Indonesia despite the latter’s intimidation tactics.- This campaign of violence and
intimidation that began in October 1998 and continued until the end of September 1999
was therefore, focused at ensuring that the East Timorese would ultimately remain part
of Indonesia.
The military contravened a decision already undertaken by the civilian head of
the country that providing East Timor with the opportunity to decide its own future was
^88
in the long-run interests of Indonesia. ' A retired general who was close to the center
of army command described Habibie’s policy as a "big blunder” - particularly
noteworthy for revealing the contempt with which these decisions were viewed. ABRI
was thus able to take a path that was separate from that which had already been decided
because of the institutional context of the New Order as well as the chaotic and fluid
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encouraging this campaign.
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Interview with high-ranking (retired) military officer, July 26. 2004.
conditions of the immediate period after the fall of Suharto. Its position within the
Indonesian political system as well as its structural power explains how it had the means
to exercise its veto in the violent manner that it did.
3.7 Conclusion
East Timor’s fate shifted with the rise and fall of contrasting political projects
and identities for Indonesia. During the Suharto period, its narrative of Indonesian
identity was an integral part of the process which constructed communists and
communism as threats to the nation. As long as such threats continued to be part of the
story of Indonesia’s peoplehood. the possibility of change in its East Timor policy was
extremely slim.
During the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, intellectual developments as well as
political and economic changes had gradually widened the gaps between what was
being experienced and the social expectations derived from the New Order’s narrative
of Indonesian identity. These disjunctures created the space available for an alternative
conception of Indonesian identity, one based on the ideals of democracy and the
inclusionary interpretations of Pancasila. to emerge and challenge the New Order’s
construction of Indonesian identity. Due to the fusion of the New Order regime’s
characteristics with Indonesian identity, a successful challenge only took place with the
fall of Suharto in 1998. Critically, the increasing legitimacy of human rights and
democratization during the last half of the 1990s ensured that political reforms geared
towards democracy would follow regime change in Indonesia.
When regime change took place, the fundamental re-organization of Indonesia's
political order and identity in 1998 would have an important impact on East Timor. For
Habibie and bis advisers, it was the need to show the rest of the world that there was a
new and democratic Indonesia afoot which ultimately resulted in the offers of autonomy
and independence. Their actions in turn, underscore the theoretical insight from
Michael Barnett that: 'the attempt to reduce action to either rule-governed action or
strategic behavior might be analytically seductive but it forces false choices and fails to
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recognize what makes social action what it is.”
Finally, the highly centralized nature of Indonesia’s political system created
conditions in which there were only two veto points. Suharto’s demise and the rise of
an unsteady new democracy with the military still present as a significant veto player
ensured that the new identity could not matter in all stages of the passage through which
the policy had to navigate. It enabled the military to veto and openly defy Habibie’s
decision on the East Timor issue, producing a disengagement process that was
unfortunately, noteworthy for its violent and bloody end.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION: IDENTITY, TERRITORIAL DISENGAGEMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
4.1 Introduction
Rather than engaging in making definitive statements or conclusions regarding
invariant cause and effect relations for territorial disengagement that will encompass an
entire universe of cases across time and space, this dissertation has been focused on
investigating identity mechanisms and processes that may be involved in the processes
leading to territorial disengagement. Hence, the discussion in this concluding chapter
will be guided by the following questions. How do identity mechanisms and processes
play a role in territorial disengagement? What do the findings from the preceding two
chapters tell us about the processes involved in territorial disengagement? How do the
findings contribute to our understanding of identity in International Relations?
4.2 Identity and Territorial Disengagement
Identity was central to the actions of elite British and Indonesian policymakers
who supported the changes that would initiate the way to disengagement from India and
East Timor. It was also a critical ingredient to how elite British and Indonesian
policymakers who opposed disengagement understood and approached challenges from
India and East Timor. In both Britain and Indonesia, change in policy took place when
the dominant identity in the colonial or territorial power that had supported the status
quo was successfully challenged and contested by an alternative identity. This
alternative emerged when changing social, economic and political circumstances
234
created increasingly visible gaps between what was being experienced on the ground
and the expectations associated with the dominant identity.
In both cases, identity mechanisms and processes played an important role in
territorial disengagement in three ways. First, identity shaped the form of action and
interaction that were considered "possible, feasible, desirable and efficacious" and
“hence at least by implication what forms of action and interaction would be
impossible, impracticable, undesirable, ineffectual."
1
Secondly, practices that were an
intimate part of the construction, establishment, maintenance and validation of an
identity also affected policies regarding territories. Thirdly, territorial disengagement
was also influenced by the domestic political structures from which a dominant identity
emerges.
In Britain and Indonesia, identity, in providing a basis for seeing the world,
shaped, influenced and constrained responses to challenges to the territorial status quo
by making some actions thinkable and others, unthinkable. The conception of
Britishness that was based in part on the principle of democratic constitutionalism
shaped the response of Stanley Baldwin and the reformers to the issue of constitutional
reforms for India. In particular, it excluded any actions that would contravene and
contradict Baldwin’s conception of Britishness. Significantly, it meant co-operating
with the leadership of the Labor Party who. while not working for the independence of
India, were in favor of these reforms. In Habibie’s Indonesia, the building of a new
Indonesia based on democracy not only made the reconsideration of the country's
policy on East Timor possible but legitimate. Specifically, it was Habibie’s concern
1
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with demonstrating that a democratic Indonesia was afoot that led to policies that were
consistent with this principle. Previously unthinkable policies had become, as Dewi
Fortuna Anwar. Habibie’s unofficial Minister of Foreign Affairs, described it.
“extremely rational.”
Approaches to India and East Timor were also influenced by the very processes
and mechanisms that were necessary to the construction, maintenance and consolidation
of identities in Britain and Indonesia. First, the very processes and mechanisms
involved in the construction of these identities also resulted in the simultaneous
construction of India and East Timor with specific characteristics. This concurrent
construction in turn, influenced Britain’s and Indonesia’s policy towards their territorial
possessions. Second, acting and performing the dominant British and Indonesian
identity also contributed to the initiation of policies that would lead to their
disengagement from India and East Timor.
In Britain, the constitution of the diehards’ conception of Britishness against an
Indian 'Other' resulted in the simultaneous construction of India as a place that was
deeply divided by caste, language and religion, and dominated by centuries of 'barbaric’
customs, traditions and beliefs. This particular construction of India as 'uncivilized'
and inferior ensured that the diehards were unable to recognize Indian calls and desires
for self-determination and independence for what they were. At the same time, the
diehards’ opposition to the proposed constitutional reforms in India was also the result
of their fear that such changes would reduce Britain, as Churchill described it. from a
titan on the world stage to a mere rabbit. Being British was synonymous with political,
economic, social and moral exceptionalism and the passage of constitutional reforms in
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India would be not only be an abrogation of Britain’s destiny, duty and responsibility to
spread civilization and progress throughout the world but a negation of their greatness.
Hence, the importance of practices that were needed for the continued construction and
maintenance of the diehards’ conception of Britishness played a part in their insistence
on maintaining the status quo in British policy towards India.
Processes related to acting and performing an identity for recognition and
validation were also important to Baldwin's support for Indian constitutional reforms.
His support, as discussed earlier, was heavily influenced by the need to demonstrate the
principle of democratic constitutionalism, one of the most important components of
Baldwin's emerging construction of Britishness during a period of tremendous change
and flux for Britain as well as the Conservative Party. The way in which the issue of
India was handled was a crucial part of the process not only to act out this principle of
constitutionalism but in sustaining and garnering recognition that Baldwin's
construction of Britishness was indeed valid.
In Indonesia, processes related to construction, maintenance and consolidation
were also influential in Jakarta's approach to East Timor. During Suharto's New Order,
the construction of an Indonesian identity through narratives of a state in constant peril
also resulted in the simultaneous construction of communists, together with other
groups of differing religious and ideological convictions, as threats to the collectivity.
This specific construction of communists as the most dangerous threat to the safety and
security of all Indonesians resulted in demands for independence from a Freitlin-linked
East Timor to be viewed as illegitimate and a danger to Indonesian security, unity and
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sovereignty. Rather than negotiations, such demands were therefore, met by security
measures and the maintenance of the territorial status quo.
Practices to construct and sustain a particular identity were also a critical
component in Habibie’s offer of special autonomy for East Timor in June 1998 and
later, the offer to allow the East Timorese to decide their own future in an indirect
referendum in January 1999. As discussed earlier. Habibie and his advisers believed,
both in June 1998 and January 1999, that Indonesia had to act in ways that were
consistent with a country that was professing to be on its way to becoming a democratic
nation committed to human rights. The actions they had taken vis-a-vis East Timor was
part of a process to perform Indonesia’s nascent identity as a democracy and to gain
recognition from the rest of the world that there was a new and democratic Indonesia
afoot.
Here, it is interesting to note that the need not only to demonstrate that a
particular identity is real and genuine but for its recognition whether within a domestic
or international context led by both Baldwin and Habibie to support the changes that
would have far-reaching effects in the path to independence for India and East Timor.
This indicates that periods in which a new' or at least ‘newer’ identity has recently
emerged and is therefore, still in need of consolidation and recognition may be
particularly critical for changes regarding territorial policies.
Finally, these cases also point to the need to take the disengaging power's
domestic political system into account in order to fully understand the ways in which
identity is involved in territorial disengagement. In Britain, the bitter and prolonged
contestation over British identity between the reformers and the diehards through the
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question of India was confined only to political avenues that were open to these
opposing groups. The eventual winners, Baldwin and the reformers, were able to
implement the constitutional reforms that would go on to have profound impact on
India's path to independence without any interference from the diehards once the latter
had exhausted all formal political channels open to them. The political contestation
over identity was confined in Britain because its political system only had one veto
player and was parliamentary in nature. The former ensured that disagreements over
identity would not be bogged down in a quagmire as a one veto player system provided
only one place within the system where policies could be contravened or vetoed. The
structural proclivities of the latter gave a parliamentary party tremendous leverage over
its members and ensured that battles within the veto player - during this period in
Britain, the Conservative Party - would be confined to the structural channels of the
party. In the battle of contending identities over the question of India, the British
political system eased the way for Baldwin’s construction of Britishness and the Indian
constitutional reforms which it engendered to carry the day.
In Indonesia however, identity contestation did not remain within normal
political channels but spilled out to result in a violent and bloody disengagement from
East Timor. While it was a political system that was in transition to a democracy, it was
critically, still a system that included the powerful military as one of its two veto
players. The latter, which had held on to the New Order's narrative of Indonesian
identity and a specific construction of the East Timorese, worked to block, compromise
and contravene Habibie’s decision through a different set of measures based on
intimidation and violence to influence East Timor’s ability to decide their own future.
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Hence, Habibie's ability to validate and make real his lofty pronouncements that this
Indonesia was democratic through performing its main features was hampered by a
second veto player in the system. Moreover, the Indonesian military’s lack of regard
for the civilian political structure ensured that its differences with the latter would not
be abandoned even though definitive and final decisions had been made and
implemented.
Besides the need to include identity-related mechanism in analyses of the
processes related to territorial disengagement and decolonization, the findings from this
dissertation also point to the need for caution before making arguments that point to the
sole significance of ideas, norms and principles of democracy, human rights and self-
determination. and relatedly, the humanization of the non-Western ‘Other* in how we
understand the great wave of decolonization that took place in the middle of the
twentieth century when a world of imperial powers and colonies shifted to one of
sovereign states."
In International Relations, recent and well-deserved scholarly attention on these
events and their significance, obscured for decades by the exigencies of the Cold War
and when they were filed away as a class of phenomenon that had passed firmly not
only into the past but irrelevance, had placed them and their relevance in a very
different light. Particularly important at both the empirical and theoretical levels is the
emerging consensus that it was the diffusion and gradual acceptance of norms and ideas
of self-determination and human rights, whether within or across borders, which altered
"Crawford 2002; Lustick 1993; R. Jackson 1998; and Philpott 2001.
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the way states understood their interests and paved the road leading to the end of five
hundred years of colonialism.
Three important observations and theoretical arguments about world politics can
and have been derived from this understanding of how and why decolonization took
place. First, these changes and their underlying basis represent a radical transformation
not only in the geopolitical configurations of world politics but more significantly, in its
normative landscape. Second is the implicit and explicit conclusion in these
explanations that decolonization, in overturning the legality, morality and racial
hierarchy of colonialism, probably represents one of the final stages in a long-term
movement towards moral progress and the gradual humanization of the non-West.
’
Regardless of one’s position on these conclusions, there can be little doubt that
twentieth century decolonization, in overturning the overt hierarchical practices in
world politics that were associated with colonialism, is one of the monster periods in
International Relations and therefore, deserving of much greater attention and analysis. 4
Third is the theoretical argument that it was ideas and norms, and processes rooted in
argument rather than material reasons that were central to one of the most dramatic
shifts in the international politics of the twentieth century.
While ideas, norms and ethical arguments regarding human rights, self-
determination, racial equality and democracy were indeed a very important and
undeniable part of the story, the findings from this dissertation point to other processes
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore 1996; Klotz 1995; Crawford 2002; R.
Jackson 1993; and Keck and Sikkink 1998.
1
1 borrow the term, ‘monster period' from Der Derian 1997.
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and mechanisms that may be at play when states react to challenges from and regarding
colonies and other territorial disputes. Indonesia for example, invaded East Timor in
1975 and remained there for twenty-five years in a period when explicit colonial
practices were condemned internationally and norms of self-determination de rigueur.
Moreover, the tacit support of the U.S.. Britain and Australia for Indonesia’s annexation
of East Timor in 1975 illustrate the highly contingent nature of the international
community’s support for such principles in the modern era. 5 If the normative landscape
had indeed changed, why did Indonesia, a country proud of. and constituted by its anti-
colonial history, annex East Timor and retain it for twenty-four years even in the face of
widespread international condemnation? Why did the U.S., Britain, or Australia
support Indonesia’s actions?
Second, norms and ideas-based explanations, as already discussed in Chapter 1
,
are unable to provide a non-tautological account of norm selection and in doing so. risk
missing out other significant causal mechanisms and processes. For example, norms of
democracy were indeed pertinent and critical in the disengagement process in both
Britain and Indonesia but only as it related to what it meant to be British and
Indonesian. Thus, the concern was not so much for the Indian or the East Timorese but
for the Briton and the Indonesian. Recent case-oriented research on Britain's
decolonization of its colonies across Asia and Africa in the 1950s and 1960s also
support the importance of maintaining a specific British identity as a factor in
explaining the pace, timing and direction of these processes.' In Todd Shepard’s
Simpson (2005: 303).
6
Heinlein 2002.
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brilliant and detailed study of France’s disengagement from Algeria, another frequently
discussed case in decolonization, he has shown that it was French identity that had a
critical role. Moreover, Charles De Gaulle and other elite French policymakers were
far more concerned that Algeria and Algerian Muslims could never be French rather
than with the issue of human rights and self-determination. Ironically, it was the
supporters of a French Algeria who based their arguments on equality and France's
republican values.
Here, let me reiterate that I do not dispute the significance of ideas and norms
principles of democracy, human rights and self-determination in the large wave of
decolonization that took place in the middle of the twentieth century nor their increasing
importance in the current social structure of international politics. However. I do argue
that explanations that are based solely on the suggestion that these norms and ideas
were primarily responsible for how the disengaging or colonial power came to
understand self-determination, sovereignty or the evils of colonialism may miss certain
critical elements in the heart of these colonial empires. In particular, the cases in this
dissertation as well as recent research conducted on British and French decolonization
suggest these ideas and norms may have been embedded in discursive structures,
processes and mechanism of far greater complexity than previously realized and must
be examined for a fuller and more complete understanding of processes that are
involved.
7
Shepard 2006.
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4.3 Identity and International Relations
In this section. I discuss issues and questions regarding identity that were
foregrounded in Chapter 1 in view of the empirical evidence of this dissertation.
Specifically, what are the practices, processes, mechanisms, actors and politics involved
in the construction and contestation of identities? Why does a particular identity matter
at specific periods and not others? How does identity affect or influence politics and
human behavior?
In the matter of where one should focus one’s attention when it comes to the
issue of identity construction, social constructivist theories of identities have been no
different from other approaches in International Relation and more generally, the social
sciences, in having to contend with the levels-of-analysis issue. In Chapter 1. I argued
for treating this as an empirical question that can and should be examined rather than by
starting with a standpoint that prioritizes either the systemic or domestic levels.
Studying the construction of identity in Britain and Indonesia show that neither
the "domestic or international will dominate in the construction of state identity.”
s
For
Britain and Indonesia, identities were constructed both at home and in relation to other
states. In Britain, cultural and political processes at the domestic level sustained the
diehards’ conception of British identity - imperial themes were a vital and intrinsic part
of every day life as well as the high culture of the nation from the eighteenth to the mid-
twentieth centuries. ' At the same time, grand imperial adventures provided the place
and the means for the exceptionalism and greatness that was such an inherent part of
8 Hopf 2002, 289.
'
See Said 1993.
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British identity to be performed and therefore, reconstructed and sustained at the
systemic level.
In Indonesia, conceptions of Indonesian identity based on the ideals of
democracy, openness, human rights and inclusionary interpretations of Pancasila had
been constructed domestically by oppositional groups and academics in the country
through their alternative narrations of Indonesian history. Habibie, when he came into
office, was unable to ride on these groups’ construction of Indonesian identity. His
proclamation that Indonesia was on its way to becoming a democratic country as well as
the political reforms that were being implemented proved insufficient. For them,
recognition from the international community and subsequent social interactions based
on this self-understanding was especially important in order for them to begin to
validate and establish this identity. East Timor became a means for this new identity to
be performed.
In addition, the findings from these two cases also indicate that identity can be
constructed in a variety of ways within the same country and even within the same
period. In Britain, the diehards’ construction of British greatness was constructed
against an Indian 'Other’ while Baldwin constructed an identity for Britain through
organizing and connecting places, people and events into a coherent story regarding the
timeless character of Britishness. Indonesian identity was constructed during the
Suharto regime from a narrative that drew on past historical events which were pulled
together into a story of how Indonesia and Indonesians became a people. Within this
narrative, Indonesian identity was also often contrasted and constructed not only against
the Communist ‘Other’ but against its historical past. Habibie and his colleagues built
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on new narratives of Indonesian-ness that drew on reinterpretations of 1950s and 1960s
Indonesian history and the reprioritization of the anti-colonial component of their
founding. Thus, both the narrativization of identity and the construction of the Self
against an Other were involved at different times in both cases examined here. These
cases support Ted Hopfs findings and arguments that prioritizing one mechanism over
another may again “capture only a small part of empirical reality and so should not be
treated unproblematically as universally valid a priori assumptions on which to build
meaningful theories of identity.’ 1
”
The empirical findings from this dissertation also indicate that human agency
and politics are very much involved in the construction of identities. In Britain.
Baldwin was particularly significant in promulgating a particular vision of Britishness
that was based on harmony, unity, tranquility, moderation and democratic
constitutionalism during the Interwar period. Baldwin’s actions were however, driven
in part by British politics as well as that of the Conservative Party. Fears that the
turbulent changes in the political landscape would render the Conservative Party
irrelevant and more importantly, divide Britain and destroy its social and political
cohesion were the twin forces that kept him focused on constructing a Britain and a
British identity based on democratic constitutionalism.
Human agency and politics were no less significant in the construction of a new
Indonesian identity after the fall of Suharto. Intellectual developments as well as the
conscious efforts of academics, students and other activists had interjected an
alternative narrative of Indonesian history and nationhood in the country’s political
Hopf 2002. 263.
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discourse in the late 1980s and 1990s. When Suharto's regime collapsed and
democracy was the only game left in town. Habibie and his advisers did not only initiate
a series of domestic political reforms but offered East Timor autonomy and later, the
option of independence. These policy changes can be viewed as the conscious efforts
of actors who were acting strategically to convince the rest of the world that the
Indonesia under Habibie was in fact a new and democratic Indonesia and no longer the
Indonesia of old.
Therefore, constructivist theorizing that begin and end with the construction of
identities from discourses fail to recognize that actors have agency and can engage in
practices that are geared towards the promotion and consolidation of re-inscribed
identities. Such an oversocialized view of actors portrays them as marionettes under the
control of larger social structures and neglects the possibility that human agency may
have a hand in the construction of our cultural landscapes.
While my project highlights the role of human agency, this is however, not to
say that structures do not play a role in the construction and constitution of identities.
Actors who are attempting to construct an identity are also embedded in normative
structures and are sometimes circumscribed by them. For example. Habibie's actions to
perform and act out an Indonesian identity that was democratic vis-a-vis changes to
their East Timor policy, while strategic at one level, must also be situated within what
these elite policymakers understood to be an international social structure where norms
of democracy and human rights were hegemonic.
Finally, this dissertation points to two main ways in which identity works its
way into human action. The first, already demonstrated in many constructivist
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analyses, point to the way in which "identity provides a set of parameters within which
certain practices and actions are possible, while others are not.” 11 The second is rooted
in the relationship between the importance of practices and actions in the consolidation
and validation of an identity, important parts of a process that will "determine whether
identity shall congeal around certain ideas or evolve.” 1 '
Both the constraining and enabling effects of identity were apparent during the
Suharto period when identity narratives based on continuing threats to the unity and
security of the nation influenced "the cognitive scripts, categories and rationalities that
are indispensable for social action.”
1
1
In particular, the construction of an Indonesia
that was perpetually vulnerable to the dangers from communists influenced and
severely limited its understanding of the East Timorese independence and resistance,
relegating it to the realm of security 'threat' and the corresponding intelligence and
military measures to contain, defuse or eliminate it.
The second and perhaps less discussed way in which identity makes its way into
human action is through actions or practices that are tied to defending, consolidating or
validating an identity. These actions, in defense of "persons we want to be"'
4
were an
important part of the identity mechanism that formed a critical component in processes
that were initiated by Baldwin and the reformers in Britain in regard to constitutional
reforms for India, as well as Habibie and his advisers in their re-evaluation of the place
1
1
Goff and Dunn 2004, 244.
12
Goff and Dunn 2004. 244.
13 Goff and Dunn 2004. 244.
14
Ringmar 1996, 3.
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of East Timor in the Republic of Indonesia. Besides pointing to the way in which
identity mechanisms have a part in action, these examples also underscore that it is not
“only words or ideas, but also the actions and practices that enact the idea, make it
knowable." 15
Lastly, these findings also raise a number of issues that should be examined
before we can have a better overall understanding of how identity affects international
relations. Some of these questions that can form areas for further research in the area of
identity include the following: Can we isolate a range of constitutive practices and
agents in the construction of identities? Is an ‘Other’, like some have argued, a
necessary part of identity formation, as some have argued ? If so, how and where do
identity narratives fall within this mechanism? Is the ‘Other' always in oppositional
form? What alternative forms can it assume and how does it have an impact on human
action and behavior? If identities are constructed against an 'Other' and through
narratives, what is the relationship between identity formation and security in countries
that are in the process of nation- and state-building? How can we better understand the
processes involved in the co-constitution of identities?
In summary, this dissertation, while making no claims to definitive conclusions
regarding identity since it is an area where there is still much left to grasp, does
however, add to. and support a small but growing body of literature on identity and
international relations which are ontologically built on several of the following
propositions regarding the nature of identity and the mechanisms and processes that are
involved in its construction, maintenance and change. First, identities are constructed at
15 Goff and Dunn 2004, 242.
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both the domestic as well as the international levels. Second, identities are constructed
against an Other, and through narratives. Third, identities do not acquire ‘substance’
once they have been constructed. Rather they are continually constituted by processes,
relations and practices as identities are defined, recognized and validated in an actor’s
interaction with and in relationship to others. Identities are thus fundamentally social
and relational. 16 This characteristic of identity has in turn, important consequences for
how we understand the way in which identity influences human actions. While identity
enables or constrains actions since it is in knowing who we are that we can know what
we want, it also influences human actions that come from the need to act out or perform
who we are or who we say we want to be that are necessary in the process of becoming.
16
Mattern 2005. 9.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adam, C.F. 1948. Life ofLord Lloyd. London: Macmillan.
Alagappa. M. 1995(a). “The Anatomy of Legitimacy” in M. Alagappa (ed.). Political
Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authorin'. Palo Alto:
Stanford University Press.
Alagappa, M. 1995(b). “The Bases of Legitimacy" in M. Alagappa (ed.). Political
Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authorin'. Palo Alto:
Stanford University Press.
Alagappa. M. 1995(c). “Contestation and Crisis” in M. Alagappa (ed.). Political
Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority. Palo Alto:
Stanford University Press.
Alatas. Ali. 2006. The Pebble in the Shoe. The Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor.
Jakarta: Aksara Karunia.
Ambrosio, Thomas. 2002. “East Timor Independence: The Changing Nature of
International Independence." R. Compton (ed.). Transforming East Asian
Domestic and International Politics: the Impact ofEconomy and Globalization.
Aldershot: Burlington.
Anderson, Benedict. 2001. “Imagining East Timor,” Lusotopie 2001: 233-239
—
.
1999. “Indonesian Nationalism. Today and In the Future,” New Left Review , no.235:
3-17.
—
. 1991 . Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism. London: Verso.
Anderson, Benedict and Ruth McVey. 1971. A Preliminary Analysis of the Coup
Attempt of the October I, 1965 Coup in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University
Modern Indonesia Project.
Anwar. Dewi Fortuna. 2000. “The East Timor Crisis: an Indonesian View”. Bruce
Brown (ed). East Timor- the Consequences. Wellington: The New Zealand
Institute of International Affairs.
—
.
1998. "Indonesia: Domestic Priorities Define National Security,” Muthiah Alagappa
(ed), Asian Security' Practice. Material and Ideational Influences. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Anwar. Dewi Fortuna. 1996. Indonesia's Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional,
Wawasan Nusantara and Hakamrata. Brisbane: Griffith University.
Aspinall. Edward and Mark T Berger. 2001. "The Break-up of Indonesia? Nationalisms
after decolonisation and the limits of the nation-state in post-cold war Southeast
Asia.” Third World Quarterly
,
v.22. no.6: 1003-1024.
Aspinall. Edward. H. Feith and G. van Klinken (eds). 1999. The Last Days of President
Suharto. Clayton. Victoria: Monash Asia Institute.
Aspinall. Edward. 1996. "The Broadening Base of Political Opposition in Indonesia,”
Garry Rodan (ed). Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia. London:
Routledge.
Ayoob. Mohammed. 1991. “The Security Problematic of the Third World.” World
Politics. V.43. No. 2: 257-83.
Baldwin. Stanley. 1926. On England And Other Addresses. Freeport. NY: Books for
Libraries Press (1971 reprint).
Ball. Desmond. 2001. "Silent Witness. Australian Intelligence and East Timor,” Pacific
Review
,
v.14, no.l: 35-62.
Ball. Stuart. 1988. Baldwin and the Conservative Party. The Crisis of1929-1931
.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Barnett. Michael. 1999. “Culture. Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to
Oslo,” European Journal of International Relations , v. 5. no. 1 : 5-36.
—
. 1998. Dialogues in Arab Politics. Negotiations in Regional Order. NY: Columbia
University Press.
Barth. Frederik. 1969. “Introduction,” Frederik Barth (ed.). Ethnic Groups and
Boundaries. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
Behnke, A. 2001. “Grand Theory In the Age of its Impossibility: Contemplations on
Alexander Wendt,” Cooperation and Conflict, v.36. no.l: 121-134.
Beissinger. Mark. 1998. “Nationalisms that bark and nationalisms that bite: Ernest
Gellner and the substantiation of nations,” John A. Hall (ed.). The State of the
Nation. Ernest Gellner and the Theory ofNationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bennett, Andrew and Alexander George. 1997. "Lost in Translation: Big (N)
Misinterpretations of Case Study Research”. Paper presented at International
Studies Association.
Berger, Mark T. 1997. “Old State and New Empire in Indonesia: Debating the Rise and
Decline of Suharto’s New Order,” Third World Quarterly
,
v.18. no. 2: 321-361.
Bertrand, Jacques. 2004. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage Publications.
Blustein, Paul. 2001. The Chastening. Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global
Financial System and that Humbled the IMF. NY: Public Affairs.
Bourchier, D. 1998. “Totalitarianism and the “National Personality”: Recent
Controversy about the Philosophical Basis of the Indonesian State,” J. Schiller
and B. Martin-Schiller ( eds. ). Imagining Indonesia: Cultural Politics and
Poltical Culture. Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies.
Bourchier, D. and Vedi R. Hadiz (eds). 2001. Indonesian Politics and Society. A
Reader. London: Routledge Curzon.
Bourchier, D. and John Legge (eds). 1994. Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s.
Clayton. Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.
Boyce. D George. 1999. Decolonisation and the British Empire. NY: St Martin's Press.
Brasted. H.V. and Carl Bridge. 1994. 'The Transfer of Power in South Asia: An
Historiographical Review,” in South Asia , vol. XVII. no.l: 93-1 14.
Brasted. H.V. and Carl Bridge. 1990. 15 August 1947: Labour’s Parting Gift to
India," in Jim Masselas (ed), India. Creating a New Nation. New Delhi:
Sterling Publishers.
Brasted. H.V. and Carl Bridge. 1988. "The British Labour Party and Indian
Nationalism, 1907-1947,” South Asia. v. XI. no. 2: 69-100.
Brasted, H.V. and Carl Bridge. 1989. “The British Labour Party “Nabobs” and Indian
Reform, 1924-1931,” The Journal of Commonwealth and Imperial History,
v.17, no. 3: 396-412.
Brasted, H.V. and Carl Bridge. 1987. “Labour and the Transfer of Power in India: A
Case for Reappraisal?,” hulo-British Review, v.12: 70-90.
Bridge, Carl. 1987. “Churchill and Indian Political Lreedom: The Diehards and the
1935 Act,” Indo-British Review, v.13, no:2: 26-30.
Bridge, Carl. 1986. Holding India to the Empire. The British Conservative Party and
the 1935 Constitution. London: Oriental University Press.
253
Bridge, Carl. 1976. ‘Conservatism and Indian Reform ( 1929-30): Towards a
Prerequisities Model in Imperial Constitution-Making,' Journal ofImperial and
Commonwealth History
\
v.4. no.??:
Brooks, David. 1995. The Age of Upheaval: Edwardian Politics, 1899-1914.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Brooks, Karen. 1995. ‘"The Rustle of Ghosts: Bung Kamo in the New Order.”
Indonesia , v. 60: 61-100.
Brown, David. 2002. “Why Might Constructed Nationalist and Ethnic Ideologies Come
into Confrontation With Each Other?” The Pacific Review , v.15. no.4: 555-570.
Brown, J. 1998. “India.” J. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, The Oxford History' of the
British Empire. Volume IV: The Twentieth Century. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Brown, Judith. 1994. Modern India. The Origins ofan Asian Democracy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. 2 nd edition.
Brubaker. R. 1998. “Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism,” John A.
Hall (ed.). The State of the Nation. Ernest Gellner and the Theory of
Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—
. 1996. Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brubaker. R. and F. Cooper. 2000. “Beyond Identity,” Theory' and Society', v.29: 1-47.
Bubandt. Nils. 2005. “Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in Global,
National and Local Worlds,” Security Dialogue , v. 36. no. 3: 275-296.
Budianta. Melani. 2000. “Discourse of cultural identity in Indonesia During the 1997-
1998 Monetary Crisis,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, v.l. no.l: 109-128.
Bukovansky, Mlada. 1997. “American Identity and Neutral Rights, from Independence
to the War of 1812,” International Organization, v.51. no. 2: 209-243.
Butler. David. 1986. Governing Without a Majority. Dilemmasfor Hung Parliaments
in Britain. London: Macmillan Press.
Cabral, E. 2000. "The Indonesian Propaganda War Against East Timor in Paul
Hainsworth and Stephen McCluskey (eds.). The East Timor Question. London:
IB Tauris.
254
Campbell, David. 1999. Writing Security
,
2
nd
Edition. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Carey, Peter and G. Carter Bentley (eds.) 1995. East Timor at the Crossroads: The
Forging ofa Nation. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Cerulo, Karen A. 1997. “Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions,” Annual
Review of Sociology, v. 23: 385-409.
Chalk. Peter. 2001. “Australia and Indonesia: Rebuilding Relations After East Timor,”
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal ofInternational and Strategic Affairs.
v. 23, no. 2:
Chandra, S and Douglas Kammen. 2002. "Generating Reforms and Reforming
Generations. Military Politics in Indonesia’s Democratic Transition and
Consolidation,” World Politics, v. 55: 96-136.
Checkel. Jeffrey. 1998. “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,”
World Politics
,
v.50, no. 2: 324-348.
Churchill. Winston. 1931. India. Speeches and an Introduction. London: Thornton
Butterworth Ltd.
Close, D. 1977. "The Collapse of Resistance to Democracy: Conservatives, Adult
Suffrage and Second Chamber Reform. 191 1-1928,” The Historical Journal,
v.20, no.4: 893-918.
Colley, Linda, “Britishness and Otherness: An Argument” in Journal of British Studies.
v. 31, no.4 (October 1992): 309-329.
—
. 1992. Britons. Forging the Nation. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Collier, David. 1993. “The Comparative Method.” in Ada Finifter (ed.). Political
Science: the State of the Discipline . APSA.
Connolly, William E. 1991. Identity/Difference. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Connors, Richard. 2001. “Protestantism and National Identity,” Canadian Journal of
History, v.36, no.l (April): 85-108.
Cook, Chris. 1975. The Age ofAlignment. Electoral Politics in Britain, 1922-1929.
London: Macmillan.
255
Cooper. Frederick and Laura Stoler. 1997. "Between Metropole and Colony. Rethinking
a Research Agenda.” Frederick Cooper and Laura Stoler (eds.). Tensions of
Empire. Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Cotton. James. 2001. “'Part of the Indonesian World’: lessons in East Timor policy-
making, 1974-76,” Australian Journal ofInternational Affairs, v.55. no. 2: 1 19-
131.
Cotton. James. 2000. "The Emergence of an Independent East Timor: National and
Regional Challenges,” Contemporary Southeast Asia , v.22, no. 1 : 1 -22.
Crawford, Neta. 2002. Argument and Change in World Politics. Ethics, Decolonization
and Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—
. 1993. "Decolonization as an International Norm: The Evolution of Practices,
Arguments and Beliefs” in Laura Reed and C. Kaysen (eds.). Emerging Norms
ofJustified Intervention. Cambridge. MA: Committee on International Studies,
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Cribb. Robert. 2002. "From Total People’s Defence to Massacre. Explaining Indonesian
Military Violence in East Timor.” F. Colombijn and J.Thomas Lindblad (eds).
Roots of Violence in Indonesia. Leiden: KITLV Press.
—
. 2001. “Genocide in Indonesia, 1965-1966,” Journal of Genocide Research, v. 3,
no.2: 219-239.
—
.
1999. “Nation: Making Indonesia,” in Donald K. Emmerson ( ed. ). Indonesia
Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society' in Transition. Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe.
Croft, Henry Page. 1948. My Life of Strife. London: Hutchinson.
—
. 1934. India: The Conservative Case. Bournemouth.
Crouch. Harold. 2000. “The TNI and East Timor Policy,” James J. Fox and Dionisio
Bebe Soares (eds). Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction ofEast
Timor. Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing.
—
. 1999. “Wiranto and Habibie: military-civilian relations since May 1998" in A.
Budiman. Barbara Hartley and D. Kingsbury (eds), Reformcisi: Crisis and
Change in Indonesia. Clayton. Victoria: Monash Asia Institute.
—
. 1979. “Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia.” World Politics
,
v. 31: 57 1 -
587.
256
—
. 1978. The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca: NY: Cornell University Press.
Cunningham, Hugh. 1986. “The Conservative Party and Patriotism,” in Robert Colls
and Philip Dodds (eds), Englishness. Politics and Culture, 1880-1920. Kent:
Croom Helm.
Dake, C. 1973. In the spirit ofRed Banteng: Indonesian Communists Between Moscow
and Peking. The Hague: Mouton.
Dassel, Kurt. 1997. “Domestic Instability, the Military and Foreign Policy: Indonesia,
1956-71.” Miriam Fendius Elman (ed). Paths to Peace. Is Democracy the
Answer? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Davis, Norman. 1999. The Isles: A History. Basingstoke: Macmillian.
Der Derian, James. 1997. “Post-theory: the eternal return of Ethics in International
Relations.” Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.). New Thinking in
International Relations Theory. Boulder. CO: Westview Press.
Djiwandono, Joseph Soedradjad. 2005. Bank Indonesia and the Crisis: An Insider's
View. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Doty. Roxanne. 2000. "Desire All the Way Down.” Review of International Studies, v.
26: 137-139.
Doty. Roxanne. 1996. Imperial Encounters. The Politics ofRepresentation in North-
South Relations. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Drakeley. S. 2000. Lubang Buaya: Myth. Misogyny and Massacre. Victoria. Australia:
Monash Asia Institute.
Dunn, Kevin C. 2004. "Narrating Identity: Constructing the Congo During the 1960s
Crisis,” Patricia M.Goff and Kevin C. Dunn (ed.). Identity and Global Politics.
Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
—
. 2003. Imagining the Congo. The International Relations of Identity. NY:
Pal graveMacm i 1 1 an
.
Dunn. James. 2002. “Crimes Against Humanity in East Timor. January to October
1999: Their Nature and Causes,” Hamish McDonald et al. Masters of Terror.
Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999. Canberra: Australian
National University.
Editors, “Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: January 1, 1999 - January 31,
200 1 ” Indonesia, 71 (April 2001): 135-173.
257
Eklof, Stefan. 1999. Indonesian Politics in Crisis. The Long Fall of Suharto, 1996-98.
Copenhagen: NIAS.
Eley, Geoff and Ronald Grigor Suny. 1996. “Introduction: From the Moment of Social
History to the Work of Cultural Representation,” Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor
Suny (eds.). Becoming National. A Reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fearon. James D. and David Laitin. 2000. “Violence and the Social Construction of
Ethnic Identity," International Organization, 54. 4: 845-877.
Feith. Herbert and L. Castles. 1970. Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca. NY:
Cornell University Press.
Finnemore. Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change,” International Organization, v.52, no. 4: 887-917.
Friedberg. Aaron L. 1988. The Weary Titan. Britain and the Experience of Relative
Decline, 1895-1905. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fukuda, Chisako M. 2000. “Peace Through Non-Violent Action: The East Timorese
Resistance Movement’s Strategy for Engagement,” Pacifica Review, v.12. no. 1:
1 7-30.
Gallagher, J.A. 1982. “The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire.” in A. Seal
(ed.) The Ford Lectures and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Gallagher. John and Ronald Robinson. 1953. “The Imperialism of Free Trade."
Economic History Review. 2d ser., 6. 1 : 1-15.
Ganesan. Narayanan. 1998. “Singapore: Realist cum Trading State.” M. Alagappa (ed.),
Asian Securin' Practice. Material and Ideational Influences. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Geddes, Barbara. 1990. “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get:
Selection Bias in Comparative Politics,” in James Stimson (ed.). Political
Analysis, volume 2. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press.
George. A. and T.J. McKeown. 1985. “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational
Decision-Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, vol.
2. Santa Barbara: JAI Press.
258
Ghosh. S.C. 1972. Decision-making Power in the British Conservative Party. A Study of
the Indian Problem
,
1929-1934. Calcutta: Oceania Publishing House.
Gilbert. Martin. 1976. Winston S. Churchill. Volume V: 1922-1939. London:
Heinemann.
Goff. Patricia M. and Kevin C. Dunn (ed. ). 2004. Identity and Global Politics.
Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Goh, Evelyn. 2005. Constructing the U.S Rapproachment with China, 1961-1974.
From 'Red Menace' to 'Tacit Ally'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goldstein, Judith and Robert Keohane. 1993. "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical
Framework,” Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.). Ideas, and
Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Goodfellow, Rob. 1995. Api Dalam Sekam: The New Order and the Ideology ofAnti-
Communism. Monash University: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies.
Gorjao, Paulo. 2002. “Regime Change and Foreign Policy: Portugal, Indonesia and the
Self-Determination of East Timor,” Democratization
.
v.9, no.4: 142-158
—
,
2001. “The End of a Cycle: Australian and Portuguese Foreign Policies and the
Fate of East Timor,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, v.23: 101- 121
.
Greenlees, Don and Robert Gamut. 2002. Deliverance. The Inside Story of East Timor's
Eightfor Freedom. NSW. Australia: Allen and Unwin.
Gries. Peter Hays. 2004. China ’s New Nationalism. Pride, Politics and Diplomacy.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Grimal, Henri. 1978. Decolonization: The British, French, Dutch and Belgian Empires,
1919-1963. London: Macmillan.
Gupta, P.S. 1975. Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964. New
York: Holmes and Meier Publishers.
Haas, Ernst. 1993. “Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction,” Millennium,
v.22, no. 3: 505-45.
Haas, Peter (ed.). 1992/1996. Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Co-
ordination. Columbus: University of South Carolina.
Halifax, Earl. 1957. Fulness ofDays. London: Collins.
259
Haseman. John B. 2000. "East Timor: The Misuse of Military Power and Misplaced
Military Pride.” James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares (eds). Out of the Ashes.
Destruction and Reconstruction ofEast Timor. Adelaide: Crawford House
Publishing.
Heinlein. Frank. 2002. British Government Policy and Decolonization, 1945-1963:
Scrutinizing the Official Mind. London: Frank Cass Publishing.
Herman, Robert. 1996. Ideas, Identity and the Redefinition of Interests: The Political
and Intellectual Origins of the Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution. Ph.D
Dissertation. Cornell University.
Heryanto. Ariel. 2006. State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia. London:
Routledge.
—
. 1999. “Where Communism Never Dies,” International Journal of Cultural Studies .
v.2. no. 2: 147-77.
—
. 1996. “Indonesian Middle-Class Opposition in the 1990s,” in Garry Rodan (ed).
Political Oppositions in Industrializing Asia. London: Routledge.
Hikam, Muhmmad Altho'illah Shohibul. 1995. The State, Grass-roots Politics and Civil
Society: A Society of Social Movements Under Indonesia's New Order ( 1989-
1994). (Ph.D Dissertation: University of Hawaii)
Hill, Hal (ed.). 1994. Indonesia's New Order. The Dynamics ofSocioEconomic
Transformation. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Hill. Helen M. 2004. Stirrings ofNationalism in East Timor. Ereitlin 1974-1978. The
Origins, Ideologies and Strategies ofa Nationalist Movement. Sydney:
Contemporary Otford Press.
Hobsbawm, Eric. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth,
Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hodgkin, T. 1956. Nationalism in Colonial Africa. NY: New York University Press.
Hogg. Michael A. and D. Abrams. 1988. Social Identifications. Social Psychology of
Intergroup Relations and Group Processes. London: Routledge.
Holland. R.F. 1991. The Pursuit of Greatness. Britain and the World Role (London:
Fontana Press.
260
Holtzappel. C. 1997. “Nationalism and Cultural Identity,” in Michael Hitchcock and
Victor T. King (eds). Images ofMalay-Indonesian Identity. Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press.
Honna, Jun. 2003. Military' Politics and Democratization in Indonesia. London:
Routledge Curzon.
—
. 2001. "Military Ideology in Response to Democratic Pressure During the Late
Soeharto Era,” Benedict Anderson (ed). Violence and the State in Suharto's
Indonesia. Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press.
Hopf, Ted. 2002. Social Construction ofInternational Politics. Identities and Foreign
Policies, Moscow, 1955 <£ 1999. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
Hosen. N. 2003. “Indonesian Political Laws in Habibie Era: Between Political Struggle
and Law Reform,” Nordic Journal ofInternational Law , v.72, no.4: 483-518.
Howe, Stephen. 1993. Anticolonialism in British Politics. The Left and the End of
Empire, 19 IS- 1964. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Howkins, Alun. 1986. “The Discovery of Rural England,” Robert Colls and Philip
Dodds (eds), Englishness. Politics and Culture, 1880-1920. Kent: Croom Helm.
Hutchins, Francis G. 1967. The Illusion ofPermanence. British Imperialism in India.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
Jackson, Karl D. 1978. 'Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis
of Power and Communications in Indonesia,” in Karl Jackson and Lucian Pye
(eds.). Political Power and Commutations in Indonesia. Berkeley. CA: Univ of
California Press.
Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006. Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and
the Invention of the West. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 1999. “Civilization' on Trial,” Millennium, v.28, no.l: 141-
153.
Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus and Daniel H. Nexon. 1999. “Relations Before States:
Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics,” European Journal of
International Relations
,
v.5, no. 3: 291-332.
Jackson, Robert. 1998. “The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in
International Relations" in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds.). Ideas
and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change. NY: Columbia
University Press.
261
James. Robert Rhodes. 1970. Churchill. A Study in Failure. 1900-1939. London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Jardine, Matthew. 1998. "Power and Principle in East Timor,” Peace Review, 10, no. 2:
195-202.
Jarvis, David. 1997. “The Shaping of Conservative Electoral Hegemony. 1918-39,” J.
Lawrence and M. Taylor (eds.). Parts\ State and Society. Electoral Behaviour in
Britain since 1820. London: Scolar Press.
Jarvis, David. 1996. "British Conservatism and Class Politics in the 1920s,” The
English Historical Review, v. 1 1 1, no. 440: 59-84.
Jarvis. D. 1991
. Stanley Baldwin and the Ideology of the Conservative Response to
Socialism. 1918-1931. Lancaster University. Ph.D Dissertation.
Jenkins, David. 1984. Suharto and His Generals. Indonesian Militaiy Politics 1975-
1983. Ithaca. NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
Jenkins, R. 1996. Social Identities. London: Routledge.
Jetschke, Anja. 1999. “Linking the Unlinkable? International Norms and Nationalism
in Indonesia and Philippines,” Thomas Risse. Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn
Sikkink (eds). The Power ofHuman Rights: International Norms and Domestic
Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Jones, Thomas. 1954. Diary with Letters. 1931-1950. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Juoro, Umar. 1998. “Indonesia," W. Sachsenroder and U. Flings (eds.). Political Party
Systems and Democratic Development in East and Southeast Asia. Volume I:
Southeast Asia. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Kahler. Miles. 1986. Decolonization in Britain and France. The Domestic
Consequences ofInternational Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kammen, Douglas. 2001. “The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military,
Paramilitaries, and the Final Solution in East Timor,” Benedict Anderson(ed),
Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia. Ithaca. NY: Cornell University
Press.
Katzenstein. Peter. 1996a. "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National
Security,” Peter Katzenstein (ed). The Culture ofNational Securin'. Norms and
Identity in World Politics. NY: Columbia University Press.
262
1996b. Cultural Norms and National Securityh Police and Military in Postwar
Japan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
and N. Okawara. 1993. “Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and
Policies,” International Security
,
v.17, no.4 (Spring): 84-1 18.
Kebbel.T.E. ed., 1882. Selected Speeches of the Earl of Beaconfield. Volume II.
London.
Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders. Ithaca. NY:
Cornell University Press.
Kennedy, Paul. 1989. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. NY: Random House.
Kier, Elizabeth. 1997. Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between
the Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kiernan, V. 1974. Marxism and Imperialism. London: Edward Arnold.
Kingsbury, Damien. 2003. Power Politics and the Indonesian Military. NY:
RoutledgeCurzon.
—
. 2002. The Politics of Indonesia. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
Kivimaki, Timo. 2003. U.S. -Indonesian Hegemonic Bargaining. Strength of Weakness.
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing.
Klein, Kerwin Lee. 2000. “On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse,”
Representations , no. 69: 129-150.
Klotz, Audie. 1998. Norms in International relations. The Struggle Against Apartheid
Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press.
Kowert. P and J. Legro. 1996. "Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretieal
Reprise,” in Peter Katzenstein (ed). The Culture ofNational Security\ Norms
and Identity in World Politics. NY: Columbia University Press.
Krishnan, Kumar. 2003. The Making ofEnglish National Identity. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Kumar, Ann. 2003. “The State and the Status of the Nation. A Historical Viewpoint,”
D. Kingsbury and H. Aveling (eds). Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia.
NY: RoutledgeCurzon.
Laffey, Mark. 2000. “Locating Identity: Performativity, Foreign Policy and State
Action,” Review of International Studies , v.26: 429-444.
263
Lament. M. and M. Volnar. 2002. “The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences,”
Annual Review ofSociology, v. 28: 167-195.
Langston. Emily. 2001. Producing the Ideal National Citizen: An Analysis ofLanguage,
Power and the Individual in New Order Indonesia. Working Paper 1 1 5.
Clayton. Australia: Monash University Press.
Lawrence. J. and M. Taylor. 1997. "Introduction: Electoral Sociology and the
Historians,” J. Lawrence and M. Taylor (eds.). Party, State and Society.
Electoral Behaviour in Britain since 1820. London: Scolar Press.
Lavbourn. Keith ( ed. ). 1999. Modern Britain Since 1906. A Reader. London: IB Tauris.
Lee. Yong Wook. 2006. Japan and the Asian Monetary Fund: An Identity-Intention
Approach. International Studies Quarterly
,
v. 50: 339-366.
Leifer. Michael. 1983. Indonesia's Foreign Policy. London: GeorgeAllen & Unwin.
Leigh. Barbara. 1991. “Making the Indonesian State: the Role of School Texts,” Review
ofIndonesian and Malaysian Affairs, v.25. no.l: 17-43.
Legro. Jeffrey. 2005. Rethinking the World. Great Power Strategies and International
Order. Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press.
Levy. Jack S. 1994. "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,”
International Organization, v. 48. no. 2: 279-312.
Liddle. R. William. 2002. “Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing By the Rules,”
Andrew Reynolds (ed.). The Architecture ofDemocracy. Constitutional Design,
Conflict Management, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
. 1999. “Regime: The New Order,” Donald K. Emmerson (ed.). Indonesia Beyond
Suharto. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
—
. 1992. “Indonesia's Democratic Past and Future,” in Comparative Politics, v.24:
443-62.
Lloyd, Grayson J. 2000. 'The Diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United Nations
and the International Community," James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares
(eds). Out of the Ashes. Destruction and Reconstruction ofEast Timor.
Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing.
Low. D.A. 1997. Britain and Indian Nationalism. The Imprint Ambiguity 1929-1942
Cambridge. UK : Cambridge University Press.
264
Low, D.A. 1982. “The Asian Minor to Tropical Africa’s Independence,” Prosser
Gifford and Win Roger Louis (eds.). The Transfer ofPower in Africa:
Decolonization
,
1940-1960. New Haven: Yale University Press.
—
. 1973. Lion Rampant. Essays in the Study of British Imperialism. London: Cass.
Louis, William R (ed.). 1976. Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy.
NY: New Viewpoints.
Lustick, lan. 1993. Unsettled Lands. Disputed States. Britain and Ireland. France and
Algeria. Israel and the West Bank-Gaza. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
. 1996. “History, Historiography and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records
and the Problem of Selection Bias,” American Political Science Review
,
v.90,
no. 3: 605-618.
Lynch, Philip. 1999. The Politics ofNationhood: Sovereignly, Britishness and
Conservative Party. NY: St Martin’s Press.
Macintyre, Andrew. 2003. The Power of Institutions. Political Architecture and
Governance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
—
. 1999. “Indonesia,” Ian Marsh, J. Blondel and T. Inoguchi (eds.). Democracy,
Governance, and Economic Performance: East and Southeast Asia. Tokyo:
United Nations University Press.
Marker, Jamsheed. 2003. East Timor. A Memoir of the Negotiationsfor Independence
Jefferson: McFarland and Co, Inc Publishers.
Mattern. Janice Bially. 2005. Ordering International Politics. Identity’, Crisis and
Representational Force. New York: Routledge.
Maynard. Harold Ward. 1976. A Comparison ofMilitary Elite Role Perceptions in
Indonesia and the Philippines. American University, Ph.D Dissertation.
McCrillis, N. 1998. The British Conservative Party' in the Age of Universal Suffrage.
Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
McDonald, Hamish et al, 2002. Masters of Terror. Indonesia's Military and Violence in
East Timor in 1999. Canberra: Australian National University.
McFarling, Ian. 1996. The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Military
Politics in Indonesia. Canberra: Australian Defence Forces.
265
McGregor, Katherine. 2002. Claiming History: Military 1 Representations of the
Indonesian Past in Museums
,
Monuments, and Other Sources of Official History
from Guided Democracy to the New Order. PhD Dissertation. University of
Melbourne.
—
. 2002a. “Commemoration of 1 October, “Hari Kesaktian Pancasila”: A Post
Mortem Analysis?” Asian Studies Review
,
v. 26. no.l: 39-72.
McKibbin, Ross. 1990. The Ideologies of Class. Social Relations in Britain, 1880-
1950. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
McRae. D. 2002. 'A Discourse on Separatists,” Indonesia . v.74: 37-58.
—
. 2000. ‘A Discourse on Separatists’ Downloaded from www.papuaweb.org
Mearsheimer, John. 1990. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold
War" International Security. 15. 1:5-56.
Metcalf. B. and T.R. Metcalf. 2002. A Concise History of India. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Middlemas, Keith and John Barnes. 1969. Baldwin. A Biography. London: Weidenfield
and Nicolson.
Moore. R.J. 1988. Endgames of Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moore. R.J. 1983. Escapefrom Empire .Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Moore. Samuel. 2001. “The Indonesian Military’s Last Years in East Timor: An
Analysis of its Secret Documents, ” Indonesia, 72 (October): 9-44.
Muldoon. Andrew. 2003. “’An Unholy Row in Lancashire’: the Textile Lobby,
Conservative Politics and Indian Policy, 1931-1935.” Twentieth Century British
History
,
v.14, no.2: 93-1 11.
Naipospos, Coki. 2000. “East Timor in the Dynamics of Indonesian Politics," Bulletin
of Concerned Asian Scholars, v. 32. nos. 1 and 2: 87-90.
Nathan. K.S. 1998. “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation,” M. Alagappa (ed .). Asian
Security Practice. Material and Ideational Influences. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Neumann, Iver. 2004. "Deep Structure. Free-Floating Signifier, or Something in
Between? Europe's Alterity in Putin’s Russia,” Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C.
Dunn (ed.). 2004. Identity and Global Politics. Empirical and Theoretical
Elaborations. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
266
Neumann, Iver. 1999. Uses of the Other: “The East ” in European Identity Formation.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Nevins, Joseph. 2005. A Not-So-Distant Horror. Mass Violence in East Timor. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Nye Jr., Joseph S. 1987. “Nuclear Learning and U.S. -Soviet Security Regimes.”
International Organization , v.41, no. 3: 371-402.
Owen, Nicholas. 2003. “The Conservative Party and Indian Independence, 1945-1947.”
The Historical Journal , v. 46, no. 2: 403-436.
—
. 2002. “The Cripps Mission of 1942: A Reinterpretation,” The Journal ofImperial
and Commonwealth History
,
v. 30, no.l: 61-98.
—
. 1998. “Critics of Empire,” Judith Brown and Wnt Roger Louis (eds.). The Oxford
History 1 of the British Empire. Volume IV: The Twentieth Century. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Pasic, Sujata Chakrabarti. 1996. "Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for
Extension,” Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.). Return of Culture and
Identity in IR Theory
\
Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Peele, G. 1975, “Revolt Over India,” G. Peele and C. Cook (eds). 1975. The Politics of
Reappraisal 1918-1939. NY: St Martin's Press.
Philpott, Daniel. 2001 . Revolutions in Sovereignty. How Ideas Shaped Modern
International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Philpott. Simon. 2003. ‘The Natural Order of Things: From Lazy Natives to Political
Science,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies , v.4, no. 2: 249-63.
Phoenix, Ann. 1998. “Dealing with Difference: The Recursive and the New,” Ethnic
and Racial Studies
,
v.21, no. 5 (September 1998): 859-880.
Price, Richard and C. Reus-Smit. 1998. “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International
Theory and Constructivism,” European Journal of International Relations , v.4.
no.3:259-294.
Pugh, Martin. 2004. “Lancashire, Cotton, and Indian Reform: Conservative
Controversies in the 1930s,” Twentieth Century British History , v.15, no 2: 143-
151.
—
. 1999. State and Society. A Social and Political History ofBritain, 1870-1997.
London: Arnold. 2nd edition.
267
—
. 1993. The Making ofModern British Politics, 1867-1939. London: Blackwell, 2"'
1
edition.
—
. 1992. "Lessons of ’31,” Times Literary> Supplement , 4 September 1992.
Potts. Alex. 1989. "’Constable Country’ Between the Wars,” Raphael Samuel (ed).
Patriotism, Volume 3. London: Routledge.
Powell. David. 2002. Nationhood and Identity. The British State Since 1800. London:
IB Tauris.
—
. 1996. The Edwardian Crisis: Britain, 1901-14. NY: St. Martin's Press.
Ramage, Douglas E. 1997. Politics in Indonesia. Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of
Tolerance. London: Routledge.
Reid. Anthony and David Marr (eds.) 1979. Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia.
Singapore: Heinemann.
Rich. Paul. 1988. "British Imperial Decline and the Forging of English Patriotic
Memory, cl 91 8- 1968" in History ofEuropean Ideas . vol.9. no. 6: 659-680.
Ringmar, Erik. 1996. Identity, Interest and Action. A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s
Intervention in the Thirty Years War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Risse. Thomas. 2000. ""Let’s Argue!” Communicative Action in World Politics.”
International Organization
.
v.54. no. 1: 1-54.
Risse. Thomas, S. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.) 1999. The Power ofHuman Rights.
Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Press.
Robb. P.G. 1976. The Government ofIndia and Reform: Policies Towards Politics and
Constitution, 1916-1927. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Robertson-Snape, Fiona. 1999. “Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism in Indonesia,”
Third World Quality/, v.20, no. 3: 589-602.
Robinson, Geoffrey. 2002. "The Fruitless Search for a Smoking Gun” F. Colombijn and
J. Thomas Lindblad (eds). Roots of Violence in Indonesia. Leiden: K1TLV
Press.
Robinson. Ronald E. 1972. "The Non-European Foundations of European
Imperialism,” in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.). Studies in the Theory' of
Imperialism. London: Longman.
268
Robison. Richard and Vedi R. Hadiz. 2004. Reorganizing Power in Indonesia. The
Polities of Oligarchy in an Age ofMarkets. London. NY: RoutledgeCurzon.
Roosa. John. 2003. “Violence and the Suharto Regime’s Wonderland,” Critical Asian
Studies
.
v.35. no.2: 315-323.
Rubin, Robert. 2003. In an Uncertain World. Tough Choices from Wall Street to
Washington. NY: Random House.
Rubinstein. William D. 2003. Twentieth-Century Britain. A Political History. London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Ruggie, John. 1998. “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and
the Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization , v.52. no.4:
855-885.
—
. 1996. Winning the Peace. America and World Order in the New Era. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Rumelili, B. 2004. “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding
the EU's Mode of Differentiation,” Review of International Studies , v.30: 27-47.
Said, Edward. 1993. Culture and Imperialism. NY: Knopf.
Said, Edward. 1994/1978. Orientalism. NY: Vintage Books.
Said. Salim. 1991. Genesis ofPower. General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military
in Politics, 1945-49. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Schmitz. Hans Peter. 2004. “Domestic and Transnational Perspectives on
Democratization,” International Studies Review , v.6, no. 3: 403-426.
Schreiner, K. 2002. “’National Ancestors’: The Ritual Construction of Nationhood,”
Henri Chambert-Loir and Anthony Reid (eds.). The Potent Dead: Ancestors,
Saints and Heroes in Contemporary Indonesia. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
Schreiner, K. 1997. “History in the Showcase: The Representation of National History
in Indonesian Museums,” J. Sri Kuhnt-Saptodewo, V.Grabowski and M.
GroBheim (eds.). Nationalism and Cultural Revival in Southeast Asia:
Perspectivesfrom the Centre and the Region. Weisbaden: Harrassowitz.
Schwarz, Adam. 2000. “Introduction: The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia," Adam
Schwarz and Jonathan Paris (eds). The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia. NY:
Council of Foreign Relations Press.
269
Schwarz, Adam. 1999. A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability. 2 ni1 Ed.
Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Schwarz, Bill. 1999. “Philosophies of the Conservative Nation: Burke. Macaulay, and
Disraeli,” Journal ofHistorical Sociology, v. 12. no. 3: 183-217.
Schwarz, Bill. 1984. “The Language of Constitutionalism: Baldwinite Conservatism."
Formations ofNation and People (London: Routledge Kegan & Paul.
Sian. Nicholas. 1996. “The Construction of a National Identity" in Martin Francis and
Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds). The Conservatives and British Society. J880-
1990. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
Seal. Anil. 1968. The Emergence ofIndian Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Sen, Krishna and David Hill. 2000. Media
,
Culture and Politics in Indonesia.
Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
Sen. Krishna. 1988. “Filming ‘History’ Under the New Order." in Krisha Sen (ed.).
Histories and Stories: Cinema in New Order Indonesia. Clayton: Monash
University.
Shiraishi, T. 2000, “The Indonesian Military in Politics" Adam Schwarz and Jonathan
Paiis (eds.). The Politics ofPost-Suharto Indonesia. NY: Council of Foreign
Relations Press.
Shepard. Todd. 2006. The Invention ofDecolonization. The Algerian War and the
Remaking of France. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Simpson, Brad. 2005. “'Illegally and Beautifully’: The United States, the Indonesian
Invasion of East Timor and the International Community, 1974-76,” Cold War
History\ v.5. no. 3: 281-315.
Singh. Bilveer. 2000. Habibie and the Democratization of Indonesia. Sydney: Book
House.
Smart, Nick. 1999. The National Government, 1931-40. London: Macmillan Press.
Smith. Dennis. 1986. “Englishness and the Liberal Inheritance After 1886” in Robert
Colls and Philip Dodds (eds). Englishness. Politics and Culture
,
1880-1920.
Kent: Croom Helm.
Smith. Gary and M. Muetzelfeldt. 2000. "Global Governance and Strategies for Civil
Society,” Pacific Review, v. 12. no.3: 265-279.
270
Smith. Rogers. 2003. Stories ofPeoplehood. The Politics and Morals of Political
Membership. NY: Cambridge University Press.
Smith. Rogers, “Beyond Tocqueville. Myrdal and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in
America.” American Political Science Review, v.87, no. 3 (September 1993):
549-566.
Snyder. Jack. 1991. Myths of Empire. Domestic Politics and International Ambition
Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press.
. 2000. From Voting to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. NY:
WW Norton.
Somers, Margaret R. and Gloria D. Gibson. 1994. “Reclaiming the Epistemological
"Other': Narrative and the Social Constitution of Identity.” Craig Calhoun (ed.).
Social Theory' and the Politics ofIdentity. Oxford. UK: Blackwell.
Somers, Margaret. 1994. “The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and
Network Approach,” Theory> and Society
\
v.23: 605-649.
Spruyt, H. 2005. Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty' and Territorial Partition.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
—
. 2000. “The End of Empire and the Extension of the Westphalian System: The
Normative Basis of the Modern State Order,” International Studies Review, v 2.
no.2 (2000): 65-92.
Stevenson. J. and C. Cook. 1994. Britain in the Depression: Society and Politics, 1929-
1939. London: Longman.
Stewart, G. 2001. Burying Caesar. The Churchill-Chamberlain Rivalry. Woodstock.
NY: The Overlook Press.
Studdert-Kennedy, Gerald. 1998. Providence and the Raj. Imperial Mission and
Missionary Imperialism. Walnut Creek. CA: AltaMira Press.
Sukma, Rizal. 1999. Indonesia and China: the Politics ofa Troubled Relationship.
London: Routledge.
Sundhaussen, Ulf. 1982. The Road to Power. Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967.
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
Suryadinata, Leo. 1996. Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto. Aspiring to
International Leadership. Singapore: Times Academic Press.
271
Tajfel, H and J.C. Turner. 1985. “The Social Identity of Intergroup Behavior,” S.
Worchel (ed.). Psychology ofIntergroup Relations. Chicago: NelsonHall.
Tanter. Richard. 2001. Intelligence Agencies and Third World Militarization: A Case
Study of Indonesia. PhD Dissertation. Monash University.
Tanter. Richard. 2000. “East Timor and the Crisis of the Indonesian Intelligence State.”
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars , v.32, nos. 1/2: 73-82.
Tanter. Richard. M. Selden and Stephen R. Shalom. 2000. "East Timor Faces the
Future,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars , v.32. nos. 1/2: 1 13-124.
Taylor. John. 2003. “’Encirclement and Annihilation’: The Indonesian Occupation of
East Timor.” Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (eds). The Specter of Genocide.
Mass Murder in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Taylor. John. 1999. East Timor. The Price ofFreedom. London: Zed Books.
Thayer, Carlyle. 1999. Australia-Indonesia Relations: The Case of East Timor. Paper
presented at International Conference on Australian and East Asian Security into
the 21
s1
Century. Taipei. Taiwan.
Tichenor, Daniel J. 2002. Dividing Lines. The Politics ofImmigration Control in
America Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tilly. Charles. 2002. Stories, Identities and Political Change. Lanham, Md: Rowman
and Littlefield.
—
. 1997. “Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology,” Comparative Social
Research, v.16: 43-54.
—
. 1995. "To Explain Political Process,” American Journal ofSociology, v.100, no.
6
(May): 1594-1610.
Todorov, T. 1982. The Conquest ofAmerica. The Question of the Other. NY: Harper
Perrenial.
Tomlinson. B.R. 1976. The Indian National Congress and the Raj. London: Macmillan.
Uhlin. Anders. 1997. Indonesia and the Third Wave ofDemocratization. The
Indonesian pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World. NY: St Martin’s
Press.
Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca.
NY: Cornell University Press.
072
Van Klinken, Gerry. 2005. “The Battle for History After Suharto,” Mary Zurbuchen
(ed.). Beginning to Remember. The Past in the Indonesian Present. Singapore:
Singapore University Press.
van Langenberg, Michael. 1988. “Analysing Indonesia's New Order State: A Keywords
Approach,” Review ofIndonesian and Malaysian Affairs , v. 20, no. 2: 1-47.
—
. 1990. “The New Order State: Language, Ideology, Hegemony,” A. Budiman (ed.).
State and Civil Society; in Indonesia. Clayton. Victoria, Australia: Centre of
Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.
Vatikiotis, Michael R.J. 1998. Indonesian Politics Under Suharto. The Rise and Fed! of
the New Order. New York: Routledge.
—
. 1998a, “The Military and Democracy in Indonesia,” in R.J. May and V. Selochan
(eds). The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific. Adelaide: Crawford
House Publishing.
Veerathappa, K. 1976. British Conservative Party and Indian Independence, 1930-
1947. New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House.
Wallace, William. 1991. “Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom.”
International Affairs, v.67, no.l (January): 65-80.
Wallenstein, Immanuel. 1961. Africa: The Politics of Independence. New York:
Vintage Books.
Ward, E. and Peter Carey. 2001 . “The East Timor Issue in the Context of EU-
Indonesian Relations, 1975-1999," Indonesia and the Malay World, v.29. no.
83: 51-74.
Ward, Paul. 2004. Britishness Since 1870. London: Routledge.
Waters, Chris. 1997. “'Dark Strangers’ in Our Midst: Discourses of Race and Nation in
Britain, 1947-1963,” Journal ofBritish Studies, v. 36. no.2 (April): 207-238.
Way. Wendy (ed.). 2000. Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese
Timor
,
1974-1976. Documents on Australian Foreign Policy. Victoria,
Australia: Melbourne University Press.
Wellings. Ben. 2002. “Empire-Nation: National And Imperial Discourses In England,”
Nations And Nationalism, V.8, No.l: 95-109.
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. NY: Cambridge
University Press.
273
Wertheim, W.F. 1970. 'Suharto and the Untung Coup - The Missing Link." Journal of
Contemporary Asia, no.l: 50-57.
Wiener. Martin. 1981. English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-
1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wieringa, Saskia. 1998. 'Sexual Metapohors in the Change from Soekarno's Old Order
to Soeharto’s New Order in Indonesia,” Review of Indonesian and Malaysian
Affairs, v.32, no.2: 143-78.
Williamson. Philip and Edward Baldwin (eds). 2004. Baldwin Papers. A Conservative
Statesman. 1908-1947. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williamson, Philip. 1999. Stanley Baldwin. Conservative Leadership and National
Values. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—
. 1993. "The Doctrinal Politics of Stanley Baldwin”, Michael Bentley (ed). Public
and Private Doctrine: Essays in British History Presented to Maurice Cowling.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—
. 1992. National Crisis and National Government. British Politics, the Economy, and
Empire, 1926-1932. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wolfers, Arnold. 1962. Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Zehfuss, Maja. 2002. Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality.
NY: Cambridge University Press.
—
. 2001. “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison,” European Journal of
International Relations
,
v.7: 315-48.
Zertal. Idith. 2005. Israel's Holocaust and the Politics ofNationhood. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Zurbuchen, Mary. 2005. "Historical Memory in Contemporary Indonesia,” Mary
Zurbuchen (ed.). Beginning to Remember. The Past in the Indonesian Present.
Singapore: Singapore University Press.
Newspapers
Angkatan Bersenjata
Berita Buana
The Jakarta Post
274
Kompas
Republikka
Tempo
Primary Documents
Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform , Volume I (Part I).
London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1934.
Proceedings of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform /Session 1933-
34/, Volume I (Part II). London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1934.
House ofCommons Debates
British National Archives, CAB 27/520. Cabinet Committee on India ( 16 March 193
12 February 1935).
275






